Dr S Kulshrestha

Introduction

The advent of hypersonic weapons signifies a significant advancement in military technology, like the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles during the Cold War. These weapons, characterised by their capacity to maintain flight at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (approximately 6,174 km/h or 3,836 mph at sea level), combine extraordinary speed with manoeuvrability, presenting challenges to existing defence systems and influencing strategic planning (Congressional Budget Office, 2023).

The contemporary hypersonic arms race is centred on two categories of weapons: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs). HGVs are propelled by ballistic missile boosters, achieving hypersonic velocities before detaching and gliding unpowered through the atmosphere while performing complex manoeuvres, whereas, HCMs employ air-breathing propulsion systems, such as scramjets, to sustain continuous hypersonic flight throughout their missions (National Institute for Defence Studies, 2024).

This paper provides an examination of hypersonic weapon systems by analysing their technical design features, operational capabilities, national development initiatives, and strategic implications. The analysis is based on open-source intelligence, government documents, and technical literature to provide an exhaustive evaluation of this transformative technology. The scope encompasses both the engineering challenges that have been addressed and those that remain, as well as the operational and strategic contexts in which these weapons are deployed.

Technical Design and Engineering Challenges

Aerodynamic Design Principles

The aerodynamic design of hypersonic weapons presents unique engineering challenges that are distinct from those of subsonic/supersonic aircraft and traditional ballistic missiles. At hypersonic speeds, the airflow behaviour is dominated by high-temperature gas effects, chemical reactions, and nonequilibrium thermodynamics, which fundamentally alter the conventional aerodynamic assumptions (Patsnap Eureka, 2025).

HGVs utilise lifting-body configurations optimised for high lift-to-drag ratios during atmospheric gliding. The DF-ZF (China) and C-HGB (United States) feature wedge-shaped or conical aeroshell designs that generate sufficient lift to maintain the altitude while allowing lateral manoeuvrability. These designs must balance competing requirements, such as adequate lift for an extended range, minimal drag to preserve speed, and sufficient control authority for terminal manoeuvring (Jamestown Foundation, 2016). 

DF-ZF (China): This vehicle is frequently described as having a lifting body or waverider design. Its wedge-like, flatter aeroshell is designed to harness the shockwaves produced during flight to create lift, thereby greatly enhancing its range and ability to manoeuvre across different trajectories. 

C-HGB (United States): This model is characterised by a slender, bi-conical, or tri-conical form instead of a flat wedge. Its conical, axisymmetric aeroshell is designed for high manoeuvrability, with a strong emphasis on aerodynamic stability and thermal management, drawing its lineage from earlier U.S. experimental re-entry vehicles.

The management of shock waves is a critical design consideration. At hypersonic speeds, strong shock waves form at the leading edges, creating areas of extremely high pressure and temperature. Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulations, validated through wind tunnel testing and flight experiments, guide the shaping of vehicle surfaces to manage shock interactions and minimise aerodynamic heating. The interaction between aerodynamics and vehicle dynamics becomes particularly complex during a manoeuvring flight, where changes in the angle of attack alter the entire flow field (University of Notre Dame Hyperlab, 2024).

Thermal Protection Systems

Thermal management is the most formidable challenge in the design of hypersonic weapons. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, aerodynamic heating generates surface temperatures above 2,000 °C (3,632 °F), with peak temperatures at the leading edges and nose sections reaching 3,000 °C (5,432 °F) during prolonged flights (Congressional Budget Office, 2023).

Carbon-carbon (C/C) composites are the best materials for high-temperature areas. They remain strong in extreme heat and are lightweight. The Space Shuttle used these materials for heat protection, demonstrating their effectiveness; however, hypersonic weapons require even tougher materials because they fly longer in the atmosphere (NASA, 2008). Ultra-High-Temperature Ceramics (UHTCs), such as zirconium diboride (ZrB2) and hafnium diboride (HfB2), are other options for parts such as leading edges and nose caps. These materials resist oxidation and heat well but are brittle, making them difficult to use. Ceramic Matrix Composites (CMCs), especially silicon carbide fibre-reinforced silicon carbide (SiC/SiC), work well under high heat and are less likely to break (Nature Communications, 2024). Ablative thermal protection systems, such as phenolic-impregnated carbon ablator (PICA), are efficient in areas with extreme heat conditions. They absorb heat by breaking down but can only be used once; therefore, they are disposable and suitable for use in weapons (MDPI Polymers, 2025).

Propulsion

Scramjet Technology helps hypersonic missiles fly by compressing air with shock waves, mixing it with fuel, and burning it at high speeds. This method does not require complex machinery, making it simpler and lighter for speeds over Mach 5 (Johns Hopkins APL, 2005). The main challenge is burning fuel quickly because air moves through the engine rapidly at Mach 6. This is like "keeping a match lit in a hurricane" (Congressional Budget Office, 2023). Hydrocarbon fuels, such as JP-7 and JP-10, are practical but burn slower than hydrogen. The X-51A Waverider showed scramjet flight for about 200 seconds in 2010, paving the way for future weapons. Current projects, such as the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) and Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Ship Missile (HALO), build on these successes while solving integration issues (Forecast International, 2025).

Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) need rocket boosters to reach high speeds for gliding. Two-stage solid rocket motors are optimal for ground and sea launches because they are powerful, easy to store, and simple to use. The U.S. Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) and the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) use a common booster for launching from ships, submarines, and ground launchers (Defence Security Monitor, 2025). Air-launched HGVs, such as the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), use smaller boosters for bombers and fighter jets. These systems trade range for flexibility, allowing for quick deployment in different situations. Despite these challenges, the ARRW program successfully tested boosters in 2022, proving that air-launched systems also work (National Institute for Defence Studies, 2024).

Navigation, Guidance, and Onboard Computing

Inertial Navigation Systems

Hypersonic weapons employ Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) to ascertain their position during flight. INS utilises precise instruments, such as gyroscopes and accelerometers, to measure movement and rotation, and integrates these data to determine velocity and position. This method remains effective even when external signals are obstructed, such as during plasma blackouts that affect radio-based systems during hypersonic travel (SIPRI, 2022). Ring Laser Gyroscopes (RLGs) and Fiber Optic Gyroscopes (FOGs) are essential for detecting rotation in these scenarios. They exhibit remarkable stability, with errors as minimal as 0.001 deg per hour, thereby facilitating accurate weapon targeting. Accelerometers, such as those composed of quartz and silicon, measure linear motion with exceptional precision (Pugwash Foundation, 2020).

GPS Integration and Plasma Effects

The integration of the Global Positioning System (GPS) enhances navigation accuracy when signals are accessible. However, the plasma layer surrounding hypersonic vehicles can obstruct GPS signals; this plasma consists of charged air particles and free electrons that attenuate signals, particularly those below a specific frequency (Defence Technical Information Center, 2005). Recent research indicates that modifying vehicle shapes and employing specialised materials can mitigate plasma effects, enabling GPS signal penetration. Additionally, robust antennas and advanced signal processing facilitate signal reception during partial blackouts. The combination of GPS with INS using Kalman filtering maintains navigation accuracy even when GPS is intermittently available (Genesys Defence, 2025).

Onboard Computing Architectures

Hypersonic weapons encounter challenging conditions that constrain onboard computing systems. Temperatures can exceed 200 °C, and the high forces experienced during manoeuvres necessitate specialised hardware. Radiation-resistant processors, high-temperature electronics, and durable packaging provide the requisite computing power for guidance and control (Pugwash Foundation 2020). The application of neural networks represents a novel approach for enhancing guidance and flight control. Machine learning can adapt to unforeseen conditions and optimise trajectories in real time to extend the range, reduce thermal loads, or evade defences. These strategies leverage the increasing computational capabilities of aerospace systems (SIPRI 2022).

Target Detection, Acquisition, and Attack Sensor Systems and Seeker Technologies

For terminal guidance, hypersonic weapons employ multiple sensors to identify targets despite their defences and obstacles. Radio Frequency (RF) seekers, such as radars, operate under all weather conditions and possess long ranges. However, plasma effects can degrade the RF sensor performance during high-speed flight (Genesys Defence, 2025). Infrared (IR) seekers offer precision and resistance to electronic interference; however, they encounter challenges from the heat of the vehicle and atmospheric effects. Advanced seekers utilize multiple IR wavelengths to differentiate targets from complex backgrounds. The integration of RF and IR sensors with fusion algorithms enhances the system performance and reliability (Raytheon, 2024).

Kill Chain Dynamics

The deployment of hypersonic weapons encompasses several critical stages, including detection, tracking, targeting, engagement, and outcome assessment. These stages are executed within minutes because the rapid velocity of hypersonic systems necessitates expedited decision-making and advanced control mechanisms (Joint Advanced Warfighting School 2023). Prior to launch, intelligence and surveillance operations identify target locations and assess the defensive measures. Planning systems then determine the optimal flight trajectories, considering potential threats and terrain features. During flight, hypersonic weapons adhere to predetermined paths but can be adjusted based on updated targeting information (Northrop Grumman, 2026). In the terminal phase of the attack, these weapons employ sharp manoeuvres to evade defences and achieve precise target engagement. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) can move laterally over extensive distances, rendering them unpredictable and challenging to intercept. Their velocity and manoeuvrability significantly complicate defensive efforts (Wikipedia 2025).

Warhead Design and Explosive Effectiveness

Conventional Warhead Configurations

Hypersonic weapon warheads leverage high-speed impacts to enhance their destructive potential. At velocities exceeding Mach 5, the kinetic impact can surpass the efficacy of traditional explosives, allowing for reduced explosive payloads while maintaining their effectiveness. This capability facilitates the penetration of fortified targets and minimises collateral damage compared to slower weapon systems (Congressional Budget Office, 2023). Penetrator warheads are engineered with robust casings and specialised geometries to engage subterranean and reinforced targets. Hypersonic speeds enable penetration depths exceeding 10 m in concrete. Blast-fragmentation warheads are optimised for extensive area effects on soft targets, utilising high-speed impact to amplify the blast pressure (Defence Security Monitor, 2025).

Nano energetic materials (nEMs) are revolutionising the capabilities of hypersonic warheads by employing ultrafine fuel and oxidiser powders. These materials enhance the reactive surface area, resulting in much higher energy densities and faster reaction rates compared to traditional explosives. This allows substantial structural damage without increasing the payload weight or size. Key Advantages of nEMs in Hypersonic Warheads:

Mass-to-Destruction Multiplier: Hypersonic missiles depend on immense kinetic energy to breach heavily fortified targets, making warhead space and weight critical constraints in their design. nEMs offer explosive power that far surpasses that of conventional materials within the same volume.

Tailored Reaction Rates: The combustion efficiency and energy release rate of nEMs can be adjusted at the molecular level. This enables warheads to decide whether to deliver explosive energy as a rapid, high-pressure shock wave for deep penetration or as prolonged heat and gas for maximum incendiary impact.

Enhanced Insensitivity: Despite their high reactivity, many nEM composites show reduced mechanical sensitivity, meaning they are less likely to accidentally detonate owing to friction, impact, or the intense aerodynamic vibrations of Mach 5+ flight compared with traditional microsized formulations.

Operational Applications

Kinetic Energy Penetrators: Incorporating nEMs into the tips of kinetic energy penetrators allows the warhead to pierce through hardened bunkers before detonation, creating a combined kinetic and chemical breach.

Reactive Material (RM) Warheads: When hypersonic fragments or fragments infused with nEMs hit a target, the impact triggers an intense, localised energy release. This transforms kinetic fragmentation into extremely hot incendiary reactions capable of destroying unarmoured vehicles or detonating secondary fuel or ammunition supplies within the target.

Miniaturised Initiation: The high surface-to-volume ratio of nEMs is crucial for micro-electro-explosive devices (MEEDs), enabling the safe, precise, and instantaneous initiation of complex multi-stage warheads.

Nuclear Warhead Integration

Russia and China are integrating nuclear warheads with hypersonic systems, thereby altering their strategic implications. The Russian Avangard HGV, equipped with a 2-megaton nuclear warhead, can achieve speeds of Mach 20, circumvent existing missile defences while traversing vast distances (National Institute for Defence Studies 2024). The dual capability to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads introduces ambiguity, complicating the identification of the warhead type in flight. This ambiguity reduces decision-making timeframes and increases the risk of inadvertent conflict. Such uncertainty poses significant challenges to arms control and strategic stability (Congressional Research Service 2025).

Country-Wise Development Status

United States

The United States is advancing hypersonic weapon development in its various military branches. The Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) underwent its inaugural test in December 2024, employing the Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) with a two-stage booster. The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program also utilises the C-HGB and is progressing towards integration with Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines (Defence Security Monitor, 2025).

The United States Air Force's Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) initiative, awarded to Raytheon, is projected to become operational by 2027. This project employs scramjet engines to facilitate rapid deployment from aircraft, distinguishing it from the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), which has encountered developmental challenges (Popular Mechanics 2026). Concurrently, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is advancing hypersonic technology through initiatives such as the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) and Tactical Boost Glide (TBG), which emphasise scramjet propulsion, thermal protection, and guidance systems for hypersonic vehicles. The fiscal year 2026 budget allocates approximately $2.1 billion to hypersonic projects, underscoring their strategic significance (Forecast International, 2025). 

Russia

Russia possesses several advanced hypersonic systems. The Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV), deployed on SS-19 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), became operational in December 2019 with the 13th Guards Rocket Division at Dombarovsky. Russia claims that Avangard can achieve speeds of Mach 20 and evade missile-defence systems (National Institute for Defence Studies, 2024). The 3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon) missile exemplifies Russia's scramjet capabilities, reaching speeds of Mach 9 and ranges exceeding 1,000 km. Tests conducted between 2021 and 2022 demonstrated its sea-launch capabilities. President Putin announced the induction of Zircon into the Navy in July 2022, although its current operational status remains uncertain (National Institute for Defence Studies 2024). The Kinzhal (Dagger) missile, although not a true hypersonic glide vehicle, attains hypersonic speeds during its terminal phase and has been deployed in Ukraine, providing empirical data on hypersonic weaponry and defence systems (WION, 2025).

China

China is recognised as a leader in hypersonic technology, demonstrated by the DF-17 missile, which carries the DF-ZF glide vehicle, which was showcased during the 2019 military parade. The DF-ZF can reach speeds between Mach 5 and 10 and circumvent regional defence systems, with a range of 1,800 to 2,500 km, targeting areas such as Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea (Jamestown Foundation, 2016). China's hypersonic test in August 2021, which involved a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) and a glide vehicle, raised significant concerns owing to its demonstrated capability to strike the United States from the southern hemisphere, thereby bypassing the northern defence systems. General Mark Milley described the test as alarming and indicative of China's rapid technological advancements (National Institute for Defence Studies, 2024). The Starry Sky-2 (Xing Kong-2) represents China's waverider-type missile, achieving Mach 6 in tests. China's hypersonic program encompasses glide vehicles, cruise missiles, and supporting technologies, such as wind tunnels (AIVON, 2025).

Other Nations

India is advancing the development of a Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) in collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Successful tests conducted in 2020 and 2023 demonstrated the effective operation of scramjet engines. Additionally, India is collaborating with Russia on hypersonic cruise missiles while simultaneously enhancing its capabilities (WION, 2025). 

France's V-max program conducted its inaugural flight test in June 2023 to gather data for future advancements, underscoring the significance of hypersonic technology in its defence strategy. In July 2023, the United Kingdom established a dedicated department for hypersonic technology, with plans to allocate contracts worth up to GBP 1 billion over seven years (AIVON, 2025). 

Australia is partnering with the United States in the SCIFiRE program and leveraging its robust aerospace research expertise. 

Japan's HVGP program aims to achieve operational readiness by 2030 to safeguard its remote islands. 

North Korea claims to have tested hypersonic missiles, although Western experts are sceptical about their full capabilities (WION, 2025). 

Testing and Evaluation of Hypersonic Weapons

The development of hypersonic weapons necessitates extensive testing, which is challenging because of the extreme conditions involved. Ground test facilities, such as wind tunnels, aid but cannot fully replicate real flight conditions, as they offer only short test durations, which limits long-duration flight testing (Johns Hopkins APL, 2005). Flight tests are essential but entail significant expenses and complexity, requiring extensive preparation, including safety checks and data collection. Initial tests often encounter failures, as evidenced by the U.S. X-51A program, which achieved approximately 50% success, compared to China's DF-ZF, which attained about 83% success (Jamestown Foundation, 2016). 

Computer modelling and simulation are increasingly pivotal in hypersonic development, enabling virtual testing prior to expensive flight tests. Advances in simulation tools have enhanced engineers' ability to predict performance; however, the intricate nature of hypersonic flows continues to challenge these tools (Patsnap Eureka, 2025). Model-based systems engineering is employed to manage the complexity of hypersonic weapon development, facilitating the integration of subsystems and optimising performance prior to physical testing. The Mayhem program, led by Leidos with support from Draper Laboratory and the University of Michigan, utilises virtual ecosystems for hypersonic designs (AIVON, 2025).

Cost Considerations and Industrial Base

The development and procurement of hypersonic weapons entail significant financial expenditure, influencing program planning and military organizational structures. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the cost of each hypersonic weapon system ranges from $10 million to $30 million, depending on its design and production volume. These costs exceed those of conventional cruise missiles, which are priced between $1 million and $3 million. Nonetheless, hypersonic weapons possess unique capabilities that conventional systems lack (Congressional Budget Office 2023). The hypersonic industry requires specialised expertise in high-temperature materials, precision manufacturing, advanced propulsion systems, and system integration. Sustaining this industry requires ongoing investment in research, testing, and workforce training. Over time, the number of companies capable of managing hypersonic programs has diminished, potentially leading to production delays (Congressional Research Service 2025). International collaboration can facilitate cost- and risk-sharing and expedite development. The United States and Japan are collaborating on the Glide Phase Interceptor, with Japan concentrating on engine development and the United States focusing on system integration and technology. Similar partnerships with Australia, the United Kingdom, and other nations are under consideration to leverage each country's strengths and distribute the development responsibilities (Raytheon, 2024).

Future Developments

The field of hypersonic weapons is rapidly evolving, with emerging trends shaping their future trajectory. Rotating Detonation Engine (RDE) technology has the potential to enhance the fuel efficiency and power of hypersonic missiles. DARPA's Gambit program, led by Raytheon, is investigating RDE for air-launched weapons, which could result in smaller and more advanced hypersonic weapons (AIVON, 2025). The U.S. The Air Force's ARMD program, which utilises Ursa Major's Draper engine, aims to produce cost-effective, liquid-fuelled hypersonic missiles expeditiously. The Draper engine combines the storage advantages of solid fuels with the control offered by liquid systems, thereby providing flexibility. Brigadier General Jason Bartolomei of AFRL described this program as "a new path towards a cost-effective, mass-producible deterrent for the nation" (Popular Mechanics, 2026). Space-based hypersonic systems may emerge as future options with significant strategic implications. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) in Low Earth Orbit could enable global strikes without the conventional warnings associated with missile launches. Although these systems would contravene existing space weapon treaties, they present strategic challenges. China's 2021 test of the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) indicates that space-based hypersonic concepts are under exploration (Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2023).

Hypersonic defence systems

Advancements in hypersonic defence systems are progressing in tandem with the development of offensive capabilities. The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), currently under development by Raytheon and Northrop Grumman in collaboration with Japan, is designed to target hypersonic weapons during their most vulnerable phases. Space-based sensors, such as the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), are intended to monitor hypersonic threats throughout their trajectory. These defensive measures are anticipated to influence the efficacy of hypersonic weapons (Raytheon 2024). Emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, quantum sensing, and directed energy, have the potential to transform hypersonic weapons and their defences. Artificial intelligence systems may enhance target identification and engagement, whereas quantum sensors can offer navigation solutions that are resistant to jamming. Directed energy weapons present a potentially cost-effective defence against hypersonic threats, although they continue to encounter technical challenges (Loop, 2025). 

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability

Hypersonic weapons hold significant importance in contemporary warfare, impacting deterrence strategies by reducing decision-making time and challenging existing defences. Their speed and agility enable rapid target engagement, providing capabilities that were previously exclusive to nuclear weapons (Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2023). The influence of hypersonic weapons on strategic stability remains debatable. Some argue that they provide credible deterrence below the nuclear threshold, thereby enhancing the stability of crises. Conversely, others contend that ambiguous warheads and compressed timelines may elevate these risks (The Loop, 2025). The Atlantic Council posits that hypersonic weapons introduce uncertainty into deterrence dynamics, potentially prompting pre-emptive actions during crises. Their velocity may embolden adversaries to consider non-nuclear strikes, thereby affecting political decisions and heightening the risk of conflict (Joint Advanced Warfighting School 2023). Hypersonic weapons fulfil dual roles within Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies, both reinforcing one's own denial capabilities and facilitating the penetration of enemy zones. For nations such as China and Russia, hypersonic systems complicate U.S. power projection by threatening critical assets, including aircraft carriers and military bases. Conversely, U.S. hypersonic capabilities can counteract adversarial A2/AD systems (Congressional Budget Office, 2023). Russian General Valery Gerasimov's doctrine emphasises "long-distance, contactless actions" to achieve strategic objectives in warfare. Hypersonic systems are integral to Russia's non-nuclear deterrence strategy, which aims to avoid large-scale confrontations while achieving strategic effects through precise strikes (Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2023).

Impact on Alliances 

The proliferation of hypersonic weapons poses significant challenges to the United States' commitment to safeguarding its allies. Nations possessing these weapons have the capability to threaten U.S. forces and allied nations, thereby casting doubt on U.S. security assurances. This situation has prompted allies such as Japan, Australia, and European countries to pursue the development of their own hypersonic weapons (Militaire Spectator, 2020). In response, alliances are collaborating on initiatives such as the US–Japan GPI partnership and sharing intelligence for early warning systems. NATO's strategic plans now incorporate hypersonic threats, underscoring their increasing significance. However, integrating hypersonic defence into security strategies remains a complex task (Raytheon, 2024). The challenges of integration include the following aspects:

- Radar and Horizon Constraints: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) operate at significantly lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. Consequently, they remain below the detection range of traditional ground-based radar systems until shortly before they strike.

- Plasma Disruption: The intense speeds generate a plasma sheath around the vehicle, posing technical difficulties for onboard navigation and maintaining real-time communication with the missile.

- Constellation Needs: To counteract this, continuous 360-degree monitoring is essential, prompting defence agencies to invest in costly space-based sensor networks, such as the United States' hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor (HBTSS) initiatives.

- Manoeuvrability: Unlike the predictable paths of ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons can change their course, complicating the calculation of interception points during flight and rendering space-based defence systems ineffective.

- Cost-Exchange Imbalance: The expense of developing and deploying sophisticated interceptors far exceeds the cost of hypersonic threats. Protecting large areas with interceptors is financially impractical, leading militaries to focus on strategically fortified "point defence" zones.

At the tactical level, hypersonic weapons provide commanders with the capability to engage critical targets rapidly. These weapons can strike within minutes, targeting mobile assets, command centres, and essential infrastructure before adversaries can respond to them. This capability is particularly advantageous against anti-access systems, command hubs, and locations housing weapons of mass destruction (Joint Advanced Warfighting School 2023). However, these weapons also complicate force protection and logistical management. The rapidity of attacks reduces the time available for defensive preparations, rendering bases and ports more susceptible to threats. Consequently, there is a need for enhanced defensive measures and improved protection systems. The threat to aircraft carriers has necessitated adjustments to naval strategies (Congressional Budget Office, 2023).

The emergence of hypersonic weapons has compelled naval forces to transition from close-range power projection to "standoff" operations. To ensure survival, strike groups disperse their formations, emphasise long-range capabilities, and employ AI-enhanced early warning systems, depending on speed and layered kinetic and directed-energy defence strategies. These changes are categorised into the following areas.

- Extended Strike Distances: Carrier aircraft operate farther offshore to stay beyond the reach of land-based hypersonic missiles' Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zones.

- Autonomous Refuelling: The use of unmanned platforms, such as the carrier-launched MQ-25 Stingray, provides mid-air refuelling for strike aircraft, enabling carriers to project air power from safer standoff distances.

- Over-the-Horizon Detection: Navies are incorporating space-based infrared satellite constellations (such as the US Space Development Agency's tracking layers) and airborne sensors to immediately detect hypersonic launches and track their changing trajectories.

- Coordinated Command and Control: Distributed sensor networks, such as the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA), link various ships, and aircraft, allowing interceptors to engage targets beyond the radar range of the launching ship.

- Decentralised Formations: Instead of operating in tightly grouped, heavily protected formations, Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) are increasingly using dispersed formations. This complicates enemy targeting, making it challenging to locate high-value assets in real time.

- Offensive Strategy: Focus is shifting towards offensive "left-of-launch" deterrence, which neutralises enemy missile sites, launch platforms, and command nodes through cyber, electronic warfare, or pre-emptive strikes.

- Terminal Interception: The U.S. The Navy and allied forces are concentrating on terminal-phase interception with systems such as the SM-6 missile, which are updated to track and engage highly manoeuvrable threats in their terminal moments of flight.

- Directed Energy: Given the extremely short reaction times for hypersonic weapons, navies are testing and deploying Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), such as high-energy shipboard lasers, to disrupt or destroy incoming threats.

The employment of hypersonic weapons in joint operations necessitates the development of new tactics and coordination among intelligence, command systems, and strike platforms. The rules of engagement must be adapted to accommodate swift decision-making and the potential for rapid escalation (Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2023). 

Hypersonic Weapons and International Arms Control Frameworks

The rapid advancement of hypersonic weapons has outpaced international arms control frameworks, resulting in security breaches. The 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was not designed to address hypersonic systems, focusing instead on ballistic and cruise missiles. This leaves the regulatory framework for HGVs and HCMs ambiguous (SIPRI 2022). The New START treaty between the U.S. and Russia does not encompass hypersonic weapons, creating a regulatory loophole. While it imposes limits on ballistic missile launchers and warheads, it may not fully account for hypersonic glide vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This undermines the treaty's control over strategic systems and highlights the necessity for updated arms control measures (Altrinsic, 2025).

To effectively regulate hypersonic weapons, experts advocate the revision of existing treaties to encompass these weapons, the establishment of new multilateral agreements, and the implementation of transparency measures. However, the verification of these weapons poses significant challenges because of their high velocity and the difficulty in distinguishing between nuclear and conventional warheads, complicating treaty formulation. Additionally, geopolitical competition among major powers renders swift agreements improbable (Congressional Research Service 2025). 

Conclusion

Hypersonic missiles and glide vehicles are revolutionizing military technology, influencing global security and military strategy. Technological challenges, such as heat management and navigation, have been addressed, transitioning these weapons from experimental stages to operational capabilities. Russia and China are at the forefront of deploying these weapons, while the United States is actively developing its arsenal. Countries such as India, France, and Japan are also engaging in this domain, which has implications for regional security and global stability. The impact of hypersonic weapons extends beyond military applications and affects deterrence, crisis stability, and alliances. The rapid decision-making required, uncertainty regarding warhead types, and inadequate defences present risks that necessitate careful consideration by policymakers. Current arms control agreements have not kept pace with these advancements, resulting in gaps that require renewed diplomatic initiatives. Future advancements in hypersonic technology, including enhanced propulsion systems and space-based platforms, will continue to reshape the strategic landscape of military operations. The integration of these weapons into military strategies signifies a long-term transformation of warfare. A comprehensive understanding of their technical specifications and strategic implications is crucial for formulating defence policies and ensuring global security. As the proliferation of these weapons continues, the international community must manage the associated risks while harnessing their potential to enhance stability.

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The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a narrow passage but a critical maritime corridor linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and is essential for the transit of 20% of the world’s oil and 25% of its transported natural gas.

Naval operations in this area are constrained by the sea depth and navigational regulations. The seabed of the Strait is irregular, with the deepest section, exceeding 650 feet, located near Oman, whereas the Iranian coast is characterised by shallow and congested waters. This geographical configuration renders it a strategic stronghold for the Iranian Navy, as the shallow regions are ideal for deploying small submarines and concealed mines, which are difficult to detect for larger Western vessels. The proximity of Iran’s coastline to shipping lanes, at times merely three miles away, gives vessels less than two minutes to respond to rapid threats or missile attacks originating from the shore. Some characteristics of the Hormuz Straits-

Narrowest Width: 21 miles (34 km)– Ships are highly vulnerable to shore-based artillery, MANPADS, and drones.

Main Shipping Lane Width: 2 miles (each way)–Highly predictable transit paths of ships simplify mine seeding and swarm targeting.

Maximum Depth (Southern Reach): >200 meters (650 feet)- It allows for limited manoeuvring of large-deck carriers and conventional submarines.

Average Depth (Northern Littoral): <25meters (80 feet)–Optimised for Ghadir-class midget submarines and diverse mine warfare capabilities.

Strategic Island Infrastructure: Qeshm, Abu Musa, and Tunbs-Function as forward staging for A2/AD and missile batteries.

Visibility and atmospheric interference: Fog, haze, and dust complicate electro-optical targeting and favour close-in asymmetric attacks.

Iran exercises control over strategically significant islands, including Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs. These islands serve as critical defensive assets, functioning as “unsinkable aircraft carriers,” and are equipped with sensors that enable Iran to closely monitor maritime traffic.

The conventional Iranian Navy has been incapacitated; however, the conflict is now transitioning into a new phase. Local commanders have been granted increased autonomy, enabling them to initiate attacks and deploy mines, a strategy referred to as “mosaic defence.” The primary challenge in the Third Gulf War is Iran’s capacity to engage in unconventional warfare. Despite the absence of large naval vessels, Iran possesses numerous inexpensive, lethal weapons concealed along its extensive coastline. Naval mines constitute a critical component of Iran’s defensive strategy, with thousands available for deployment through various means, such as fishing vessels. A single mine has the potential to halt all commercial shipping because mine clearance is slow and hazardous. Although the U.S. The Navy employs specialised vessels for mine clearance; Iran can rapidly deploy additional new mines. Additionally, Iran uses fast boats to conduct swarm attacks, complicating the defence efforts of advanced naval ships. The use of unmanned boats and drones further enhances Iran’s capability for swift attacks. Iran’s small submarines, which are difficult to detect in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf, can remain concealed for extended periods and remain poised to target critical military assets. Despite the coalition’s emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, locating these submarines remains a formidable challenge.

In the context of the Third Gulf War, the physical obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz became unnecessary, instead, market dynamics and insurance mechanisms have been employed to render the Strait “commercially unusable.”

By mid-March 2026, Iran had confirmed 21 attacks on merchant vessels, including the U.S.-flagged Stena Imperativa. In response, insurance companies, such as Lloyd’s of London, increased war-risk premiums or ceased coverage. This escalation in costs rendered passage through the Strait prohibitively expensive for many, effectively closing it without Iranian naval intervention. This blockade is primarily attributed to the global insurance industry rather than to the Iranian Navy.

Iran has implemented a toll system as part of its maritime strategy, shipping companies are required to pay up to 14 million Chinese Yuan (approximately $2 million USD) for an “official certificate” from Iran to use the route. This certificate mitigates insurance costs, thereby facilitating the continuation of operations. This system transforms the Strait into a revenue source for Iran while simultaneously excluding nations aligned with the coalition.

The “soft closure” of the strait presents a significant challenge for the United States. To “open” it, the coalition must overcome the IRGCN and restore confidence in the global insurance market, a task complicated by the resilience and unpredictability of the adversary.

Amphibious and Airborne Escalation

As the conflict enters its second month and the strait remains closed, the Trump administration contemplates deploying ground forces to secure critical maritime regions. The deployment of the USS Tripoli and USS Boxer, accompanied by the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, indicates a strategic shift towards the utilisation of amphibious forces.

Kharg Island holds substantial strategic importance for Iran’s oil economy, managing approximately 90% of its crude-oil exports. Securing control of the island could enable the United States to weaken the IRGC and terminate the maritime blockade. Other islands, such as Qeshm and Tunbs, are also considered potential targets for dismantling Iran’s defence infrastructure.

The 82nd Airborne Division’s Immediate Response Force, capable of rapidly deploying 3, 000 paratroopers, is positioned in the region. A paradrop onto Kharg Island could provide a swift and unexpected manoeuvre, circumventing numerous naval threats. The Amphibious Ready Groups would offer support with F-35B stealth fighters and MV-22 Osprey aircraft for air support and logistical operations in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Military analysts, however, caution that the occupation of Kharg Island may pose significant risks to the United States. Once established on the island, U.S. forces could become vulnerable targets for Iranian assaults originating from as little as 20 miles away. Iran possesses the capability to deploy specialised drones that are resistant to jamming, enabling precise strikes against U.S. troops. Furthermore, the naval vessels required to defend and supply the island would be diverted from their primary mission of escorting tankers, potentially prolonging the closure of the strait.

The proposition of physically occupying Iran’s coastal region is perceived as perilous by the US. The mountainous terrain of Iran poses significant logistical challenges for any invading force, impeding the rapid movement and maintenance of supply lines. Iran is well prepared for such incursions, employing concealed forces and a comprehensive defence strategy that eliminates safe zones for invaders to retreat. Even minor assaults could escalate into broader conflicts, potentially involving entities such as Hezbollah and Iraqi militias targeting U.S. bases in the Middle East. For the coalition, a ground war in Iran could devolve into a protracted and difficult conflict with no definitive resolution.

To circumvent the protracted conflict, the U.S. The Navy has deployed Task Force 59, which integrates artificial intelligence and unmanned vehicles into its operations to achieve this goal.

Unmanned systems facilitate the monitoring of Iranian activities without endangering personnel’s safety. Drones and solar-powered vessels can track Iranian boats and mine layers in real time, thereby undermining Iran’s ability to deny its aggressive actions.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Threshold of Escalation

The potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf is a subject of considerable, albeit confidential, debate. The deployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in the current Gulf War would represent a significant departure from conventional warfare strategies. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons designed for widespread urban destruction, TNWs are intended for precise military objectives, such as targeting subterranean bunkers and large naval vessels. The utilisation of TNWs can precipitate several critical consequences.

-The employment of TNWs could obscure the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare. Owing to their limited explosive yields, military strategists may perceive them as viable options for engaging otherwise inaccessible targets. However, their use could initiate a retaliatory cycle, as nations may feel compelled to respond similarly.

The Persian Gulf is of paramount importance to the global energy supply. A nuclear incident in this region would not only elevate energy prices but also destabilise the entire system. If a TNW obstructs the Strait of Hormuz, a substantial portion of the world’s oil and gas reserves will become inaccessible. This scenario would induce widespread panic, and maritime shipping would cease because of the unavailability of insurance for tankers.

– The geographical characteristics of the Gulf render it particularly vulnerable to a nuclear strike of any kind. Even a limited nuclear detonation can have devastating effects, countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which depend on desalination for potable water, could face severe water crises if nuclear contamination affects water sources. Additionally, radiation can disperse throughout the region, resulting in significant health challenges.

The use of TNW would fundamentally alter the security dynamics of the Middle East, should the international community fail to intervene, other nations might pursue their own nuclear capabilities, potentially undermining the Non-proliferation Treaty.

The use of tactical nukes in any form could rapidly escalate the conflict zone to unprecedented levels; therefore, their use does not look likely at the present juncture.

The VLS Depletion Crisis

A significant challenge is the finite supply of interceptor missiles on advanced destroyers, which necessitates returning to the port for reloading. Iran’s strategy of deploying numerous inexpensive drones compels the coalition to expend costly interceptors, with the objective of depleting their resources. As long as the cost of Iranian attacks remains low for  Iran, the coalition faces a formidable predicament in which achieving victory is both financially burdensome and difficult to sustain in the long term. 

Bab Al Mandeb Strait

“And at the time of the end shall the king of the south push at him: and the king of the north shall come against him like a whirlwind, with chariots, and with horsemen, and with many ships; and he shall enter into the countries, and shall overflow and pass over”

(Daniel 11:40)

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a critical maritime corridor, measuring between 20 and 30 km in width and extending 70 miles in length. It serves as a geographical demarcation between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea in Africa. This strait facilitates the connection between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, linking it to the Indian Ocean. It is recognised as one of the three most significant chokepoints for global energy and trade, particularly concerning oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments. Furthermore, the strait provides a conduit from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal. Approximately over 10% of the world’s seaborne oil and a quarter of all global shipping transits through this passage. The strait is colloquially referred to as the “Gate of Tears” or “Gate of Grief” due to its narrowness and navigational challenges. Perim Island, located within Yemeni territory, divides the strait into two distinct channels: the eastern channel, approximately 2 miles wide, accommodates outbound vessels, and the western channel, approximately 16 miles wide, is designated for inbound traffic. The strait is not under the jurisdiction of any single nation, rendering it susceptible to security threats, including terrorism and regional conflicts such as Houthi attacks on maritime vessels. The considerable depth of the strait, often exceeding 200 m, is advantageous for the passage of large ships. Additionally, they play a significant role in influencing tidal and oceanic currents. 

Iranian allies, such as the Houthi group in Yemen, possess both the capability and intent to exacerbate the conflict by potentially closing the Bab Al Mandeb (BAM) Strait. In late March 2026, Houthi leaders indicated their willingness to close this critical maritime passage should hostilities against Iran and Lebanon intensify or if Gulf Arab nations align with the U.S.-Israeli coalition.

The Houthis’ closure of the Bab Al Mandeb would result in a “dual bottleneck” scenario. With the Strait of Hormuz already largely inaccessible, global reliance on alternative routes, such as Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, has increased to circumvent the Persian Gulf.

-In March 2026, the volume of oil transiting through Bab Al Mandeb increased by 21% as shippers sought alternatives to the Hormuz route.

– The simultaneous closure of both straits would effectively halt nearly all Gulf energy exports, potentially driving oil prices to exceed $100–$150 per barrel and causing significant disruptions to the global supply chains.

The Houthis are equipped with sophisticated weaponry supplied by Iran, enabling them to obstruct maritime traffic in the narrow 18-mile-wide strait.

– Their arsenal includes missiles such as the ‘Asif’ (400 km range) and ‘Tankeel’, as well as cruise missiles such as the ‘Al-Mandeb 2’ (300 km range) and the ‘Sayyed’.

– They employ explosive boats disguised as fishing vessels, attack drones (Samad-3 with a range of 1,800 km), and sea mines (Masjoor, Mujahid).

Between 2023 and 2025, the Houthis had targeted over 100 commercial vessels, demonstrating their capacity to deter shipping with a limited number of successful attacks.

The Houthis entered the Third Gulf War on 28 March 2026 but have not fully obstructed maritime passage. Initially, they launched missiles at Israel to express solidarity with Iran while adhering to a May 2025 agreement with the U.S. concerning Red Sea shipping. The agreement was specifically relevant to U.S. forces, while the Houthis maintained their stance of continuing to target Israeli ships.

The Houthis declared their intention to close the strait if the U.S. conducted ground assaults on Iran (such as seizing Kharg Island) or if nations like Saudi Arabia or the UAE provided military support to the coalition.

Decisive Victory or Prolonged Struggle

The Third Gulf War represents a confrontation between two divergent strategic approaches. The coalition seeks a swift victory through technological superiority and precision strikes, whereas Iran endeavours to prolong the conflict by leveraging its geographical advantages and strategic patience. From a naval perspective, several critical observations have emerged.

– The destruction of Iran’s primary naval assets has not secured control of the Strait. The threat has shifted to coastal regions, where inexpensive and rudimentary weaponry can significantly disrupt global trade.

– Iran’s dominion over the northern coastline and strategic islands enables it to obstruct access with minimal effort, compelling the coalition to incur substantial expenditures on defence.

– The depletion of interceptors and loss of maritime insurance present significant challenges. If the coalition fails to address maritime resupply and insurance issues, the conflict is likely to persist.

– Occupying strategic locations such as Kharg Island may yield short-term tactical gains, but the occupation of Iranian territory could precipitate a broader regional conflict.

– To ensure the protection of both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al Mandeb simultaneously, a significantly increased deployment of naval vessels is required. Similar to the situation in the Persian Gulf, the defence of naval vessels in the Red Sea against cost-effective Houthi drones and missiles would rapidly deplete the coalition destroyers’ Vertical Launch System (VLS) interceptors.

– Should the Houthis succeed in closing Bab Al Mandeb, it has the potential to escalate the Third Gulf War from a regional conflict to a global economic crisis. By retaining this strategic option, the Houthis provide Iran with a significant advantage in ceasefire negotiations.

In its current status, the third Gulf War is poised to plunge into a quagmire of protracted struggle for both sides.

The Third Gulf War serves as a critical examination of future naval warfare, in which contemporary hi-tech confronts the complexities of maritime geography.

The best option for both sides is to prolong the ceasefire and continue discussions for as long as feasible until a mutually acceptable face-saving solution emerges.

Pacific Ocean

The Pacific Ocean is the largest and deepest ocean on the planet and significantly influences global geography, geology, and climate. Encompassing roughly 165.25 million square kilometres (63.8 million square miles), the Pacific surpasses the combined size of all Earth's landmasses, covering about one-third of the Earth's surface. The Pacific Basin is encircled by the Ring of Fire, a zone known for its frequent seismic activity and housing most the world's active volcanoes, a result of the movement and interaction of tectonic plates surrounding the Pacific Plate. The ocean floor is distinguished by numerous deep oceanic trenches, such as the Mariana, Tonga, and Peru-Chile trenches, and is home to over 25,000 islands, including volcanic chains such as Hawaii and coral atolls.

The Pacific Ocean encompasses numerous islands, which are categorised into three principal regions: Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. These islands have contemporary significance and exhibit diverse geological characteristics. The formation of the Pacific Islands is attributed to geological processes primarily driven by plate tectonics. There are two predominant types of islands: continental and oceanic islands. Continental islands are extensions of continents, typically larger in size, and possess fertile soils. Notable examples include New Guinea, New Caledonia, and New Zealand, which are remnants of the ancient supercontinent, Gondwana. Oceanic islands are volcanic in origin and have never been part of any continent.

The Pacific Islands are situated along crucial sea and air routes connecting Asia, North America, and Australia. Their strategic location and large EEZ render them significant in geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China. As an example, Kiribati’s land area is just ~811 sq. km, about 4000 times smaller than that of India’s land area of ~3,287,263 sq. km, however, Kiribati’s EEZ is ~3,550,000 sq. km i.e., about a million sq.km larger than India’s EEZ of ~2,305,143 sq. km.

Strategic Policies Pursued by China

At this point, it would be pertinent to highlight the overarching strategic policies which China is pursuing in respect of Pacific Islands and in aid of eventual global dominance.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated by President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a crucial component of China's foreign policy. Its objectives include enhancing trade connections, addressing the global "infrastructure gap,” and augmenting China's influence in international affairs. By 2023, the BRI encompassed 151 countries, representing 75% of the global population and over half of the world's GDP. The BRI's ambitions extend beyond mere developmental assistance; it seeks to diversify resources, export surplus industrial capacity, open new markets for Chinese enterprises and fortify political alliances with partner countries. A significant element of this initiative is the Financial Leverage System, wherein most projects are financed through loans from state-backed financial institutions in China, such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC). These banks provide loans at low interest rates and operate with fewer transparency requirements than Western banks do. They frequently secure loans against critical future resources; for example, the $60 billion loan to Venezuela was collateralised by oil reserves for energy and infrastructure projects. The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is also integral to the BRI, facilitating China's ascendancy in global value chains by promoting the adoption of Chinese technology in domains such as 5G, artificial intelligence, smart cities, and data management. This involvement grants China a substantial role in the technological development of its partner countries, raising concerns regarding security and privacy. 

China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy aims to modernise the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by integrating civilian industries, academic institutions, and defence projects to develop advanced technologies for military use. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) will position the MCF as a primary mechanism for cultivating an "Intelligentized" PLA by 2035, ensuring that civilian technological innovations also serve military objectives. This strategy is implemented globally through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that lead international infrastructure. The China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) is the largest port design and construction enterprise in China, having formulated more than 70% of the national standards for water transportation. COSCO (China Ocean Shipping Company) is engaged in acquiring and operating key foreign deep-water ports, such as the Chancay Port in Peru.

The management of port equipment is an often-underappreciated aspect of logistics planning. Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC) is a significant entity in the global container crane market, commanding approximately 70% of the market share. This includes the essential infrastructure in various countries. ZPMC manufactures 80% of the cranes used in U.S. ports, including 10 major seaports in the country. These cranes are equipped with advanced sensors that monitor container data, rendering them integral to global shipping and logistics operations. The Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy implies that civilian technology can be repurposed for military applications. Consequently, ZPMC cranes may provide substantial information for China. They can discreetly monitor supply chains, economic activities, and the movement of foreign military equipment in real time, potentially facilitating covert surveillance through commercial control. A US congressional investigation found that Chinese-made container cranes for U.S. ports have included hidden cellular modems that were not part of the original contracts. These modems could potentially allow for remote access, data collection, or disruption of operations, raising national security concerns. The manufacturer, ZPMC, claims its own investigation found no evidence of wrongdoing, but U.S. officials remain concerned.

The Global Security Initiative (GSI), inaugurated in 2022, represents China's strategic endeavour to assert its influence over global security. Distinct from Western military alliances, the GSI emphasizes policing, surveillance, and governance, promoting China's "law and order model." The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to train 3,000 police officers globally, providing them with equipment and inculcating political ideologies aligned with the CCP's governance. Its objective is to shape regional policing practices and cultivate leaders who espouse the values of Beijing. A salient example of this initiative is the establishment of overseas Chinese police stations. Reports indicate that four Chinese public security bureaus have established 102 such stations across 53 countries, including Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, and Cambodia. While these stations serve the Chinese diaspora, they have been criticised for employing coercive methods such as surveillance and intimidation. This model of extraterritorial surveillance and control is perceived as a threat to the rule of law and national sovereignty in host nations.

Three Island Chain Strategy

Perhaps anticipating a similar move, The Three Island Chains strategy, a geopolitical concept, was formulated by the U.S. foreign policy expert John Foster Dulles in 1951. Developed during the Cold War, its purpose was to curtail the influence of the Soviet Union and China by encircling them with naval bases and allied territories in the Western Pacific.

The First Island Chain is situated closest to Asia, extending from the Kuril Islands through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo to the Indian Ocean. This chain represents the primary arena of competition between the United States and China. For the U.S. and its allies, it serves as a defensive line to exert control and restrict China's maritime expansion, whereas for China, it constitutes a barrier to be surmounted to gain access to the broader Pacific. The "island chains" concept is integral to China's military strategy, perceiving them as both barriers and launch points for power-projection. China's strategic initiatives aim to displace U.S. forces from this chain, particularly around Taiwan and the South China Sea.

The Second Island Chain is positioned east of the First Island Chain and encompasses the Bonin, Volcano, and Mariana Islands (including Guam) and Palau. The Second Island Chain functions as a critical fallback and "launch point" for the U.S. military, and Guam, a major U.S. military installation, serves as a forward base. This chain is vital for the U.S. to defend its allies within the First Island Chain and maintain a robust presence in the Pacific, even when faced with challenges near China's coastline. China is endeavouring to augment its influence in this region to counterbalance the U.S.

The Third Island Chain represents the outermost defence line, extending from the Aleutian Islands in Alaska through Hawaii and south to American Samoa and Fiji. The Third Island Chain constitutes the final defence line safeguarding the U.S. mainland. It hosts significant U.S. military bases, particularly in Hawaii, the home of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Although traditionally perceived as a secure area, China's expanding naval capabilities and influence in the Pacific Islands have raised concerns regarding the security of this chain.

China’s Strategic Penetration in the Pacific Islands

Ten Pacific Island Nations with Chinese-Funded Infrastructure

The following list provides some of the major ingresses made by China in the Pacific.

Solomon Islands: China has concentrated on infrastructure, with initiatives such as road improvements, health facilities, and a new national stadium. Discussions have also taken place regarding infrastructure that could serve both civilian and military purposes, such as ports and airfields.

Fiji: Significant projects include the construction of the Stinson Parade and Vatuwaqa Bridges, along with support for water and electricity systems.

Vanuatu: China has backed infrastructure projects such as the Malakula Island Highway and engaged in talks about dual-use infrastructure, including ports.

Papua New Guinea (PNG): Efforts include the restoration of the Highlands Highway and Independence Boulevard, with Chinese firms such as the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) playing a key role in Melanesia.

Kiribati: China has invested in solar energy projects and, after Kiribati shifted diplomatic recognition to Beijing, and has been involved in talks about dual-use infrastructure, such as upgrading a former U.S. airfield and potential port access.

Tonga: China helped rebuild infrastructure damaged by Cyclone Gita and supported the renovation of national roads. Tonga also owes China significant debt from various projects.

Samoa: China has offered technical assistance across different sectors and supported infrastructure projects, including agricultural projects.

Federated States of Micronesia (FSM): China has backed essential infrastructure, such as the Pohnpei highway.

Cook Islands: A comprehensive agreement with China aims to enhance maritime and air connectivity, positioning the Cook Islands as a regional logistics hub.

Nauru: After switching diplomatic recognition to Beijing, Nauru is part of agreements for deeper economic collaboration and is a focus of potential infrastructure projects.

The Northern Flanks and Maritime Chokepoints (Aleutians and Ryukyus)
At this stage, it would be worthwhile to look at the northern maritime region, that is, The Aleutian Islands and the Arctic Periphery, where China contests U.S. and Japanese dominance. In this context, the emphasis is less on infrastructure development and more on safeguarding navigation rights and intelligence gathering.

The Aleutian Islands, situated near Alaska, are crucial to the Chinese military and research operations. In July 2025, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) identified three Chinese military vessels and an additional ship in the Bering Sea within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), north of the Amchitka and Amukta Passes. The Chinese authorities claimed that these were "freedom of navigation operations" conducted in accordance with international regulations. This naval activity is reinforced by research initiatives, with the USCG monitoring five Chinese research vessels operating in or near the U.S. Arctic. These activities necessitated aerial reconnaissance by Air Station Kodiak. The data collected by these research vessels could be instrumental in future submarine operations and anti-submarine warfare. The persistent presence of these vessels compels the U.S. Northern Command and Alaskan Command to maintain vigilance, thereby allocating resources and highlighting China's challenge to international maritime norms within a competitor's domain.

The collaboration between China and Russia is intensifying, as exemplified by joint bomber missions over the Bering Sea and through the Bering Strait into the Arctic Ocean. This escalating presence has prompted the United States to consider reactivating former military installations, such as the one on Adak Island, and to enhance facilities such as the Eareckson Air Station, which is equipped with a radar system for missile tracking. 

The Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa and the Miyako Gap, are critical for regulating maritime routes between the East China Sea and Philippine Sea. China utilises this region for naval manoeuvres to project its power and assess Japan's defensive capabilities. Chinese naval vessels frequently navigate between the Okinawa and Miyako. In October 2025, two naval groups traversed this area: one proceeded to the East China Sea and the other to the Philippine Sea. The Japanese Navy is compelled to maintain vigilant surveillance of these regions by employing ships and aircraft, which presents ongoing challenges. 

China has increasingly concentrated its attention on Okinawa, developing narratives regarding the island and its geopolitical status. Among these narratives is the "Ryukyu Undetermined Status Theory." Beijing asserts that the San Francisco Peace Treaty lacks validity, arguing that while the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration confirm Taiwan as part of China, the status of Okinawa remains unresolved.

In light of the aforementioned developments, Japan is undertaking the establishment of missile installations, radar stations, ammunition depots, and other military facilities across the 160-island Ryukyu chain. Furthermore, substantial military resources are being allocated to Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's four principal islands. This includes the deployment of F-35 fighter jets and long-range missiles, as well as the expansion of its Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, which is comparable to the United States Marine Corps.

The Philippines and the First Island Chain  

The Philippines holds significant strategic importance because of its location at the southern end of the First Island Chain. Its geographical position facilitates control over the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait, rendering it a crucial partner in the event of tensions involving Taiwan or regional conflicts. 

China has sought to expand its territorial claims in this area through a "grey zone" strategy, which involves persistent, low-level harassment to assert its claims under the "Nine-Dash Line." Recently, at locations such as the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, China's Coast Guard and maritime militia have employed water cannons, instigated collisions, and even targeted Philippine personnel. These actions are not isolated incidents but rather part of a deliberate strategy to exhaust the Philippines and test the US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty. 

In response, the United States and the Philippines fortified their alliance under President Bongbong Marcos Jr. The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) has been expanded, granting the U.S. access to nine military bases, including strategically significant bases in northern Luzon near Taiwan and Palawan near the South China Sea. Additionally, joint training exercises, such as "Balikatan", have intensified, with a focus on coastal defence and anti-ship tactics.

Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia: A New Southern Front

The China-Solomon Islands security pact of 2022 represents China's security agreement in the Pacific Islands region. The potential establishment of a Chinese military base in this strategically significant location would profoundly impact the U.S. and its allies.

While a Chinese military base in the South Pacific would be challenging to sustain, the mere prospect prompts the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand to redirect their focus and resources southward. This shift diverts attention from Taiwan and the South China Sea, thereby stretching the resources of the U.S. and its allies and complicating the maintenance of the "First Island Chain" strategy. China leverages security agreements to extend its influence without resorting to the use of force. In response, Australia and its partners have engaged in diplomatic protests and increased developmental assistance to counter China's influence in the region.

China employs naval vessels to project its strength and exert pressure on Australia and New Zealand. By navigating near their coastlines, it demonstrates its capability to threaten these nations and their citizens. This situation engenders concerns in Australia and New Zealand about potential isolation in a conflict, thereby augmenting China's influence on regional security. 

Extent of increasing Chinese influence in the regions near west and far east of the Pacific Islands

Ten Asian countries are major recipients of Chinese investment in port and inland connectivity projects. 

Malaysia: Significant investments, including a port in Kuala Linggi (Malacca) and stakes in ports such as Port Klang. The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) is a major railway project.

Brunei: Infrastructure and Ports

Myanmar: Development of the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal, which provides China with a strategic outlet to the Indian Ocean. Pipelines (oil and gas) and other connectivity plans linking Kyaukphyu to China's Yunnan Province.

Thailand: Part of the proposed Pan-Asia Railway network intended to link to Kunming, China, including lines that may connect to key Thai ports, such as Map Ta Phut on the Eastern Seaboard.

Cambodia: Cambodia and China have been involved in the development and upgrading of ports, including the Ream Naval Base and other projects. Various road, bridge, and highway projects connect the capital to rural and coastal areas.

Laos: The China-Laos Railway is a flagship BRI project that runs from the Chinese border to Vientiane, making Laos a land-linked hub.

Indonesia: The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed rail is a major Chinese-funded and built infrastructure project. China has also invested heavily in other sectors, such as mining and electric vehicle battery production.

Philippines: Projects involving irrigation, water supply, and railway development have been agreed upon with Chinese financing.

Vietnam: Vietnam is an active seeker of infrastructure investments, including some from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Chinese-led financial institution.

South Korea: Receives Chinese investments in various sectors, including electric vehicles and battery production.

Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN nations such as Brunei and Cambodia, are a focal point of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other strategic endeavours. China has invested substantial financial resources in this region, projected to reach $76 billion, nearly equalling the combined contributions of the Asian Development Bank and Japan from 2015 to 2022. A sizeable portion of this investment (70%) was allocated to infrastructure development, including transportation and communication networks. In early 2025, China's involvement notably increased in countries such as Laos and Thailand.

The Kuantan Port in Malaysia serves as a significant example of a strategic corridor in this regard. The Beibu Gulf Port Group, a Chinese enterprise, holds a 40% stake in the consortium. Situated on the eastern coast and facing the South China Sea, the port features a New Deep-Water Terminal (NDWT) with a depth of 16 m, enabling it to accommodate large vessels with capacities of up to 180,000 t. This deep-water capability offers a crucial alternative route via the ECRL land bridge from Northport, that circumvents the congested Strait of Malacca, thereby enhancing Chinese supply lines and augmenting China's influence over trade routes. The port is linked to the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), which integrates manufacturing and logistics. 

Six South American nations where China is currently building ports, wharves, jetties, or is involved in major port expansions and other related inland infrastructure projects like roads.

Peru: The Port of Chancay, valued at $3.5 billion, is a prominent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) endeavour, predominantly owned and managed by the Chinese state enterprise COSCO Shipping. It is a deep-water port on the Pacific coast of South America, designed to accommodate ultra-large container ships and set to emerge as a key transshipment centre for the area. Additionally, it is linked to inland routes, including highways leading to the Peruvian Andes. 

Brazil: China Merchants Port Co. has secured a 90% majority interest in TCP Participações, the entity overseeing the Port of Paranaguá, Brazil's second-largest port. The Chinese state agricultural corporation Cofco is constructing a new export terminal near São Paolo. Furthermore, there are reports of new port developments along the Amazon River, creating a waterway connecting Chinese-funded ports in Peru. 

Argentina: Chinese entities, specifically Hutchison Whampoa, possess a pier in Buenos Aires. There is also interest in establishing a port complex across the Chilean border near the Atlantic entrance of the Strait of Magellan.

Chile: China has engaged in discussions with the Chilean government about utilising the Port of Punta Arenas for Antarctic research purposes. China's involvement and interest also encompass the modernisation and expansion of ports in other cities such as Valparaíso. 

Uruguay: Port of Montevideo (Previous/Stalled Wharf) A Chinese-supported project for a wharf in Montevideo, led by Shandong BaoMa Company, was reportedly suspended due to transparency concerns. Chinese interests, possibly including Hutchison Whampoa, may also have a pier in Uruguay. 

Bolivia: Bolivia aims to reroute mineral exports through the newly established Port of Chancay in Peru. This has initiated discussions about a potential transcontinental railroad from Chancay to Brazil, with stops in Bolivia to facilitate mineral transportation.

The South American Transcontinental Railway

The main objective of this ambitious project is to create a direct land link between the Atlantic Ocean in Brazil and the Pacific Ocean in Peru, specifically through the newly constructed Chinese Port of Chancay.

Strategic Mineral Dependencies

China is actively engaged in securing critical mineral resources essential for its technology and defence sectors. The nation has concentrated its efforts on the "Lithium Triangle" countries—Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—which collectively possess half of the global lithium reserves. Chinese state-owned enterprises are involved in the development of the energy and resource sectors. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has acquired control or exclusive rights over various mining operations, often ensuring that a predetermined quantity of resources, such as copper and lithium, is prioritised for consumption by China. This strategy guarantees a consistent supply for China's burgeoning electric vehicle and battery industries, thereby supporting the BRI’s resource diversification objective.

Dual-Use Space and Intelligence Facilities

China operates a contentious tracking station in Patagonia, Argentina, known as the Neuquén Deep Space Station. Constructed by China Satellite Launch and Tracking General (CLTC), Argentine officials have described it as "dual use, but mainly military." The facility's large antennas can collect sensitive data, disrupt communications, and receive information on missile launches and drones. The agreement with Argentina has faced criticism for potentially compromising national sovereignty because of its stringent confidentiality clauses and restricted access to Argentines. Concerns were aggravated when construction commenced three months before formal approval was obtained.

Security, Arms Engagement, and Military Training in LAC

China has intensified its security engagement in Latin America. Venezuela is the largest purchaser of Chinese military equipment in the region, with expenditures amounting to $495 million between 2010 and 2020, representing 85.8% of its total arms imports. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have procured military equipment from China. China has pursued technology transfer agreements, and in 2015, China and Argentina engaged in discussions regarding defence cooperation, encompassing advanced fighter jets, armoured vehicles, and naval vessels. Argentina is currently participating in China-LAC training programs and collaborating with the National Defence University of China. This cooperation extended to Brazil, which hosted Chinese Marines for the first time in a joint exercise in 2024. This development signifies a strengthened defence relationship, providing China with opportunities to expand its influence and share its training expertise.

Exploring the Idea of the Pacific Islands as Janus

There is a world of difference between viewing the Pacific as “islands in a far sea” and as “a sea of islands.” The first emphasizes dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centres of power. Focusing in this way stresses the smallness and remoteness of the islands. The second is a more holistic perspective in which things are seen in the totality of their relationships.

Hau'ofa, E. 1994. Our Sea of Islands

Janus, as is well known, was the two-faced Roman god of beginnings, transitions, time, duality, doorways, and endings.

The small island nations in the Pacific Ocean occupy a strategically significant yet precarious position, akin to Janus, a figure symbolically gazing in two directions simultaneously, focusing on both the United States and China, each vying for their influence.

The Two Faces of Janus:

China offers rapid infrastructure development, substantial investments, and access to new markets through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The United States maintains long-standing relationships, security assurances, democratic values, and substantial communities originating from these islands. China provides swift funding for critical projects, including ports and communication networks, which Western nations might delay or reject. The United States emphasises climate resilience, governance, education, health, and shared values, such as the rule of law. The United States has strong cultural ties, particularly in its territories, and exerts influence through the English language and media.

The Janus metaphor encapsulates the dual challenges and opportunities confronting Pacific Island leaders. They must balance their economic ties with China and security ties with the United States. Their success hinges on not choosing sides but rather leveraging competition to secure the resources necessary for survival and development, ensuring that they retain control.

The U.S./Western Security Architecture (Looking East). The United States and its allies, including Australia, New Zealand, France, and Japan, primarily perceive the Pacific Islands through the lens of maritime security and defence. The United States has maintained longstanding involvement in regional security, particularly through agreements with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. These agreements confer special military privileges on the US over a substantial portion of the Pacific, effectively excluding rival powers. Western powers aim to preserve the status quo and prevent China from establishing military bases that could jeopardise critical maritime routes or encroach upon U.S. and allied territories. The United States collaborates with Pacific Islands on security matters through Coast Guard and Navy patrols, joint military exercises, and assistance in maritime surveillance and the prevention of illegal fishing, often under the pretext of safeguarding Pacific Island sovereignty.

China's Expanding Security Footprint (Looking West). China's interests in the Pacific have evolved from purely economic to political and nascent military objectives. According to Western perspectives, China's investments in ports, airfields, and communication networks have potential military applications, such as naval support or surveillance. China is increasingly providing assistance and training to island police forces, focusing on maintaining order and riot control rather than traditional defence. For the islands, engagement with China can signify an expansion of security partnerships and a demonstration to the West that they cannot be disregarded. The 2022 security agreement between China and Solomon Islands underscored this tension.

Islands frequently feel compelled to accept the initial or most financially appealing security offers. The need for a new patrol boat or police equipment can swiftly lead to a security agreement with political ramifications. Many islands aspire to maintain neutrality and avoid formal alliances; however, their small size and limited resources render them susceptible to pressure from both sides, necessitating a careful balance of their independence. 

"Third Pole" Geopolitics in the Pacific

France is a "Third Pole" Geopolitics in the Pacific Amidst US-China tensions, France aspires to be an alternative partner, emphasising autonomy and collaboration while cautioning against emerging forms of regional dominance. France maintains a significant presence in the Pacific because of its historical ties and overseas territories. 

The French territories in the Pacific include: 

New Caledonia, which is governed by the Nouméa Accord granting it a degree of autonomy and the right to hold referenda on its future. French Polynesia enjoys considerable autonomy and encompasses islands such as Tahiti, Wallis, and a smaller territory Futuna. 

These territories provide France with the world's second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with approximately 67% of the total global EEZ, approximately 7 million kilometres, located in the Pacific. This vast maritime domain is a core strategic asset for the country.

France's strategy is outlined in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which aims for a region that is "open and inclusive, free of all forms of coercion."

France maintains a significant and permanent military presence (approximately 2,900 personnel in the Pacific) through its Armed Forces in New Caledonia (FANC) and French Polynesia (FAPF). This presence is tasked with upholding French sovereignty, protecting the EEZ, and providing civil security. A primary focus is on maritime governance, specifically combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and transnational organised crime across its enormous EEZ.

France is an active security partner, participating in multilateral forums such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) and the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (Pacific Quad) with the US, Australia, and New Zealand. France is a partner in the FRANZ Arrangement (France, Australia, New Zealand), providing rapid aid and logistics for disaster response in the Pacific Islands, a crucial role given the region's vulnerability to climate change. 

Mobilising the European Union: As the sole European Union member state with a permanent presence in the region, France is actively engaged in "Europeanizing" its Pacific initiatives by encouraging the EU to enhance its developmental and diplomatic involvement.

India's Connection with Pacific Island Nations (PINs)

India's engagement with the Pacific Island Nations (PINs) has significantly intensified in recent years, moving from a low-profile relationship to a strategic partnership under the expanded 'Act East' Policy. This outreach is driven by geopolitical considerations, a shared commitment to the Global South, and mutual interest in key sectors. The cornerstone of India's Pacific engagement is the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), established by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Fiji in 2014. The FIPIC includes India and 14 Pacific Island nations (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu). It serves as a platform for regular, high-level dialogue at the Head of Government/State levels. 

India's renewed focus on PINs is motivated by several strategic and developmental factors.

-PINs are crucial components of the Indo-Pacific region. India views engagement as necessary to promote a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific and solidify its role as a regional security and development provider.

- The growing economic and political influence of China in the South Pacific has provided impetus for India, often in cooperation with Quad partners (the US, Japan, and Australia), to enhance its partnerships in the region.

- India positions itself as a leading voice for the Global South, championing the concerns of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) at international forums such as the G20 and the UN, especially on issues of climate change and sustainable development.

-The 12 PINs with UN voting rights are important partners for India in multilateral forums, including supporting India's bid for a permanent seat on the reformed UN Security Council.

- Nations such as Fiji have a large population of Indian origin, providing a strong cultural and people-to-people link.

India, a founding member of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), collaborates with PINs on climate adaptation and capacity building for natural disaster management, often providing immediate humanitarian assistance to them. India offers an annual grant-in-aid to each of the 14 PICs for community development projects. Initiatives include establishing a super-specialty cardiology hospital in Fiji, providing dialysis units & sea ambulances, and supplying affordable generic drugs & essential medicines.

India leverages its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program to offer scholarships and training opportunities, particularly in IT and renewable energy (e.g., solar power).

Maritime Cooperation includes hydrography, coastal surveillance, and establishing a space research and satellite monitoring station (in Fiji) to help with resource mapping and weather and climate change monitoring.

India's outreach to the Pacific Island Nations is a comprehensive effort to foster a durable, mutually beneficial relationship based on development cooperation and strategic convergence, demonstrating its commitment to the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Way ahead for Pacific Island Nations

Small Pacific Island nations, which lack the capacity to develop naval forces comparable to those of China, should prioritise strategies that restrict unregulated Chinese movement within their territorial waters. These nations must develop security capabilities individually, collectively as a consortium of Pacific Island Nations, and in cooperation with the United States and allied nations. These capabilities should be envisioned alongside the necessary security infrastructure, including ports, dockyards, runways, radar stations, satellite stations, and facilities for the repair and maintenance of aircraft and unmanned vehicles.

The traditional reactive approach by the U.S. and allies to addressing China's strategy should be replaced by consistent investment in the Pacific Islands, entailing a commitment to sustained developmental assistance, such as the construction of climate-resilient infrastructure and the combatting of corruption. By presenting a stable alternative to China's strategy, the United States and its allies can counteract China's influence and strengthen regional governance.

The United States and its allies should continue to provide and train local forces in defence capabilities. Provisioning of coastal defence missiles, unmanned systems, and enhanced maritime awareness represent effective and cost-efficient tools that would serve as deterrents without necessitating parity with China's numerical strength.

A cohesive front is imperative in this regard; the United States, Japan, Australia, and other partners must synchronise their diplomatic and security measures to counter China's influence. 

No people on earth are more suited to be guardians of the world’s largest ocean than those whom it has been home for generations…Our role in the protection and development of our ocean is no mean task; it is no less than a major contribution to the  well-being of humanity. Because it could give us a sense of doing something not only worthwhile but noble, we should seize the moment with dispatch. 

Hau'ofa, E. 1994. Our Sea of Islands