Dr S Kulshrestha

Pacific Ocean

The Pacific Ocean is the largest and deepest ocean on the planet and significantly influences global geography, geology, and climate. Encompassing roughly 165.25 million square kilometres (63.8 million square miles), the Pacific surpasses the combined size of all Earth's landmasses, covering about one-third of the Earth's surface. The Pacific Basin is encircled by the Ring of Fire, a zone known for its frequent seismic activity and housing most the world's active volcanoes, a result of the movement and interaction of tectonic plates surrounding the Pacific Plate. The ocean floor is distinguished by numerous deep oceanic trenches, such as the Mariana, Tonga, and Peru-Chile trenches, and is home to over 25,000 islands, including volcanic chains such as Hawaii and coral atolls.

The Pacific Ocean encompasses numerous islands, which are categorised into three principal regions: Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. These islands have contemporary significance and exhibit diverse geological characteristics. The formation of the Pacific Islands is attributed to geological processes primarily driven by plate tectonics. There are two predominant types of islands: continental and oceanic islands. Continental islands are extensions of continents, typically larger in size, and possess fertile soils. Notable examples include New Guinea, New Caledonia, and New Zealand, which are remnants of the ancient supercontinent, Gondwana. Oceanic islands are volcanic in origin and have never been part of any continent.

The Pacific Islands are situated along crucial sea and air routes connecting Asia, North America, and Australia. Their strategic location and large EEZ render them significant in geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China. As an example, Kiribati’s land area is just ~811 sq. km, about 4000 times smaller than that of India’s land area of ~3,287,263 sq. km, however, Kiribati’s EEZ is ~3,550,000 sq. km i.e., about a million sq.km larger than India’s EEZ of ~2,305,143 sq. km.

Strategic Policies Pursued by China

At this point, it would be pertinent to highlight the overarching strategic policies which China is pursuing in respect of Pacific Islands and in aid of eventual global dominance.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initiated by President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a crucial component of China's foreign policy. Its objectives include enhancing trade connections, addressing the global "infrastructure gap,” and augmenting China's influence in international affairs. By 2023, the BRI encompassed 151 countries, representing 75% of the global population and over half of the world's GDP. The BRI's ambitions extend beyond mere developmental assistance; it seeks to diversify resources, export surplus industrial capacity, open new markets for Chinese enterprises and fortify political alliances with partner countries. A significant element of this initiative is the Financial Leverage System, wherein most projects are financed through loans from state-backed financial institutions in China, such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC). These banks provide loans at low interest rates and operate with fewer transparency requirements than Western banks do. They frequently secure loans against critical future resources; for example, the $60 billion loan to Venezuela was collateralised by oil reserves for energy and infrastructure projects. The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is also integral to the BRI, facilitating China's ascendancy in global value chains by promoting the adoption of Chinese technology in domains such as 5G, artificial intelligence, smart cities, and data management. This involvement grants China a substantial role in the technological development of its partner countries, raising concerns regarding security and privacy. 

China's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy aims to modernise the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by integrating civilian industries, academic institutions, and defence projects to develop advanced technologies for military use. The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) will position the MCF as a primary mechanism for cultivating an "Intelligentized" PLA by 2035, ensuring that civilian technological innovations also serve military objectives. This strategy is implemented globally through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that lead international infrastructure. The China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) is the largest port design and construction enterprise in China, having formulated more than 70% of the national standards for water transportation. COSCO (China Ocean Shipping Company) is engaged in acquiring and operating key foreign deep-water ports, such as the Chancay Port in Peru.

The management of port equipment is an often-underappreciated aspect of logistics planning. Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited (ZPMC) is a significant entity in the global container crane market, commanding approximately 70% of the market share. This includes the essential infrastructure in various countries. ZPMC manufactures 80% of the cranes used in U.S. ports, including 10 major seaports in the country. These cranes are equipped with advanced sensors that monitor container data, rendering them integral to global shipping and logistics operations. The Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy implies that civilian technology can be repurposed for military applications. Consequently, ZPMC cranes may provide substantial information for China. They can discreetly monitor supply chains, economic activities, and the movement of foreign military equipment in real time, potentially facilitating covert surveillance through commercial control. A US congressional investigation found that Chinese-made container cranes for U.S. ports have included hidden cellular modems that were not part of the original contracts. These modems could potentially allow for remote access, data collection, or disruption of operations, raising national security concerns. The manufacturer, ZPMC, claims its own investigation found no evidence of wrongdoing, but U.S. officials remain concerned.

The Global Security Initiative (GSI), inaugurated in 2022, represents China's strategic endeavour to assert its influence over global security. Distinct from Western military alliances, the GSI emphasizes policing, surveillance, and governance, promoting China's "law and order model." The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aims to train 3,000 police officers globally, providing them with equipment and inculcating political ideologies aligned with the CCP's governance. Its objective is to shape regional policing practices and cultivate leaders who espouse the values of Beijing. A salient example of this initiative is the establishment of overseas Chinese police stations. Reports indicate that four Chinese public security bureaus have established 102 such stations across 53 countries, including Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, and Cambodia. While these stations serve the Chinese diaspora, they have been criticised for employing coercive methods such as surveillance and intimidation. This model of extraterritorial surveillance and control is perceived as a threat to the rule of law and national sovereignty in host nations.

Three Island Chain Strategy

Perhaps anticipating a similar move, The Three Island Chains strategy, a geopolitical concept, was formulated by the U.S. foreign policy expert John Foster Dulles in 1951. Developed during the Cold War, its purpose was to curtail the influence of the Soviet Union and China by encircling them with naval bases and allied territories in the Western Pacific.

The First Island Chain is situated closest to Asia, extending from the Kuril Islands through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo to the Indian Ocean. This chain represents the primary arena of competition between the United States and China. For the U.S. and its allies, it serves as a defensive line to exert control and restrict China's maritime expansion, whereas for China, it constitutes a barrier to be surmounted to gain access to the broader Pacific. The "island chains" concept is integral to China's military strategy, perceiving them as both barriers and launch points for power-projection. China's strategic initiatives aim to displace U.S. forces from this chain, particularly around Taiwan and the South China Sea.

The Second Island Chain is positioned east of the First Island Chain and encompasses the Bonin, Volcano, and Mariana Islands (including Guam) and Palau. The Second Island Chain functions as a critical fallback and "launch point" for the U.S. military, and Guam, a major U.S. military installation, serves as a forward base. This chain is vital for the U.S. to defend its allies within the First Island Chain and maintain a robust presence in the Pacific, even when faced with challenges near China's coastline. China is endeavouring to augment its influence in this region to counterbalance the U.S.

The Third Island Chain represents the outermost defence line, extending from the Aleutian Islands in Alaska through Hawaii and south to American Samoa and Fiji. The Third Island Chain constitutes the final defence line safeguarding the U.S. mainland. It hosts significant U.S. military bases, particularly in Hawaii, the home of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Although traditionally perceived as a secure area, China's expanding naval capabilities and influence in the Pacific Islands have raised concerns regarding the security of this chain.

China’s Strategic Penetration in the Pacific Islands

Ten Pacific Island Nations with Chinese-Funded Infrastructure

The following list provides some of the major ingresses made by China in the Pacific.

Solomon Islands: China has concentrated on infrastructure, with initiatives such as road improvements, health facilities, and a new national stadium. Discussions have also taken place regarding infrastructure that could serve both civilian and military purposes, such as ports and airfields.

Fiji: Significant projects include the construction of the Stinson Parade and Vatuwaqa Bridges, along with support for water and electricity systems.

Vanuatu: China has backed infrastructure projects such as the Malakula Island Highway and engaged in talks about dual-use infrastructure, including ports.

Papua New Guinea (PNG): Efforts include the restoration of the Highlands Highway and Independence Boulevard, with Chinese firms such as the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) playing a key role in Melanesia.

Kiribati: China has invested in solar energy projects and, after Kiribati shifted diplomatic recognition to Beijing, and has been involved in talks about dual-use infrastructure, such as upgrading a former U.S. airfield and potential port access.

Tonga: China helped rebuild infrastructure damaged by Cyclone Gita and supported the renovation of national roads. Tonga also owes China significant debt from various projects.

Samoa: China has offered technical assistance across different sectors and supported infrastructure projects, including agricultural projects.

Federated States of Micronesia (FSM): China has backed essential infrastructure, such as the Pohnpei highway.

Cook Islands: A comprehensive agreement with China aims to enhance maritime and air connectivity, positioning the Cook Islands as a regional logistics hub.

Nauru: After switching diplomatic recognition to Beijing, Nauru is part of agreements for deeper economic collaboration and is a focus of potential infrastructure projects.

The Northern Flanks and Maritime Chokepoints (Aleutians and Ryukyus)
At this stage, it would be worthwhile to look at the northern maritime region, that is, The Aleutian Islands and the Arctic Periphery, where China contests U.S. and Japanese dominance. In this context, the emphasis is less on infrastructure development and more on safeguarding navigation rights and intelligence gathering.

The Aleutian Islands, situated near Alaska, are crucial to the Chinese military and research operations. In July 2025, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) identified three Chinese military vessels and an additional ship in the Bering Sea within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), north of the Amchitka and Amukta Passes. The Chinese authorities claimed that these were "freedom of navigation operations" conducted in accordance with international regulations. This naval activity is reinforced by research initiatives, with the USCG monitoring five Chinese research vessels operating in or near the U.S. Arctic. These activities necessitated aerial reconnaissance by Air Station Kodiak. The data collected by these research vessels could be instrumental in future submarine operations and anti-submarine warfare. The persistent presence of these vessels compels the U.S. Northern Command and Alaskan Command to maintain vigilance, thereby allocating resources and highlighting China's challenge to international maritime norms within a competitor's domain.

The collaboration between China and Russia is intensifying, as exemplified by joint bomber missions over the Bering Sea and through the Bering Strait into the Arctic Ocean. This escalating presence has prompted the United States to consider reactivating former military installations, such as the one on Adak Island, and to enhance facilities such as the Eareckson Air Station, which is equipped with a radar system for missile tracking. 

The Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa and the Miyako Gap, are critical for regulating maritime routes between the East China Sea and Philippine Sea. China utilises this region for naval manoeuvres to project its power and assess Japan's defensive capabilities. Chinese naval vessels frequently navigate between the Okinawa and Miyako. In October 2025, two naval groups traversed this area: one proceeded to the East China Sea and the other to the Philippine Sea. The Japanese Navy is compelled to maintain vigilant surveillance of these regions by employing ships and aircraft, which presents ongoing challenges. 

China has increasingly concentrated its attention on Okinawa, developing narratives regarding the island and its geopolitical status. Among these narratives is the "Ryukyu Undetermined Status Theory." Beijing asserts that the San Francisco Peace Treaty lacks validity, arguing that while the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration confirm Taiwan as part of China, the status of Okinawa remains unresolved.

In light of the aforementioned developments, Japan is undertaking the establishment of missile installations, radar stations, ammunition depots, and other military facilities across the 160-island Ryukyu chain. Furthermore, substantial military resources are being allocated to Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's four principal islands. This includes the deployment of F-35 fighter jets and long-range missiles, as well as the expansion of its Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, which is comparable to the United States Marine Corps.

The Philippines and the First Island Chain  

The Philippines holds significant strategic importance because of its location at the southern end of the First Island Chain. Its geographical position facilitates control over the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait, rendering it a crucial partner in the event of tensions involving Taiwan or regional conflicts. 

China has sought to expand its territorial claims in this area through a "grey zone" strategy, which involves persistent, low-level harassment to assert its claims under the "Nine-Dash Line." Recently, at locations such as the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, China's Coast Guard and maritime militia have employed water cannons, instigated collisions, and even targeted Philippine personnel. These actions are not isolated incidents but rather part of a deliberate strategy to exhaust the Philippines and test the US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty. 

In response, the United States and the Philippines fortified their alliance under President Bongbong Marcos Jr. The Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) has been expanded, granting the U.S. access to nine military bases, including strategically significant bases in northern Luzon near Taiwan and Palawan near the South China Sea. Additionally, joint training exercises, such as "Balikatan", have intensified, with a focus on coastal defence and anti-ship tactics.

Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia: A New Southern Front

The China-Solomon Islands security pact of 2022 represents China's security agreement in the Pacific Islands region. The potential establishment of a Chinese military base in this strategically significant location would profoundly impact the U.S. and its allies.

While a Chinese military base in the South Pacific would be challenging to sustain, the mere prospect prompts the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand to redirect their focus and resources southward. This shift diverts attention from Taiwan and the South China Sea, thereby stretching the resources of the U.S. and its allies and complicating the maintenance of the "First Island Chain" strategy. China leverages security agreements to extend its influence without resorting to the use of force. In response, Australia and its partners have engaged in diplomatic protests and increased developmental assistance to counter China's influence in the region.

China employs naval vessels to project its strength and exert pressure on Australia and New Zealand. By navigating near their coastlines, it demonstrates its capability to threaten these nations and their citizens. This situation engenders concerns in Australia and New Zealand about potential isolation in a conflict, thereby augmenting China's influence on regional security. 

Extent of increasing Chinese influence in the regions near west and far east of the Pacific Islands

Ten Asian countries are major recipients of Chinese investment in port and inland connectivity projects. 

Malaysia: Significant investments, including a port in Kuala Linggi (Malacca) and stakes in ports such as Port Klang. The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) is a major railway project.

Brunei: Infrastructure and Ports

Myanmar: Development of the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal, which provides China with a strategic outlet to the Indian Ocean. Pipelines (oil and gas) and other connectivity plans linking Kyaukphyu to China's Yunnan Province.

Thailand: Part of the proposed Pan-Asia Railway network intended to link to Kunming, China, including lines that may connect to key Thai ports, such as Map Ta Phut on the Eastern Seaboard.

Cambodia: Cambodia and China have been involved in the development and upgrading of ports, including the Ream Naval Base and other projects. Various road, bridge, and highway projects connect the capital to rural and coastal areas.

Laos: The China-Laos Railway is a flagship BRI project that runs from the Chinese border to Vientiane, making Laos a land-linked hub.

Indonesia: The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed rail is a major Chinese-funded and built infrastructure project. China has also invested heavily in other sectors, such as mining and electric vehicle battery production.

Philippines: Projects involving irrigation, water supply, and railway development have been agreed upon with Chinese financing.

Vietnam: Vietnam is an active seeker of infrastructure investments, including some from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Chinese-led financial institution.

South Korea: Receives Chinese investments in various sectors, including electric vehicles and battery production.

Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN nations such as Brunei and Cambodia, are a focal point of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and other strategic endeavours. China has invested substantial financial resources in this region, projected to reach $76 billion, nearly equalling the combined contributions of the Asian Development Bank and Japan from 2015 to 2022. A sizeable portion of this investment (70%) was allocated to infrastructure development, including transportation and communication networks. In early 2025, China's involvement notably increased in countries such as Laos and Thailand.

The Kuantan Port in Malaysia serves as a significant example of a strategic corridor in this regard. The Beibu Gulf Port Group, a Chinese enterprise, holds a 40% stake in the consortium. Situated on the eastern coast and facing the South China Sea, the port features a New Deep-Water Terminal (NDWT) with a depth of 16 m, enabling it to accommodate large vessels with capacities of up to 180,000 t. This deep-water capability offers a crucial alternative route via the ECRL land bridge from Northport, that circumvents the congested Strait of Malacca, thereby enhancing Chinese supply lines and augmenting China's influence over trade routes. The port is linked to the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP), which integrates manufacturing and logistics. 

Six South American nations where China is currently building ports, wharves, jetties, or is involved in major port expansions and other related inland infrastructure projects like roads.

Peru: The Port of Chancay, valued at $3.5 billion, is a prominent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) endeavour, predominantly owned and managed by the Chinese state enterprise COSCO Shipping. It is a deep-water port on the Pacific coast of South America, designed to accommodate ultra-large container ships and set to emerge as a key transshipment centre for the area. Additionally, it is linked to inland routes, including highways leading to the Peruvian Andes. 

Brazil: China Merchants Port Co. has secured a 90% majority interest in TCP Participações, the entity overseeing the Port of Paranaguá, Brazil's second-largest port. The Chinese state agricultural corporation Cofco is constructing a new export terminal near São Paolo. Furthermore, there are reports of new port developments along the Amazon River, creating a waterway connecting Chinese-funded ports in Peru. 

Argentina: Chinese entities, specifically Hutchison Whampoa, possess a pier in Buenos Aires. There is also interest in establishing a port complex across the Chilean border near the Atlantic entrance of the Strait of Magellan.

Chile: China has engaged in discussions with the Chilean government about utilising the Port of Punta Arenas for Antarctic research purposes. China's involvement and interest also encompass the modernisation and expansion of ports in other cities such as Valparaíso. 

Uruguay: Port of Montevideo (Previous/Stalled Wharf) A Chinese-supported project for a wharf in Montevideo, led by Shandong BaoMa Company, was reportedly suspended due to transparency concerns. Chinese interests, possibly including Hutchison Whampoa, may also have a pier in Uruguay. 

Bolivia: Bolivia aims to reroute mineral exports through the newly established Port of Chancay in Peru. This has initiated discussions about a potential transcontinental railroad from Chancay to Brazil, with stops in Bolivia to facilitate mineral transportation.

The South American Transcontinental Railway

The main objective of this ambitious project is to create a direct land link between the Atlantic Ocean in Brazil and the Pacific Ocean in Peru, specifically through the newly constructed Chinese Port of Chancay.

Strategic Mineral Dependencies

China is actively engaged in securing critical mineral resources essential for its technology and defence sectors. The nation has concentrated its efforts on the "Lithium Triangle" countries—Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—which collectively possess half of the global lithium reserves. Chinese state-owned enterprises are involved in the development of the energy and resource sectors. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has acquired control or exclusive rights over various mining operations, often ensuring that a predetermined quantity of resources, such as copper and lithium, is prioritised for consumption by China. This strategy guarantees a consistent supply for China's burgeoning electric vehicle and battery industries, thereby supporting the BRI’s resource diversification objective.

Dual-Use Space and Intelligence Facilities

China operates a contentious tracking station in Patagonia, Argentina, known as the Neuquén Deep Space Station. Constructed by China Satellite Launch and Tracking General (CLTC), Argentine officials have described it as "dual use, but mainly military." The facility's large antennas can collect sensitive data, disrupt communications, and receive information on missile launches and drones. The agreement with Argentina has faced criticism for potentially compromising national sovereignty because of its stringent confidentiality clauses and restricted access to Argentines. Concerns were aggravated when construction commenced three months before formal approval was obtained.

Security, Arms Engagement, and Military Training in LAC

China has intensified its security engagement in Latin America. Venezuela is the largest purchaser of Chinese military equipment in the region, with expenditures amounting to $495 million between 2010 and 2020, representing 85.8% of its total arms imports. Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have procured military equipment from China. China has pursued technology transfer agreements, and in 2015, China and Argentina engaged in discussions regarding defence cooperation, encompassing advanced fighter jets, armoured vehicles, and naval vessels. Argentina is currently participating in China-LAC training programs and collaborating with the National Defence University of China. This cooperation extended to Brazil, which hosted Chinese Marines for the first time in a joint exercise in 2024. This development signifies a strengthened defence relationship, providing China with opportunities to expand its influence and share its training expertise.

Exploring the Idea of the Pacific Islands as Janus

There is a world of difference between viewing the Pacific as “islands in a far sea” and as “a sea of islands.” The first emphasizes dry surfaces in a vast ocean far from the centres of power. Focusing in this way stresses the smallness and remoteness of the islands. The second is a more holistic perspective in which things are seen in the totality of their relationships.

Hau'ofa, E. 1994. Our Sea of Islands

Janus, as is well known, was the two-faced Roman god of beginnings, transitions, time, duality, doorways, and endings.

The small island nations in the Pacific Ocean occupy a strategically significant yet precarious position, akin to Janus, a figure symbolically gazing in two directions simultaneously, focusing on both the United States and China, each vying for their influence.

The Two Faces of Janus:

China offers rapid infrastructure development, substantial investments, and access to new markets through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The United States maintains long-standing relationships, security assurances, democratic values, and substantial communities originating from these islands. China provides swift funding for critical projects, including ports and communication networks, which Western nations might delay or reject. The United States emphasises climate resilience, governance, education, health, and shared values, such as the rule of law. The United States has strong cultural ties, particularly in its territories, and exerts influence through the English language and media.

The Janus metaphor encapsulates the dual challenges and opportunities confronting Pacific Island leaders. They must balance their economic ties with China and security ties with the United States. Their success hinges on not choosing sides but rather leveraging competition to secure the resources necessary for survival and development, ensuring that they retain control.

The U.S./Western Security Architecture (Looking East). The United States and its allies, including Australia, New Zealand, France, and Japan, primarily perceive the Pacific Islands through the lens of maritime security and defence. The United States has maintained longstanding involvement in regional security, particularly through agreements with Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. These agreements confer special military privileges on the US over a substantial portion of the Pacific, effectively excluding rival powers. Western powers aim to preserve the status quo and prevent China from establishing military bases that could jeopardise critical maritime routes or encroach upon U.S. and allied territories. The United States collaborates with Pacific Islands on security matters through Coast Guard and Navy patrols, joint military exercises, and assistance in maritime surveillance and the prevention of illegal fishing, often under the pretext of safeguarding Pacific Island sovereignty.

China's Expanding Security Footprint (Looking West). China's interests in the Pacific have evolved from purely economic to political and nascent military objectives. According to Western perspectives, China's investments in ports, airfields, and communication networks have potential military applications, such as naval support or surveillance. China is increasingly providing assistance and training to island police forces, focusing on maintaining order and riot control rather than traditional defence. For the islands, engagement with China can signify an expansion of security partnerships and a demonstration to the West that they cannot be disregarded. The 2022 security agreement between China and Solomon Islands underscored this tension.

Islands frequently feel compelled to accept the initial or most financially appealing security offers. The need for a new patrol boat or police equipment can swiftly lead to a security agreement with political ramifications. Many islands aspire to maintain neutrality and avoid formal alliances; however, their small size and limited resources render them susceptible to pressure from both sides, necessitating a careful balance of their independence. 

"Third Pole" Geopolitics in the Pacific

France is a "Third Pole" Geopolitics in the Pacific Amidst US-China tensions, France aspires to be an alternative partner, emphasising autonomy and collaboration while cautioning against emerging forms of regional dominance. France maintains a significant presence in the Pacific because of its historical ties and overseas territories. 

The French territories in the Pacific include: 

New Caledonia, which is governed by the Nouméa Accord granting it a degree of autonomy and the right to hold referenda on its future. French Polynesia enjoys considerable autonomy and encompasses islands such as Tahiti, Wallis, and a smaller territory Futuna. 

These territories provide France with the world's second-largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with approximately 67% of the total global EEZ, approximately 7 million kilometres, located in the Pacific. This vast maritime domain is a core strategic asset for the country.

France's strategy is outlined in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which aims for a region that is "open and inclusive, free of all forms of coercion."

France maintains a significant and permanent military presence (approximately 2,900 personnel in the Pacific) through its Armed Forces in New Caledonia (FANC) and French Polynesia (FAPF). This presence is tasked with upholding French sovereignty, protecting the EEZ, and providing civil security. A primary focus is on maritime governance, specifically combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and transnational organised crime across its enormous EEZ.

France is an active security partner, participating in multilateral forums such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) and the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (Pacific Quad) with the US, Australia, and New Zealand. France is a partner in the FRANZ Arrangement (France, Australia, New Zealand), providing rapid aid and logistics for disaster response in the Pacific Islands, a crucial role given the region's vulnerability to climate change. 

Mobilising the European Union: As the sole European Union member state with a permanent presence in the region, France is actively engaged in "Europeanizing" its Pacific initiatives by encouraging the EU to enhance its developmental and diplomatic involvement.

India's Connection with Pacific Island Nations (PINs)

India's engagement with the Pacific Island Nations (PINs) has significantly intensified in recent years, moving from a low-profile relationship to a strategic partnership under the expanded 'Act East' Policy. This outreach is driven by geopolitical considerations, a shared commitment to the Global South, and mutual interest in key sectors. The cornerstone of India's Pacific engagement is the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), established by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Fiji in 2014. The FIPIC includes India and 14 Pacific Island nations (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu). It serves as a platform for regular, high-level dialogue at the Head of Government/State levels. 

India's renewed focus on PINs is motivated by several strategic and developmental factors.

-PINs are crucial components of the Indo-Pacific region. India views engagement as necessary to promote a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific and solidify its role as a regional security and development provider.

- The growing economic and political influence of China in the South Pacific has provided impetus for India, often in cooperation with Quad partners (the US, Japan, and Australia), to enhance its partnerships in the region.

- India positions itself as a leading voice for the Global South, championing the concerns of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) at international forums such as the G20 and the UN, especially on issues of climate change and sustainable development.

-The 12 PINs with UN voting rights are important partners for India in multilateral forums, including supporting India's bid for a permanent seat on the reformed UN Security Council.

- Nations such as Fiji have a large population of Indian origin, providing a strong cultural and people-to-people link.

India, a founding member of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), collaborates with PINs on climate adaptation and capacity building for natural disaster management, often providing immediate humanitarian assistance to them. India offers an annual grant-in-aid to each of the 14 PICs for community development projects. Initiatives include establishing a super-specialty cardiology hospital in Fiji, providing dialysis units & sea ambulances, and supplying affordable generic drugs & essential medicines.

India leverages its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program to offer scholarships and training opportunities, particularly in IT and renewable energy (e.g., solar power).

Maritime Cooperation includes hydrography, coastal surveillance, and establishing a space research and satellite monitoring station (in Fiji) to help with resource mapping and weather and climate change monitoring.

India's outreach to the Pacific Island Nations is a comprehensive effort to foster a durable, mutually beneficial relationship based on development cooperation and strategic convergence, demonstrating its commitment to the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Way ahead for Pacific Island Nations

Small Pacific Island nations, which lack the capacity to develop naval forces comparable to those of China, should prioritise strategies that restrict unregulated Chinese movement within their territorial waters. These nations must develop security capabilities individually, collectively as a consortium of Pacific Island Nations, and in cooperation with the United States and allied nations. These capabilities should be envisioned alongside the necessary security infrastructure, including ports, dockyards, runways, radar stations, satellite stations, and facilities for the repair and maintenance of aircraft and unmanned vehicles.

The traditional reactive approach by the U.S. and allies to addressing China's strategy should be replaced by consistent investment in the Pacific Islands, entailing a commitment to sustained developmental assistance, such as the construction of climate-resilient infrastructure and the combatting of corruption. By presenting a stable alternative to China's strategy, the United States and its allies can counteract China's influence and strengthen regional governance.

The United States and its allies should continue to provide and train local forces in defence capabilities. Provisioning of coastal defence missiles, unmanned systems, and enhanced maritime awareness represent effective and cost-efficient tools that would serve as deterrents without necessitating parity with China's numerical strength.

A cohesive front is imperative in this regard; the United States, Japan, Australia, and other partners must synchronise their diplomatic and security measures to counter China's influence. 

No people on earth are more suited to be guardians of the world’s largest ocean than those whom it has been home for generations…Our role in the protection and development of our ocean is no mean task; it is no less than a major contribution to the  well-being of humanity. Because it could give us a sense of doing something not only worthwhile but noble, we should seize the moment with dispatch. 

Hau'ofa, E. 1994. Our Sea of Islands