Background

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed in 2010 and renewed in 2021, formed the groundwork of strategic stability between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. The Treaty had imposed limits on the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads on 700 deployed nuclear delivery systems (airplanes, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles) and to 800 deployed and non-deployed nuclear launchers of those missiles and airplanes that could launch nuclear weapons. Since the treaty only applied to strategic and deployed nuclear weapons, both countries have larger nuclear arsenals, with Russia estimated to possess 5,459 nuclear warheads and the United States 5,177. The treaty included strict verification procedures such as on-site inspections and data exchange. The expiration of the New START on February 5, 2026, has resulted in the lifting of legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals; thus, ushering in an era marked by increased uncertainty and strategic competition. 

The tensions between the US and the Russian Federation started in 2023 following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The United States determined that Russia was in non-compliance with the treaty in February 2023, and several weeks later, Russian President Putin officially declared that Russia would suspend its compliance with the treaty, rejecting inspections and data exchange with the United States. The United States responded by deciding to no longer share new information with Russia required by New START.

As stated in the report issued by Nuclear Threat Initiative, the end of New START represents a shift from limits of nuclear weapons at the same time as the existence of nuclear threat and reflects the decades-old erosion of arms control architecture. Unfortunately, it was the US intransigence that led to the expiration of the treaty as the Russian Federation had expressed a keen interest in renegotiation of the treaty. Even a suggestion by the Russian Federation to extend the treaty by one year to allow more negotiations was vetoed by the Trump administration which has a gung-ho attitude towards the strategic arms control regime. At numerous occasions President Trump expressed his desire to start retesting and developing more advanced strategic weapons. All this while, the US was able to conduct cold tests to verify the reliability of its existing strategic weapons. Having extended the nuclear non-proliferation treaty indefinitely in 1995, the US by abandoning the new START has clearly violated Article VI of the NPT which states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Consequences of Mutual Arms Reduction Regime

In response to the demise of the New START, both the US and Russian Federation could increase their nuclear arsenals; however, there are also limits based on their historical rivalry and strategic doctrines. In contrast to the US and Russia, China is not bound by a treaty or moral obligations and will expand its nuclear capabilities faster and from a lower starting point. Therefore, this asymmetry makes China’s relative position stronger, especially in an evolving multipolar nuclear environment. Even while the New START was in place, in various international non-proliferation conferences, Chinese academics and policy analysts took the position that their nuclear arsenal was nowhere near the numbers for the US and the Russian Federation and they planned to increase their strategic assets till China achieves numerical parity with both US and the Russian Federation.

The verification and transparency provisions of New START were also critical and allowed for the US and Russia to gain insight into each other’s nuclear force levels; thus, reducing uncertainties and reducing the risk of miscalculation. With the expiration of New START, this has also removed many sources of verification regarding nuclear deployments. No comparable verification measures are in place with China; thus, it can take advantage of a higher degree of opacity and strategic ambiguity to enhance its deterrent credibility and complicate adversarial planning. 

Hence the expiration of the New START catalyzes the slow death of the NPT as the Nuclear States under the NPT have failed to keep their commitment for total nuclear disarmament.

Advantage China

With the expiration of New START, the US and Russia are left in a state of strategic asymmetry in favor of China. In this context, China will be the primary beneficiary. Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China has remained outside of any formal arms control agreements, due to an inequality in size of both arsenals and since China ostensibly adheres to a doctrine of no-first use and minimum deterrence. Therefore, it is also worth noting that there are reports of a significant and rapid increase in the modernization of China’s nuclear capabilities, which are currently estimated at 600 warheads with potential to grow to 1,500 by 2030. In addition, China is developing additional missile silo fields, developing improved delivery systems and is now achieving a more credible nuclear triad. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear program is essentially an extension of the Chinese nuclear program.

From a geo-economic point of view, both the US and Russian Federation are declining economically while China still has foreign exchange reserves of $3.4 trillion and its trade balance continues to grow in a positive direction. While both the US and the Russian Federation may face budgetary constraints, China is not affected in that domain and can invest heavily into its strategic arsenal at a rapid pace. 

Finally, without New START, China is less likely to be included in future arms control negotiations. The treaty provided a previous structural framework for potential trilateral (US, Russia, China) arms control frameworks.

The collapse of arms control significantly restricts the diplomatic ability to obtain formal regional treaties with China, as noted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies; without an existing bilateral regime, it will be more difficult to seek broader control of arms in a formal way. The failure of arms control also slows the rate of U.S.-Russian competition since they will both divert their sources and energy to retain parity with one another. By lowering the competition between the two nations, this creates additional time and resources for China to modernise its nuclear arsenal without the immediate pressures felt by the U.S. and Russia. Based on 2020–2026 US State Department allegations and subsequent intelligence releases, the US claims China conducted a low-yield, underground nuclear explosive test at its Lop Nur site on June 22, 2020. China has rejected these allegations as "completely groundless." The US accused China of using "decoupling" techniques—detonating devices in large underground cavities—to hide the true magnitude of the tests from monitoring systems. 

Hence, while China continues to modernise and expand its strategic arsenal, it will be able to position itself as a “responsible nuclear state” seeking stability internationally and thereby gain international recognition as a state contributing to stability, but without having to make binding commitments that create restrictions upon its modernisation of its nuclear arsenal.

Multipolar Nuclear Order

The erosion of the arms control removes any credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which increases the likelihood that nations in volatile areas will have increased proliferation of nuclear weapons. The transition from an established bipolar to a multipolar nuclear order provides an additional benefit to states such as China that historically have not had to comply with arms control treaty restrictions, since there are no longer any internationally recognized legal regimes in place to regulate the proliferation of nuclear arms. In addition, a state such as China, as a new and rapidly developing nuclear power, is particularly well positioned to take advantage of this transition from a bipolar order to a multipolar order since China will have an opportunity to shape the global nuclear order in a manner consistent with its national security interests.

These developments have considerable global security ramifications. The elimination of  treaties limiting U.S. & Russia's development of nuclear weapons, poses a potential nuclear arms race with both a quantitative increase in the number of nuclear weapons/warheads and a qualitative development in the sophistication of nuclear weapons systems. Plus, without verification and transparency mechanisms there will be a heightened risk of miscalculating, meaning crisis stability will be diminished. 

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear (TPNW) is the stand-alone legal framework along with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These two treaties are the only globally applicable regulations in force that explicitly ban nuclear weapons activities, from nuclear use to nuclear testing to nuclear development. TPNW sends a strong message that a renewed arms race is not only morally unacceptable but illegal under international law in most of the world. Every country that is a party to TPNW sends a strong message to nuclear-armed states that they are on the wrong side of history. Joining the TPNW is an important step that all countries can take to press for disarmament in these dangerous times.

Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament:

There is an urgent need for new policy approaches to meet these nuclear proliferation challenges. There are instances in the past where countries have undertaken nuclear disarmament unilaterally. Besides Ukraine, in the past, unilateral nuclear disarmament was pursued for various reasons, including external pressure from the international community. South Africa, Libya, Iraq, Brazil and Argentina pursued unilateral disarmament. South Africa gave up its nuclear arsenal voluntarily before the dismantling of the apartheid regime on shrewd political calculations. The apartheid regime read the tea leaves and did not want a nuclear arsenal to fall into the hands of the African National Congress-led South African government. Countries like the UK that have the benefit of extended nuclear deterrence umbrella provided by the US need to seriously undertake unilateral nuclear disarmament as a moral imperative. In this regard, the UK must follow the Japanese example. Despite provocations from its two nuclear neighbors, Japan has explicitly ruled out the nuclear option because it enjoys the US extended nuclear deterrence umbrella.

Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament:

Efforts should begin by developing plurilateral arms control discussions that will involve China along with the US and the Russian Federation; start with confidence-building measures, and work to develop full limitations. Additional interim verification mechanisms, data exchanges will help to offset the absence of treaty-based verification and develop enhanced communication channels. More so, the need to strike a proper balance between credible deterrents and restraint to avoid escalating destabilizing arms competitions are paramount. Finally, it is essential to revitalize multilateral structures to maintain the standards of non-proliferation globally and maintain strategic stability.

Conclusions

To sum up, the end of New START is a pivotal turning point in nuclear governance around the world. The end of the treaty will not only worsen the risks of arms races and increase the strategic uncertainty associated with using nuclear weapons, but it also creates an opportunity for China and its vassal state North Korea to increase their combined strategic arsenal. China will use its enhanced nuclear arsenal, its relative power and influence on the global stage to blackmail and intimidate its neighbors.  Operating under no formal legal or moral restrictions, China can use the strategic distractions of the two established nuclear superpowers to establish itself as a key player in shaping the future of global nuclear governance. If there are no concerted efforts made to develop new, inclusive mechanisms for arms control, the global community could enter a prolonged period of competition and instability in the international system.

References

[1] Nuclear Threat Initiative, The End of New START: From Limits to Looming Risks, 2026.

[2] Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, New START Expires: What Happens Next?, 2026.

[3] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Three Truths About the End of New START and What It Means for Strategic Competition, 2026.

[4] RAND Corporation, New START’s Expiration Will Make the World Less Safe, 2026.

[5] The Diplomat, New START’s Expiration Is a Win for China, 2026.

[6] U.S. Department of State, New START Treaty Factsheet, 2021.

[7] Vrinda Rastogi and Dr. Adityanjee: Should the UK undertake unilateral nuclear disarmament?  https://www.councilforstrategicaffairs.org/csa-journal/vrinda-rastogi

Background Information

In this newly proposed Islamic security bloc, Pakistan is in an important position. It is the only Muslim country that has nuclear weapons and delivery systems and has repeatedly threatened to use them at a low threshold. Having nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, gives a country a lot of strategic influence, even if it is not very big or rich. Stephen Walt's Balance of Threat theory (1987) says that countries form military alliances because they feel threatened, not because of how powerful another country is. If Pakistan is part of a defence bloc or military alliance, it might have more influence in international relations even if its military strength does not change.

Turkey's possible involvement in this defence bloc adds a layer of strategic complexity. As a longstanding member of NATO, Turkey is part of one of the established military alliances of countries that work together on defence, security and strategic issues internationally. NATO has a strong system of working together, sharing information and defending each other. Turkey has also been working to make its domestic military industrial complex stronger in areas like drones, ships and missiles. This means Turkey has adequate capacity and control over its own defence needs and is less dependent on other countries. Modern Turkey, under the current leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has a clear, overt, and stated Caliphatic ambition and may indulge in dalliance with this compelling idea without sacrificing its existing relationship with NATO.

Islamic NATO Concept: Potential and Pitfalls:

This concept of an Islamic NATO equivalent is strategically seductive and eye-catching, indeed.  The combination of Pakistan's weapons, Turkey's defence industry and Saudi Arabia's money is why some people think this group might be the start of a new military alliance. When countries work together and share their strengths, it can be the start of an alliance. Glenn Snyder's work suggests that alliances often start small and grow over a period. Therefore, the idea of an Islamic “NATO" might not be a fully formed group, but it could be the start of something more nascent.

However, we should be careful not to get too excited. NATO is not just a name; it is the result of decades of countries working together. The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan does not have the level of cooperation and shared defence plans as NATO, despite professing an Article 5-like posture. There is no treaty that says these countries will defend each other. Reports about Turkey's involvement suggest that these are preliminary talks only. No formal agreement has been made. For an alliance to be strong, the countries involved need to agree on what mutual threats they face. Pakistan is mostly worried about India. Saudi Arabia is concerned about stability in the region and Iran. Turkey has a lot of security concerns, including the Eastern Mediterranean and its responsibilities as a NATO member. When countries do not agree on what mutual threats they face, it is hard for them to work together effectively. John Mearsheimer’s theory opines that alliances are a way for countries to balance power. They often do not work well if the countries do not share the same security concerns.

Saudi Arabia’s economic ties with India also affect its relationships with countries like Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and India have a partnership in areas like energy, trade and investment. India is one of the customers of Saudi Arabia’s energy. Trade between the two countries is growing, implying Saudi Arabia is unlikely to take a strong military stance against India, a rising regional power, even if it is working with Pakistan and Turkey. The current situation in the world also supports this view.

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept says that the world is becoming more competitive and that many countries are trying to increase their influence. In this situation, countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey are trying to work with partners to increase their autonomy and security. This is not the start of a rigid alliance but rather a flexible way of working together.

Implications for India

For India, this situation has multiple strategic implications. First of all, it affects how India is seen and perceived as a deterrent. Even if there is no agreement for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to defend each other, the fact that they are working together might make India more cautious. In deterrence theory, how countries perceive each other’s strength and intentions is very important.

Secondly, it affects the geopolitical situation in the maritime domain. Pakistan's location on the Arabian Sea, Turkey’s naval expansion and Saudi Arabia's control of sea lanes create a maritime arc near India's western coast. While there is no naval agreement, cooperation between these countries could change the strategic situation and maritime threats in the western Indian Ocean. India needs to keep investing in its capabilities and awareness of the sea to maintain its maritime security.

Thirdly, it affects the regional challenges and security situation in India’s near abroad. Taming Pakistan's nuclear posture is crucial for strategic stability in the Indian subcontinent. India’s Operation Sindoor has indirectly exposed the preponderant and overwhelming Nuclear Posturing and stark differences in the actual reality of Pakistan. While there is no visible sign of nuclear-sharing agreements, consultation between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could affect how future crises are managed. The risk is not that these countries will share nuclear weapons but that their closer military relationship could make it harder to reduce tensions.

India’s Response

However, it would be wrong to see these strategic developments as a sign of a conflict between India and a rising Islamic bloc. The current situation is more about some Islamic countries working together based on their security interests than forming rigid military alliances. As day by day, the nations are losing trust in the UN as a neutral body for arbitration, alternative arrangements are being sought eagerly. Overreacting to this situation could lead to escalation, while underestimating it could lead to complacency.

Thus, India's strategic response should be careful and measured. Therefore, a balanced outlook of ‘जागृतम् अहर्निशम्’ (alertness coupled with calmness) is the need of the hour. India needs to have balanced causal modelling considering all three x,y and z parameters and all possible permutations and combinations of them in different realms at the sub-surface and surface level. Diplomatically, India should keep talking to Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Economically, India should try to reduce its dependence on any one country for energy needs. Militarily, India should focus on making its defence-military-industrial complex and counter-intelligence systems stronger and more integrated. India must focus on increasing its capabilities in research and innovation with more budgetary allocations than the present paltry 0.6-0.7 % of the budget spent on R & D. This will help India maintain its deterrence credibility with a solid perception warfare of narratives. India should have a clear idea and operational plan about faultlines in different theatres (both intra and inter-country perspectives) without escalating the conflict situation.

Critique of the Islamic NATO Concept

The recent war in West Asia, with the US and Israeli attacks on Iran and its counterattacks on GCC countries, has demolished the strategic notion of an Islamic NATO in its infancy.  What may be possible in future is probably not an Islamic NATO but a SUTO (Sunni United Treaty Organisation) as there are deep sectarian faultlines in the Islamic world.   The lofty concept of the universal ummah being responsible for mutual security and defence of each Islamic nation is a non-starter.

Even in the post-World War II era, we have witnessed nationalistic wars among Islamic nations, e.g. Pakistan and Bangladesh, Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Libya and Chad, Indonesia and Malaysia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, etc. The unresolved intra-state conflicts between Islamic countries have led to fissiparous tendencies. The Kurdish insurgency spans over five Islamic countries. Similarly, both Iran and Pakistan are unable to crush the separatism of Baluch nationalists. Currently, we don’t see Pakistan rushing to the defence of Saudi Arabia in the recent ongoing war in West Asia. Nor do we see the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia coming to the defence of Pakistan in its open war with Afghanistan.

Conclusions

The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement and the possibility of cooperation between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Islamic nations are developments in a world where strategic alliances are fluid and changing. They do not yet form a stable strategic alliance, like NATO, but these feeble attempts should not be ignored either. Security alliances often evolve based on mutuality of intent and commonality of purpose. For India, the best approach is to be strategically patient and continue to build capacity and enhance capabilities. Continued threat perception, threat assessment and capacity building with ongoing defence modernisation will make the nation adequately prepared and vigilant as it navigates this changing situation.

References

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), “Report of the Monday Morning Meeting on Saudi Arabia–Pakistan Defence Agreement,”

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,

Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

MEMRI, “On the Way to an Islamic NATO? Turkey Advances Towards Membership in the Saudi–Pakistan Defense Pact,” https://www.memri.org/reports/way-islamic-nato-turkey-advances-towards-membership-saudi-pakistan-defense-pact

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Military Expenditure Database,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

A Cryogenic Triumph Amid Sanctions

The story of India's cryogenic engine began in 1994, in the shadow of sanctions imposed by the United States. When the US blocked the Indo-Russian cryogenic technology transfer deal, India could have easily retreated. Under the visionary leadership within ISRO, India invested heavily in building the CE-20 engine from scratch [1][3]. It was a massive national effort integrating materials science, thermodynamics, electronics, and just sheer willpower. The result was a high-performance engine that operates on liquid hydrogen and oxygen to produce the thrust needed to place satellites in geostationary orbit [4]. There were serious attempts by unknown powers to sabotage this indigenous effort by framing space scientists in fraudulent cases. Former ISRO scientist Nambi Narayanan was falsely implicated in a 1994 espionage case, tortured, and arrested for allegedly selling space secrets. The Supreme Court declared him innocent in 2018, citing a conspiracy to damage India's space program, leading to a CBI probe into officials who framed him. 

But this success was not just a story of engineering. It was a triumph of institutional design, national pride, and visionary leadership.

The Power of Perception: Space as a National Dream

Space exploration became a symbol of national pride in the US and the former USSR during the Cold War years. Every rocket launch was treated by the superpowers as a declaration of intellectual supremacy. Amplified by powerful public relations campaigns, this "craze for space" seeped into the global consciousness. [5]

In the US, NASA became a unique American brand: a cultural icon symbolising human aspiration. Films, textbooks, museums, and even children's toys glorified astronauts and scientists. Space became a metaphor for excellence and intellect. Hence, generations of young minds aspired to work in aerospace rather than ship-engineering or mechanical design. To engage the public more intensively, NASA started to recruit civilians into the space program. Christa McAuliffe,  a high school teacher, was selected as the first participant in NASA’s "Teacher in Space Project". She died alongside six crew members on January 28, 1986, when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds into its flight. 

Similarly, in the former USSR, young pioneers were encouraged to undertake space science as careers to serve the Soviet Union. Later, both China and India both followed that trend. Space, not the sea, became the romantic frontier.

For the government of India and the public alike, "to dream big" came to mean "to dream of space". The invisible maritime domain, so vital for trade, defence and national power, was never able to capture the emotional imagination.

The Budgetary Truth: Priorities Speak in Rupees

It is also an institutional difference. Since Independence, India has neglected adequate budgetary allocations for its strategic options. However, for the last two decades, the government of the day has steadily financed space research as a committed mission. From the early days of INCOSPAR under Vikram Sarabhai to today's lunar and solar missions, the Department of Space has enjoyed significant budgetary support and autonomy despite political noise from certain motivated and ideological quarters.

The maritime sector, on the other hand, was treated as a sub-branch of transport: for decades, India did not even have a separate Ministry of Shipping; it was part of the Ministry of Transport, where Railways dominated in both funds and political attention. When road transport became politically visible and electorally valuable, it too rose in prominence, leaving shipping to play the role of Cinderella. The attitude of the policy-planners and politicians in the early years following independence was a carry-over of the mindset and policies of the historic Mughal rule who neglected the navy and maritime domain for centuries, strategically viewing India merely as a land power. Marathas under the leadership of Chatrapati Shivaji, in contrast, had focused on the development of naval forces and bases. History knows of the famous Admirals like Tulaji Angre and Kanhoji Angre. In an earlier era, the Chola kingdom was known for its seafaring blue-water navy that left its impressions as far as the Philippines. Under British-occupied India, private sector shipbuilding received a boost with the Wadia family building more than 400 ships, including warships for the British Royal Navy, albeit to augment the maritime strength of the colonial empire.

It is only in recent years that policymakers have sought to correct this imbalance through initiatives such as the Sagarmala Program and the Maritime India Vision 2030 [6] [7]. But the lost decades have cost India its place in the global shipbuilding ecosystem.

Democracy and the Politics of Visibility

In a democracy, policy is driven by public opinion. Politicians need visible success stories- rockets roaring into the sky, not silent engines powering cargo ships.

Rockets inspire awe, create television spectaculars, and symbolise national capability. Ships, by contrast, vanish over the horizon. Their success is not visible to the public.

Thus, while rockets became instruments of pride, shipyards became bureaucratic concerns. Governments saw shipbuilding not as an engine of prosperity but as a problem of inefficiency, unions and subsidies.

The Forgotten Workforce and Brain-Drain

When India's shipyards did show potential in the 1970s and 1980s, local politics, unionism and red tape smothered the spark. Skilled technicians and engineers found better opportunities abroad. Today, Indian marine engineers are prized workers in Dubai, Singapore, South Korea and Europe, but rarely find fulfilling prospects here.

This migration of talent is both a cause and consequence of India's neglected marine-engine ecosystem. Without adequate R&D funding, modern test facilities or competitive pay, the best minds in marine propulsion drift to other sectors or other shores.

Kaveri and the Cost of Neglect

India’s Kaveri engine project, perhaps, is the most telling example of what went wrong outside ISRO. The establishment took a laissez-faire attitude.  Initiated in the 1980s, it remains incomplete after over three decades and billions of rupees in expenditure [8]. Though ISRO mastered the physics of cryogenics, the Gas Turbine Research Establishment struggled to bridge the gap between theoretical research and industrial-scale production. Somewhere in between, domestic corruption encouraged imports as commissions were paid and bribes demanded. We are still struggling to import jet engines, giving leverage to foreign powers that deliberately delay the supply of engines in a timely manner, causing serious delays in domestic fighter jet production targets. Everyone knows the story of delays in imports of GE 404 and GE 414 engines.

Meanwhile, India’s ship-building ecosystem remains dependent on imported marine propulsion systems for naval as well as commercial watercraft today [7]. The ship-building industry focuses on hulls and assembly, not on the “heart” of the ship, which is the engine.

This imbalance must change.

Why ISRO Succeeded Where Others Stumbled

ISRO's success is not an accident but a blueprint. Its lessons for India's shipyards and skies are clear: The visionary leadership of ISRO, from Sarabhai to Sivan, has combined scientific expertise with institution-building skills despite attempts to sabotage by foreign adversaries, ideological critiques and scarce funding.

National Pride as Motivation. ISRO harnessed the emotional pull of national pride: “India can do it.” National pride has given a strong purpose to our space scientists despite some recent failures. Marine engineering has yet to evoke such sentiment.

Dedicated Institutional Ecosystem: Now, ISRO has complete autonomy, advanced coordination with academia, and in-house testing facilities. Ship-building R&D remains scattered among PSUs, DRDO labs, and private entities.

Global Benchmarking. ISRO benchmarked itself against NASA and Roscosmos. Indian shipyards were benchmarked against each other or against cost constraints.

Stable Funding: Yearly budgetary allocations and long-term project continuity have helped ISRO plan decades, though it does not match the level of funding by superpowers for their space programs. Marine and jet-engine programs saw their futures being constantly reset with leadership changes.

The Way Forward: Building Our Own Ocean of Innovation

Essentially, India's vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat should be expanded from space and defence to indigenous marine and aero-engine ecosystems. As much as in the orbits, the future of India's economic and strategic power lies in the oceans.

For this purpose, we need:

A focused Marine Propulsion Mission, along the lines of ISRO’s organisation.

Integration of academic, defence, and private R&D under one national vision. What we need is civil-military fusion leading to the development of an integrated ecosystem.

A dedicated Mission like the National Quantum Mission, National Hydrogen Mission, etc., for Marine Engines

Public campaigns through the use of departments (like the Central Bureau of Communication or Doordarshan under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting OR MyGov.in) to make maritime technology a national aspiration, not an invisible profession.

If India could build the CE-20 engine from scratch after sanctions, it could build a marine engine that could power its navy and merchant fleet. The oceans await their Sarabhai moment and their ISRO. Therefore, we propose the creation of a new nodal agency: Indian Maritime Research and Development Organisation (IMRDO) on the pattern of ISRO, to lead India into maritime greatness! India cannot achieve superpower status without complete maritime dominance over the Indo-Pacific region. The time to act is now, before it is too late.

References

[1] ISRO (2025). “Flight Acceptance Hot Test of CE-20 Cryogenic Engine Successful for LVM3-M6 Mission.”

[2] IAF (2016). “Development Status of CE-20 Cryogenic Engine for GSLV LVM3 Vehicle.”

[3] Cryogenics Society (2023). “Explained: Why ISRO Again Test-Fired Its CE-20 Cryogenic Engine Ahead of Next Flight.”

[4] Jagran Josh (2025). “How ISRO’s CE-20 Cryogenic Engine is Important for the Gaganyaan Space Mission.”

[5] Observer Research Foundation (2024). “The Missing Heartbeat: Why Atmanirbharta in India’s Ship-building Requires Indigenous Marine Engines.”

[6] India Foundation (2025). “India’s Maritime Renaissance: Indigenising Marine Engines for Atmanirbhar Vision,” by Harsh Sinha & Ashutosh Kashyap

[7] Indian Express (2025). “On Marine Engine Production, India Must Set Sail on Its Own.”

[8] Business Today (2025). “Not Just Kaveri: Sanjeev Sanyal Says India Must Build Marine Engines to Truly Steer Its Own Course.”

[9] Times of India (2025). “Shipbuilding Vision 2037 Outlines Reforms for Maritime Sector.”

Bipolarity and Avoidance of Thucydides Trap:

The term "Thucydides Trap," was coined by Prof Graham Allison in his book, Destined for War and has become a buzzword in the western strategic discourse [3]. This concept refers to the precarious situation when an ascending hegemon threatens to displace a reigning hegemon—a situation that historically has often led to war. The US and the former Soviet Union (FSU) avoided major war by not confronting each other directly. However, the US engaged FSU while containing it simultaneously and encouraging China to emerge as a rising power to balance the former Soviet Union. As China continues to rise, challenging the global leadership of the United States, the concept of Thucydides trap is relevant. The US establishment is heavily preoccupied in avoiding a direct war over with China over Taiwan Strait. US is essentially repeating the historic formula of dissolution of the FSU by engaging China economically but also allying with others in containment of China. US has learnt from its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan that it cannot sustain a faraway war for long without hemorrhaging its economy and depleting its military. The proposed G-2 condominium is a shrewd strategic move by the US to placate China as a perceived peer to avoid direct war.

Emerging Poles:

Besides the US and China, we are, indeed witnessing an oligo-polar world with other poles being the Russian Federation, the EU and India. Groups like BRICS-plus, G-20, ASEAN and SCO would facilitate multipolarity despite attempts by the US to foist bipolarity in the form of G-2 Condominium. From the US perspective, engaging China while simultaneously containing it in a bipolar world gives it higher probability of extending its shelf-life as the reigning hegemon of the world. The US has historical experience of doing the same during the cold war years with the rival superpower, the former Soviet Union. The US started to engage China under Nixon administration, helped it grow economically and strategically while containing the Soviet Union. From Chinese perspective, the goal is to keep world bipolar and Asia unipolar till China can achieve its long-term goal of unipolar world order led by Communist China. China is fiercely contesting the rise of India and Japan in the Asian theatre.

Russian Federation & G-2:

From the perspective of the Russian Federation, G-2 condominium between US and China is a national insult. Russia is asserting its major power status and signaling to the world that it is not a junior partner of China. Under Putin doctrine, dissolution of the FSU was a major national catastrophe. Russian Federation would prefer to resurrect the FSU if possible. Russian Federation has geostrategic compulsions owing to the Ukraine war with NATO and EU necessitating closer cooperation with China. That country has made historic claims on currently Russian territories including Vladivostok port and the Russian far east. Russia is acutely aware of the dangers of G-2 condominium and would support India in plurilateral platforms to balance China. The recent visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India and enhanced bilateral economic and military cooperation is a testimony to Russian agenda of asserting its strategic weight and influence globally without yielding space on the table. Russian Federation’s technological assistance to India with the navigational capability and capacity in the fast thawing Arctic and the Northern Sea route suggests that Russia is uncomfortable with China’s postulation of “Near Arctic country”  status.

Japan & G-2:

Post World War II Japan has been hamstrung by the MacArthur dictated constitution that does not allow for power projection by Japan internationally and restricts the Japanese defense forces a limited mandate to defend the country. Abe doctrine sought to change that situation in early 2000s. the geopolitical situation today is very different from pre–World War II era. Japan is no more an imperialistic country bent upon subjugating other Asian nations militarily. This has led to Chinese belligerence in the Asian theaters as it remains unchecked and unbalanced in Northeast Asia. The comments by the newly sworn in, first female conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on lack of historicity of Chinese claims on Taiwan created an uproar in China. Free and open Taiwan strait is very important to Japanese commercial and mercantile interests. Therefore, Japan cannot be expected to allow China to convert Taiwan Strait into a private lake of the PLA. If Japan and the Russian Federation can normalize bilateral relations by resolving the Kuril Islands dispute it may check Chinese ambitions in the Northeast Asia. In such a scenario, Japan would balance the Chinese hegemony in Asia benefiting Russian Federation from being a subjugated junior partner of China.

G-2 and the ASEAN Perspective:

The ASEAN countries for the last twenty-five years have faced this dilemma of keeping equal distance from both US and China while engaging both economically. The ASEAN has failed as a regional grouping to persuade China to evolve and accept a code of conduct in the South China sea. The ASEAN has engaged both India and Japan in the regional Shangri La security dialogue with a view to diminishing the G-2 rivalry in the Indo-pacific and specifically in the Southeast Asia region. The ASEAN would have preferred both India and US to be the part of the RCEP, the ASEAN backed trade regional block. The ASEAN countries pragmatically prefer a multipolar world instead of G-2 condominium owing to acute geopolitical rivalry and its impact on the respective economies of the member states. Chian continues to have its expansionist claims on the EEZ of several member states and has disputes on sovereignty of some islands in the region forcing ASEAN countries to engage US militarily for their security and national defense.

Critique of Multipolarity:

This skepticism finds significant resonance in Indian strategic discourse. In his 2023 essay "India at G7: the Myth of Multipolarity," well-known foreign-policy commentator and scholar C. Raja Mohan argues that while India continues to champion multipolarity in principle, the facts on the ground in Asia are increasingly pointing toward a bipolar US–China alignment. He further notes that the cohesion displayed by Western-led alliances during the G7 summit-especially their handling of issues like the Russia–Ukraine war and China-related trade policy-suggests the resilience of a Western alliance and the growing likelihood of a bipolar global order [4]. Mohan warns that the popular rhetoric of multipolarity may now reflect "wishful thinking" rather than analytical accuracy.

Mohan further argues that the so-called multipolar world may be only a residual ideal rooted in past eras; in reality, the emerging power structure is evolving along bipolar lines. He warns that as global governance begins to gravitate toward a de facto US–China condominium, countries like India are in danger of being relegated to secondary status unless they consciously re-assert their agency. Rather than playing catch-up, India must proactively engage in shaping global norms, technology governance, trade architecture, and strategic alignments on its own terms.

Complementing this critique from a structural realist perspective is the more pragmatic analysis by Happymon Jacob. In his 2025 column “Grand Strategy: Multi-alignment works during peace, falls short in times of war,” Jacob contends that India's long-standing policy of multi-alignment provides strategic flexibility during peacetime but has its problems in crisis situations. chains that when global power competition heightens-for instance, on technology regulation, supply-chains, or military alignments-often, multi-alignment does not serve clarity. Allies may demand commitments; adversaries may test loyalty. For situations where high stakes are involved, Jacob implies that it may be wiser for New Delhi to cultivate a hierarchy of partnerships, choosing a few dependable relationships instead of juggling many simultaneously [5].

India, Multipolarity and G-2 Condominium:

Jacob frames the world ahead, in his longer essay on India's strategic future, as one of "messy multipolarity" marked by fluctuating alliances, shifting economic dependencies, and overlapping regional and global conflicts. Indeed, he said, India must optimally adjust its strategic posture not through blanket equidistance but by carefully calibrating alignments with a focus on core domains such as defense, technology, and supply-chain resilience.

These deliberations were reflected in the Indian public-policy discourse. Recently, the former Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla described India as an “indispensable third pole” in the evolving global order, warning New Delhi clearly against allowing its strategic space to be subsumed under any condominium in the US–China configuration. India’s future, according to him, is one of creating wide-ranging partnerships across the Global South, Indo-Pacific, Europe, and beyond, simultaneously investing in self-reliance in critical sectors such as semiconductors, AI, renewables, pharmaceuticals, and rare-earth technologies [6]. He called for economic momentum, skilled diplomacy, and strategic deterrence to safeguard India’s independence and global relevance.

Commentary in the Indian media has begun exploring alternative conceptualizations-not of a simplistic G-2, but of an "Indian way" of shaping global order. One such editorial argues for a "balanced G2 framework" rooted in dialog, multipolar cooperation, and strategic autonomy-not as a condominium dominated by two powers, but as a platform where India leads by example in bridging West and East, and North and South [7]. This emerging discourse reflects broader recognition that any stable global architecture must be inclusive, rule-based, and responsive to the priorities of Global South nations-not just great-power interests.

Taken together, these arguments point to a realistic reading of the emerging world order: even as US–China competition remains powerful particularly in technological, maritime and supply-chain domains, it is hard for any two powers today to unilaterally dominate global governance. Economic interdependence, regional asymmetries, middle-power agency, and the assertiveness of global supply networks dilute the likelihood of a stable and enforceable G-2 order [2][7].

The challenge and opportunity for India lie in managing this landscape with clarity and agency: embracing calibrated multi-alignment, prioritizing strategic sectors for self-reliance, deepening selective and dependable partnerships, and playing an active role in shaping global norms-whether on trade, technology, or security. This posture preserves not just India's strategic autonomy but positions it as a constructive pole in a genuinely multipolar world.

Conclusion:

In sum, for all the headlines and diplomatic theatre the G-2 concept continues to generate, it is destined to remain more a transitional negotiation device and rhetorical instrument than a scalable framework for global governance. What seems far more plausible, indeed, increasingly likely is a fragmented multipolar or oligo-polar order characterized by fluid alignments, regional heterogeneity, and distributed power with certain nations acting as balancers in issue-based temporary alliances. In that world, what will count far more is India’s ability to assert its agency, build resilience, and align strategically, rather than kowtow to any bilateral duopoly between great powers.

References

[1] G2 or not G2: Trump’s new favorite term for US–China relations carries a lot of history’s baggage. The Economic Times. (2025, Nov 04). https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/global-trends/g2-or-not-g2-trumps-new-favorite-term-for-us-china-relations-carries-a-lot-of-historys-baggage/articleshow/125073892.cms

[2] Return of the G2: Trump, China and the Mirage of a Bipolar World. ORF Online. (2025, Nov). https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/return-of-the-g2-trump-china-and-the-mirage-of-a-bipolar-world

[3] Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?―A Critical Examination of Historical Patterns Leading to War Between Great Powers by Graham Allison  | Aug 7, 2018

[4] Mohan, C. R. (2023, May 23). India at G7 – the Myth of Multipolarity. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-g7-myth-multipolarity-8625144/

[5] Jacob, H. (2025, May 21). Grand Strategy: Multi-alignment works during peace, falls short in times of war. Hindustan Times.

[6] India indispensable third pole in multipolar world, says former foreign secretary. The Times of India. (2025, Nov). https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/india-indispensable-third-pole-in-multipolar-world-says-former-foreign-secretary/articleshow/125068996.cms

[7] An Indian way for G2. (2025, November 4). LaEx: Editorials & Opinion. https://laex.in/articles-editorials/an-indian-way-for-g2/

End of WTO

Underpinning these changes is the weaponisation of trade as a geopolitical and foreign-policy tool. Trump's demands for allies to "pay their fair share" and his threats of punitive tariffs against Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea and the European Union undergird a worldview in which economic policy and foreign strategy are inseparable. As one commentator remarks, "Trump's rhetoric may sound theatrical, but it reflects a deeper hegemonic trend: the use of economic pressure and coercion as a substitute for direct military engagement" [1]. In this new paradigm, trade is becoming the new space for territorial aggrandisement, with coercive interdependence replacing formal conquest.

On an economic front, it is a mix of pressure and potential. The tariff-driven expansionism of Trump has already rewritten global supply chains, forcing developing economies to diversify their export destinations [1]. Yet, as the Firstpost analysis warns, "the WTO's diminished capacity to adjudicate disputes may mark a turning point in global trade" [1].

Implications for the Americas

Strategically, the U.S. revival of the Monroe Doctrine-style hemispheric focus on the American continent leads people to conclude that the US is becoming Pacifist and isolationist again. Reality is different altogether. The US under Trump 2.0 has made economic, military and expansionist threats to several countries in South America. Imposing tariffs on Brazil for prosecuting a former leader who participated in an insurrection against the newly elected government in that country does not inspire a peace-building posture. Similarly, renaming the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America reeks of expansionist claims against Mexico, a country that lost large swathes of its territories (including New Mexico, California, Nevada and Arizona) to the US under the Treaty of Guadalupe in 1848. Mexico also lost Texas to the US around the same time under an initial demographic invasion by Yankees, followed by unilateral declaration of independence, followed by merger with the US. Wanting to take over the Panama Canal also does not inspire confidence in smaller South American nations about the peaceful intentions of the US under Trump 2.0. The Panama Canal is the sovereign territory of the nation of Panama, though it was built by the US.

Threatening Argentinian voters with the denial of fiscal aid to stabilise the economy if they voted in a different direction in parliamentary elections again reflects the interventionist postures of the US. Venezuela under Maduro faces imminent invasion and military strikes. Lurking behind the anti-drug trafficking rhetoric is the regime change threat from Trump 2.0, while gunboat diplomacy goes on in the international seas, with innocent people being killed under the garb of anti-drug trafficking operations.

Implications for the European Union and Europe:

Trump’s humiliation of Volodymir Zelensky in the Oval Office earlier during the year and subsequent arm-twisting of Ukraine to sign a mineral and rare earth deal as a precondition to deter the Russian Federation’s aggression is indicative of an expansionist and predatory, neocolonial attitude. The European Union is still negotiating a free trade agreement with the US under threat of tariffs.  Trump threatened to slap additional tariffs on all the countries with digital taxes, legislation or regulations, saying they were designed to harm or discriminate against American technology, in an escalation of his criticism of EU rules on digital services.

Both France and Germany have defended Europe's right to adopt its own legislation on technology after Trump criticised European rules on digital services, saying any US economic coercion would be met with retaliation. Trump has repeatedly used harsh, critical language toward Germany, which has been described by German and international sources as "threats," particularly concerning trade surplus, defence spending (NATO) and energy policy.

Implications for Africa

While cutting all foreign aid to Africa, Trump has threatened to bomb Nigeria for alleged violence against Nigerian Christians. It is true that there is Muslim on Christian violence in Nigeria, but constitutionally, the US is a secular country. It is a coincidence that Nigeria is an oil-rich nation, and the ultimate target may be to control Nigeria’s oil fields and hydrocarbon resources. Similarly, Trump’s giving refugee status to White South Africans while they face no persecution is geared towards creating the US as a white European nation. Trump 2.0 has expeditiously signed mineral and rare earth agreements with the Democratic Republic of Congo, a port deal with Somalia, while ignoring the civil war in Sudan and South Sudan, owing to the involvement of his cronies in those conflicts.

Implications for Asia

Fortress America and an isolationist America are the myths perpetrated by the apologists for the Trump 2.0 regime. Trump has demanded the conversion of US overseas bases into sovereign US territories and demanded that Japan and South Korea must do so to continue to have a US protective umbrella. His desire to reoccupy Bagram airport in Afghanistan as a US military base ostensibly to monitor China and covert activities in Bangladesh is cause for concern. Signing crypto-currency deals with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and mineral and rare earth resources of occupied Baluchistan, and hosting of Pakistani military strongman Asim Munir, does not reflect an isolationist foreign policy but neo-imperialism and economic colonisation. 

Implications for West Asia

Bombing of Iran in consonance with Israel, cutting deals with Ahmad al-Shara of Syria and manoeuvring to get a $400 million donation of a jet from Qatar suggests the US under Trump 2.0 is going to get its pound of economic flesh in West Asia. Trump wants his family members to have a role in the redevelopment of the Gaza Strip into a Mediterranean Riviera reflects an overt desire to usurp West Asian territory and resources for family enrichment.

Implications for India

For India, this evolution has complex implications. On one hand, a more inward-looking United States may result in fewer demands on India for military alignment in global conflicts. On the other hand, an expansionist and transactional Washington DC might destabilise prevailing norms that guarantee protection for India's strategic space-particularly within the Indo-Pacific and global trade regimes. For India, this opens the opportunity to position itself as a manufacturing hub for companies hedging against unpredictability from both China and the U.S. But it would also mean that economic coercion from Washington extends to technology, critical minerals, and energy access domains that form a vital part of India’s growing relevance.

Secondary sanctions for purchasing Russian oil and for continued development of Chabahar port in Iran are serious issues to grapple for India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has thus said that "the world is moving towards a new world order. The capability and the role of India are changing fast" [3]. His words underline the importance of agility- India must learn to navigate in a world where the United States becomes less predictable and global institutions like the WTO or UN face systemic strain [1]. This erosion of multilateral institutions implies that India must be less dependent on international arbitration and more on bilateral or regional arrangements to safeguard its interests.

Commenting on the post-Trump 2.0 landscape, External Affairs Minister of Bharat, Dr. S. Jaishankar said, "The course correction in American foreign policy was both "expected" and "not necessarily disadvantageous" for India as it hastens the advent of a multipolar world [4]." He added that "the virtues of the old-world order are somewhat exaggerated" [5], reflecting India’s readiness to settle into a less rules-based but more opportunity-rich environment. Under such circumstances, the Indian doctrine of "strategic autonomy “rooted in self-reliance and pragmatic partnerships becomes even more critical in the face of U.S. unilateralism. India, whose maritime and resources strategy is so integral to its “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” ambitions, must ensure that global resource flows and sea-lanes remain open and the rules-based international order stays.

Policy Pathways for India

1. Diversify economic and trade partnerships: The need for India is to reduce dependence on any single major power by expanding market links with ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America.

2. Strengthen maritime autonomy: The Indian Ocean must remain a zone of stability. Stronger cooperation via BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association will be required. The recently concluded India’s Maritime Week from 27th to 31st October, held at Mumbai with Prime Minister Modi addressing delegates from 85+ countries, is a shining example of how India is collaborating with industries across the world to drive the Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 into action and shape the future of the Global Maritime Ecosystem

3. Champion new multilateralism: As older institutions weaken, India can spearhead frameworks around digital trade, climate governance, and critical minerals. India’s position in BRICS is counterbalancing the US and China’s assertiveness 

4. Secure supply chains and resources: The expansion of the "Make for World" initiative in rare-earth, green energy, and shipping infrastructure will assist in avoiding strategic vulnerability for India.

While preserving strategic autonomy, India should cooperate on issues of mutual interest with the U.S., like defence, technology, and Indo-Pacific security, while avoiding subordination to unilaterally driven agendas. For India, this is a reality that demands pragmatism, agility, and confidence. Rather than bemoan the passing of the liberal order, India needs to shape the contours of the new one, anchor its rise in self-reliance, balanced diplomacy, and principled multilateralism. As Prime Minister Modi reminded Indians abroad, “The world is changing rapidly, and India’s capability is rising equally rapidly” [3].

Conclusions

As a conclusion, it may be said that the Trump 2.0 era is about the return of a muscular, hegemonic, mercantilist and expansionist geopolitics draped in crude economic nationalism. The renewed interest of the U.S. in the acquisition or control of resource-rich territories, whether Greenland, Canada or the Panama Canal, bespoke an emerging view of the world where sovereignty is a bargaining chip and resources are instruments of power. The challenge for the rest of the world is to turn the rise of U.S. expansionism and brute mercantilism into an enduring strategic recalibration and multipolarity amid the turbulence of American expansionism. Perhaps, the world may move to a WTO minus one trading system while individual countries cut out bilateral deals with Trump.

References

[1] Firstpost (2025). “Trump 2.0: Expansionist Rhetoric, Tariffs, and the New Global Order.” 31 July 2025. 

[2] The Guardian (2025). “Trump’s Expansionism Threatens the Rules-Based Order in Place since the Second World War.” 23 March 2025.

[3] NDTV (2023). “New World Order Emerging: PM Modi in Address to Indians in France.” [4] Hindustan Times (2025). “S. Jaishankar Says Expected U.S. Foreign Policy Shift under Trump Suits India in Many Ways.” 

[5] Financial Times (2025). “The Virtues of the Old World Order Are Somewhat Exaggerated: S. Jaishankar.”