Bipolarity and Avoidance of Thucydides Trap:

The term "Thucydides Trap," was coined by Prof Graham Allison in his book, Destined for War and has become a buzzword in the western strategic discourse [3]. This concept refers to the precarious situation when an ascending hegemon threatens to displace a reigning hegemon—a situation that historically has often led to war. The US and the former Soviet Union (FSU) avoided major war by not confronting each other directly. However, the US engaged FSU while containing it simultaneously and encouraging China to emerge as a rising power to balance the former Soviet Union. As China continues to rise, challenging the global leadership of the United States, the concept of Thucydides trap is relevant. The US establishment is heavily preoccupied in avoiding a direct war over with China over Taiwan Strait. US is essentially repeating the historic formula of dissolution of the FSU by engaging China economically but also allying with others in containment of China. US has learnt from its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan that it cannot sustain a faraway war for long without hemorrhaging its economy and depleting its military. The proposed G-2 condominium is a shrewd strategic move by the US to placate China as a perceived peer to avoid direct war.

Emerging Poles:

Besides the US and China, we are, indeed witnessing an oligo-polar world with other poles being the Russian Federation, the EU and India. Groups like BRICS-plus, G-20, ASEAN and SCO would facilitate multipolarity despite attempts by the US to foist bipolarity in the form of G-2 Condominium. From the US perspective, engaging China while simultaneously containing it in a bipolar world gives it higher probability of extending its shelf-life as the reigning hegemon of the world. The US has historical experience of doing the same during the cold war years with the rival superpower, the former Soviet Union. The US started to engage China under Nixon administration, helped it grow economically and strategically while containing the Soviet Union. From Chinese perspective, the goal is to keep world bipolar and Asia unipolar till China can achieve its long-term goal of unipolar world order led by Communist China. China is fiercely contesting the rise of India and Japan in the Asian theatre.

Russian Federation & G-2:

From the perspective of the Russian Federation, G-2 condominium between US and China is a national insult. Russia is asserting its major power status and signaling to the world that it is not a junior partner of China. Under Putin doctrine, dissolution of the FSU was a major national catastrophe. Russian Federation would prefer to resurrect the FSU if possible. Russian Federation has geostrategic compulsions owing to the Ukraine war with NATO and EU necessitating closer cooperation with China. That country has made historic claims on currently Russian territories including Vladivostok port and the Russian far east. Russia is acutely aware of the dangers of G-2 condominium and would support India in plurilateral platforms to balance China. The recent visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India and enhanced bilateral economic and military cooperation is a testimony to Russian agenda of asserting its strategic weight and influence globally without yielding space on the table. Russian Federation’s technological assistance to India with the navigational capability and capacity in the fast thawing Arctic and the Northern Sea route suggests that Russia is uncomfortable with China’s postulation of “Near Arctic country”  status.

Japan & G-2:

Post World War II Japan has been hamstrung by the MacArthur dictated constitution that does not allow for power projection by Japan internationally and restricts the Japanese defense forces a limited mandate to defend the country. Abe doctrine sought to change that situation in early 2000s. the geopolitical situation today is very different from pre–World War II era. Japan is no more an imperialistic country bent upon subjugating other Asian nations militarily. This has led to Chinese belligerence in the Asian theaters as it remains unchecked and unbalanced in Northeast Asia. The comments by the newly sworn in, first female conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on lack of historicity of Chinese claims on Taiwan created an uproar in China. Free and open Taiwan strait is very important to Japanese commercial and mercantile interests. Therefore, Japan cannot be expected to allow China to convert Taiwan Strait into a private lake of the PLA. If Japan and the Russian Federation can normalize bilateral relations by resolving the Kuril Islands dispute it may check Chinese ambitions in the Northeast Asia. In such a scenario, Japan would balance the Chinese hegemony in Asia benefiting Russian Federation from being a subjugated junior partner of China.

G-2 and the ASEAN Perspective:

The ASEAN countries for the last twenty-five years have faced this dilemma of keeping equal distance from both US and China while engaging both economically. The ASEAN has failed as a regional grouping to persuade China to evolve and accept a code of conduct in the South China sea. The ASEAN has engaged both India and Japan in the regional Shangri La security dialogue with a view to diminishing the G-2 rivalry in the Indo-pacific and specifically in the Southeast Asia region. The ASEAN would have preferred both India and US to be the part of the RCEP, the ASEAN backed trade regional block. The ASEAN countries pragmatically prefer a multipolar world instead of G-2 condominium owing to acute geopolitical rivalry and its impact on the respective economies of the member states. Chian continues to have its expansionist claims on the EEZ of several member states and has disputes on sovereignty of some islands in the region forcing ASEAN countries to engage US militarily for their security and national defense.

Critique of Multipolarity:

This skepticism finds significant resonance in Indian strategic discourse. In his 2023 essay "India at G7: the Myth of Multipolarity," well-known foreign-policy commentator and scholar C. Raja Mohan argues that while India continues to champion multipolarity in principle, the facts on the ground in Asia are increasingly pointing toward a bipolar US–China alignment. He further notes that the cohesion displayed by Western-led alliances during the G7 summit-especially their handling of issues like the Russia–Ukraine war and China-related trade policy-suggests the resilience of a Western alliance and the growing likelihood of a bipolar global order [4]. Mohan warns that the popular rhetoric of multipolarity may now reflect "wishful thinking" rather than analytical accuracy.

Mohan further argues that the so-called multipolar world may be only a residual ideal rooted in past eras; in reality, the emerging power structure is evolving along bipolar lines. He warns that as global governance begins to gravitate toward a de facto US–China condominium, countries like India are in danger of being relegated to secondary status unless they consciously re-assert their agency. Rather than playing catch-up, India must proactively engage in shaping global norms, technology governance, trade architecture, and strategic alignments on its own terms.

Complementing this critique from a structural realist perspective is the more pragmatic analysis by Happymon Jacob. In his 2025 column “Grand Strategy: Multi-alignment works during peace, falls short in times of war,” Jacob contends that India's long-standing policy of multi-alignment provides strategic flexibility during peacetime but has its problems in crisis situations. chains that when global power competition heightens-for instance, on technology regulation, supply-chains, or military alignments-often, multi-alignment does not serve clarity. Allies may demand commitments; adversaries may test loyalty. For situations where high stakes are involved, Jacob implies that it may be wiser for New Delhi to cultivate a hierarchy of partnerships, choosing a few dependable relationships instead of juggling many simultaneously [5].

India, Multipolarity and G-2 Condominium:

Jacob frames the world ahead, in his longer essay on India's strategic future, as one of "messy multipolarity" marked by fluctuating alliances, shifting economic dependencies, and overlapping regional and global conflicts. Indeed, he said, India must optimally adjust its strategic posture not through blanket equidistance but by carefully calibrating alignments with a focus on core domains such as defense, technology, and supply-chain resilience.

These deliberations were reflected in the Indian public-policy discourse. Recently, the former Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla described India as an “indispensable third pole” in the evolving global order, warning New Delhi clearly against allowing its strategic space to be subsumed under any condominium in the US–China configuration. India’s future, according to him, is one of creating wide-ranging partnerships across the Global South, Indo-Pacific, Europe, and beyond, simultaneously investing in self-reliance in critical sectors such as semiconductors, AI, renewables, pharmaceuticals, and rare-earth technologies [6]. He called for economic momentum, skilled diplomacy, and strategic deterrence to safeguard India’s independence and global relevance.

Commentary in the Indian media has begun exploring alternative conceptualizations-not of a simplistic G-2, but of an "Indian way" of shaping global order. One such editorial argues for a "balanced G2 framework" rooted in dialog, multipolar cooperation, and strategic autonomy-not as a condominium dominated by two powers, but as a platform where India leads by example in bridging West and East, and North and South [7]. This emerging discourse reflects broader recognition that any stable global architecture must be inclusive, rule-based, and responsive to the priorities of Global South nations-not just great-power interests.

Taken together, these arguments point to a realistic reading of the emerging world order: even as US–China competition remains powerful particularly in technological, maritime and supply-chain domains, it is hard for any two powers today to unilaterally dominate global governance. Economic interdependence, regional asymmetries, middle-power agency, and the assertiveness of global supply networks dilute the likelihood of a stable and enforceable G-2 order [2][7].

The challenge and opportunity for India lie in managing this landscape with clarity and agency: embracing calibrated multi-alignment, prioritizing strategic sectors for self-reliance, deepening selective and dependable partnerships, and playing an active role in shaping global norms-whether on trade, technology, or security. This posture preserves not just India's strategic autonomy but positions it as a constructive pole in a genuinely multipolar world.

Conclusion:

In sum, for all the headlines and diplomatic theatre the G-2 concept continues to generate, it is destined to remain more a transitional negotiation device and rhetorical instrument than a scalable framework for global governance. What seems far more plausible, indeed, increasingly likely is a fragmented multipolar or oligo-polar order characterized by fluid alignments, regional heterogeneity, and distributed power with certain nations acting as balancers in issue-based temporary alliances. In that world, what will count far more is India’s ability to assert its agency, build resilience, and align strategically, rather than kowtow to any bilateral duopoly between great powers.

References

[1] G2 or not G2: Trump’s new favorite term for US–China relations carries a lot of history’s baggage. The Economic Times. (2025, Nov 04). https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/global-trends/g2-or-not-g2-trumps-new-favorite-term-for-us-china-relations-carries-a-lot-of-historys-baggage/articleshow/125073892.cms

[2] Return of the G2: Trump, China and the Mirage of a Bipolar World. ORF Online. (2025, Nov). https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/return-of-the-g2-trump-china-and-the-mirage-of-a-bipolar-world

[3] Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?―A Critical Examination of Historical Patterns Leading to War Between Great Powers by Graham Allison  | Aug 7, 2018

[4] Mohan, C. R. (2023, May 23). India at G7 – the Myth of Multipolarity. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-g7-myth-multipolarity-8625144/

[5] Jacob, H. (2025, May 21). Grand Strategy: Multi-alignment works during peace, falls short in times of war. Hindustan Times.

[6] India indispensable third pole in multipolar world, says former foreign secretary. The Times of India. (2025, Nov). https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/india-indispensable-third-pole-in-multipolar-world-says-former-foreign-secretary/articleshow/125068996.cms

[7] An Indian way for G2. (2025, November 4). LaEx: Editorials & Opinion. https://laex.in/articles-editorials/an-indian-way-for-g2/

End of WTO

Underpinning these changes is the weaponisation of trade as a geopolitical and foreign-policy tool. Trump's demands for allies to "pay their fair share" and his threats of punitive tariffs against Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea and the European Union undergird a worldview in which economic policy and foreign strategy are inseparable. As one commentator remarks, "Trump's rhetoric may sound theatrical, but it reflects a deeper hegemonic trend: the use of economic pressure and coercion as a substitute for direct military engagement" [1]. In this new paradigm, trade is becoming the new space for territorial aggrandisement, with coercive interdependence replacing formal conquest.

On an economic front, it is a mix of pressure and potential. The tariff-driven expansionism of Trump has already rewritten global supply chains, forcing developing economies to diversify their export destinations [1]. Yet, as the Firstpost analysis warns, "the WTO's diminished capacity to adjudicate disputes may mark a turning point in global trade" [1].

Implications for the Americas

Strategically, the U.S. revival of the Monroe Doctrine-style hemispheric focus on the American continent leads people to conclude that the US is becoming Pacifist and isolationist again. Reality is different altogether. The US under Trump 2.0 has made economic, military and expansionist threats to several countries in South America. Imposing tariffs on Brazil for prosecuting a former leader who participated in an insurrection against the newly elected government in that country does not inspire a peace-building posture. Similarly, renaming the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America reeks of expansionist claims against Mexico, a country that lost large swathes of its territories (including New Mexico, California, Nevada and Arizona) to the US under the Treaty of Guadalupe in 1848. Mexico also lost Texas to the US around the same time under an initial demographic invasion by Yankees, followed by unilateral declaration of independence, followed by merger with the US. Wanting to take over the Panama Canal also does not inspire confidence in smaller South American nations about the peaceful intentions of the US under Trump 2.0. The Panama Canal is the sovereign territory of the nation of Panama, though it was built by the US.

Threatening Argentinian voters with the denial of fiscal aid to stabilise the economy if they voted in a different direction in parliamentary elections again reflects the interventionist postures of the US. Venezuela under Maduro faces imminent invasion and military strikes. Lurking behind the anti-drug trafficking rhetoric is the regime change threat from Trump 2.0, while gunboat diplomacy goes on in the international seas, with innocent people being killed under the garb of anti-drug trafficking operations.

Implications for the European Union and Europe:

Trump’s humiliation of Volodymir Zelensky in the Oval Office earlier during the year and subsequent arm-twisting of Ukraine to sign a mineral and rare earth deal as a precondition to deter the Russian Federation’s aggression is indicative of an expansionist and predatory, neocolonial attitude. The European Union is still negotiating a free trade agreement with the US under threat of tariffs.  Trump threatened to slap additional tariffs on all the countries with digital taxes, legislation or regulations, saying they were designed to harm or discriminate against American technology, in an escalation of his criticism of EU rules on digital services.

Both France and Germany have defended Europe's right to adopt its own legislation on technology after Trump criticised European rules on digital services, saying any US economic coercion would be met with retaliation. Trump has repeatedly used harsh, critical language toward Germany, which has been described by German and international sources as "threats," particularly concerning trade surplus, defence spending (NATO) and energy policy.

Implications for Africa

While cutting all foreign aid to Africa, Trump has threatened to bomb Nigeria for alleged violence against Nigerian Christians. It is true that there is Muslim on Christian violence in Nigeria, but constitutionally, the US is a secular country. It is a coincidence that Nigeria is an oil-rich nation, and the ultimate target may be to control Nigeria’s oil fields and hydrocarbon resources. Similarly, Trump’s giving refugee status to White South Africans while they face no persecution is geared towards creating the US as a white European nation. Trump 2.0 has expeditiously signed mineral and rare earth agreements with the Democratic Republic of Congo, a port deal with Somalia, while ignoring the civil war in Sudan and South Sudan, owing to the involvement of his cronies in those conflicts.

Implications for Asia

Fortress America and an isolationist America are the myths perpetrated by the apologists for the Trump 2.0 regime. Trump has demanded the conversion of US overseas bases into sovereign US territories and demanded that Japan and South Korea must do so to continue to have a US protective umbrella. His desire to reoccupy Bagram airport in Afghanistan as a US military base ostensibly to monitor China and covert activities in Bangladesh is cause for concern. Signing crypto-currency deals with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and mineral and rare earth resources of occupied Baluchistan, and hosting of Pakistani military strongman Asim Munir, does not reflect an isolationist foreign policy but neo-imperialism and economic colonisation. 

Implications for West Asia

Bombing of Iran in consonance with Israel, cutting deals with Ahmad al-Shara of Syria and manoeuvring to get a $400 million donation of a jet from Qatar suggests the US under Trump 2.0 is going to get its pound of economic flesh in West Asia. Trump wants his family members to have a role in the redevelopment of the Gaza Strip into a Mediterranean Riviera reflects an overt desire to usurp West Asian territory and resources for family enrichment.

Implications for India

For India, this evolution has complex implications. On one hand, a more inward-looking United States may result in fewer demands on India for military alignment in global conflicts. On the other hand, an expansionist and transactional Washington DC might destabilise prevailing norms that guarantee protection for India's strategic space-particularly within the Indo-Pacific and global trade regimes. For India, this opens the opportunity to position itself as a manufacturing hub for companies hedging against unpredictability from both China and the U.S. But it would also mean that economic coercion from Washington extends to technology, critical minerals, and energy access domains that form a vital part of India’s growing relevance.

Secondary sanctions for purchasing Russian oil and for continued development of Chabahar port in Iran are serious issues to grapple for India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has thus said that "the world is moving towards a new world order. The capability and the role of India are changing fast" [3]. His words underline the importance of agility- India must learn to navigate in a world where the United States becomes less predictable and global institutions like the WTO or UN face systemic strain [1]. This erosion of multilateral institutions implies that India must be less dependent on international arbitration and more on bilateral or regional arrangements to safeguard its interests.

Commenting on the post-Trump 2.0 landscape, External Affairs Minister of Bharat, Dr. S. Jaishankar said, "The course correction in American foreign policy was both "expected" and "not necessarily disadvantageous" for India as it hastens the advent of a multipolar world [4]." He added that "the virtues of the old-world order are somewhat exaggerated" [5], reflecting India’s readiness to settle into a less rules-based but more opportunity-rich environment. Under such circumstances, the Indian doctrine of "strategic autonomy “rooted in self-reliance and pragmatic partnerships becomes even more critical in the face of U.S. unilateralism. India, whose maritime and resources strategy is so integral to its “Atma Nirbhar Bharat” ambitions, must ensure that global resource flows and sea-lanes remain open and the rules-based international order stays.

Policy Pathways for India

1. Diversify economic and trade partnerships: The need for India is to reduce dependence on any single major power by expanding market links with ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America.

2. Strengthen maritime autonomy: The Indian Ocean must remain a zone of stability. Stronger cooperation via BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association will be required. The recently concluded India’s Maritime Week from 27th to 31st October, held at Mumbai with Prime Minister Modi addressing delegates from 85+ countries, is a shining example of how India is collaborating with industries across the world to drive the Maritime Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 into action and shape the future of the Global Maritime Ecosystem

3. Champion new multilateralism: As older institutions weaken, India can spearhead frameworks around digital trade, climate governance, and critical minerals. India’s position in BRICS is counterbalancing the US and China’s assertiveness 

4. Secure supply chains and resources: The expansion of the "Make for World" initiative in rare-earth, green energy, and shipping infrastructure will assist in avoiding strategic vulnerability for India.

While preserving strategic autonomy, India should cooperate on issues of mutual interest with the U.S., like defence, technology, and Indo-Pacific security, while avoiding subordination to unilaterally driven agendas. For India, this is a reality that demands pragmatism, agility, and confidence. Rather than bemoan the passing of the liberal order, India needs to shape the contours of the new one, anchor its rise in self-reliance, balanced diplomacy, and principled multilateralism. As Prime Minister Modi reminded Indians abroad, “The world is changing rapidly, and India’s capability is rising equally rapidly” [3].

Conclusions

As a conclusion, it may be said that the Trump 2.0 era is about the return of a muscular, hegemonic, mercantilist and expansionist geopolitics draped in crude economic nationalism. The renewed interest of the U.S. in the acquisition or control of resource-rich territories, whether Greenland, Canada or the Panama Canal, bespoke an emerging view of the world where sovereignty is a bargaining chip and resources are instruments of power. The challenge for the rest of the world is to turn the rise of U.S. expansionism and brute mercantilism into an enduring strategic recalibration and multipolarity amid the turbulence of American expansionism. Perhaps, the world may move to a WTO minus one trading system while individual countries cut out bilateral deals with Trump.

References

[1] Firstpost (2025). “Trump 2.0: Expansionist Rhetoric, Tariffs, and the New Global Order.” 31 July 2025. 

[2] The Guardian (2025). “Trump’s Expansionism Threatens the Rules-Based Order in Place since the Second World War.” 23 March 2025.

[3] NDTV (2023). “New World Order Emerging: PM Modi in Address to Indians in France.” [4] Hindustan Times (2025). “S. Jaishankar Says Expected U.S. Foreign Policy Shift under Trump Suits India in Many Ways.” 

[5] Financial Times (2025). “The Virtues of the Old World Order Are Somewhat Exaggerated: S. Jaishankar.”