Subhi Malhotra

Historical Context

American interest in Greenland is not new. In the 19th century, Secretary of State William H. Seward, the architect of the Alaska Purchase, seriously considered acquiring Greenland and Iceland as part of U.S. territorial expansion, seeing strategic value comparable to Alaska’s geography. In 1867, the U.S. government commissioned surveys anticipating economic and strategic benefits from Greenland’s fisheries, minerals and position. Denmark rejected these early overtures.

During World War II and the early Cold War, Greenland’s importance crystallised. The United States signed a Defence of Greenland agreement in 1941, and from 1951 onward maintained bases - notably the Thule Air Base (renamed Pituffik Space Base) under formal bilateral accords with Denmark, integrating Greenland into U.S. missile early warning and Arctic defence infrastructure without changing sovereignty.

Greenland’s Identity

A vast, autonomous and self-governing Arctic island within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland is a sovereign and independent nation. After the U.S. claims, Denmark’s government reiterated that “you cannot annex another country,” Greenland’s premier denied any deal to surrender sovereignty, and allied nations warned against undermining NATO unity.

Crucially, the people of Greenland, around 57,000 and predominantly Inuit, have been vocal in opposing any scenario that would see them absorbed into another state. Leaders of Greenland’s parliamentary parties jointly condemned U.S. annexation, showing unity in times of adversity. Both Greenland and Denmark are witnessing large-scale protests with slogans like “Greenland is not for sale.” These movements reflect anxiety and fear of external interference in their culture and language, to gain strategic or economic interests.

Why Greenland Matters Strategically

Various strategic factors make Greenland more attractive for superpowers to invest and multiply their vested interests. Strategically, Greenland signifies stronger Arctic geopolitics. Amid the rising Russian and Chinese activity, the Arctic has assumed greater military importance. Greenland, sitting on the crossroads of Iceland and the United Kingdom, serves as an important corridor for naval and air operations between the Arctic and the North Atlantic.

Additionally, the missile defence and space bases contribute immensely to the early warning systems and space-oriented military infrastructure. Moreover, Greenland is a treasure island, offering rare earth and critical minerals, which are of increasing economic and technological interest for countries globally.

For the U.S., Greenland could further enhance national defence and act as a natural barrier for Chinese or Russian influence. It can also help in economic development if placed under Washington’s control, as then the U.S. will have control over all of its resources, whether natural or man-made. However, critics argue that these claims of enhanced security are too selfish and a cover for strategic hegemony, conflicting with international law and self-determination.

American Exceptionalism and Expansionism

The U.S. has long been known for its ambitious plans based on strategic realpolitik, whether we talk about the Monroe Doctrine or the 19th-century territorial expansionism. A country that started as a union of thirteen colonies now has fifty states and eight overseas territories and colonies. The US’s lust for expansion may not end at Greenland as the current administration has consistently floated the idea of acquiring Canada as the 51st state, renamed the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America, reclaimed physical control of the Panama Canal and claimed hegemony over the entire Western hemisphere under the newly re-articulated Donroe doctrine. Unfortunately, the domestic opinion in the US borders on rationalisation and hyper-nationalism. Trump’s acolytes like Senator Lyndsey Graham have reinforced this imperialistic dominance and acquisitions by statements like, “Who gives a sxxx who owns Greenland?”!   These acquisitive actions were conducted in the past for national security, political ambitions, and economic growth, as justified by the U.S., even when the impacts on local populations were secondary or adverse. In this complex global order of the 21st century, America continues to act on its own imperial impulses, as we have seen in its actions regarding Greenland annexation plans.

However, unlike past expansions, there are various constraints in the present scenario that put a barrier on any attempt to redraw borders for strategic gains. These include strong international legal frameworks, multinational alliances like NATO, and a heightened emphasis on human rights and indigenous autonomy.

Conclusion

There is yet no diplomatic end to this chaos. Reports indicate ongoing talks between the U.S. and Denmark about new agreements about expanded military access, parallel to other global U.S. base arrangements, though full annexation remains out of reach under existing international law.

The rules-based liberal world order, carefully crafted following World War II is over. The discourse around annexing Greenland with Americanese characteristics illuminates fundamental tensions at the heart of 21st-century geopolitics: strategic competition in the Arctic, the rights of smaller nations and peoples to self-determination, and the limits of superpower ambition under international law. Invoking non-existent Chinese and Russian threats to Greenland has become a fig leaf for the naked expansionist ambitions.

While Greenland’s strategic value to the United States is clear from both historical precedent and contemporary defence considerations, the idea of annexation clashes with Greenlandic identity, Danish sovereignty, and international norms. The path forward, if any shift in status were ever to occur, would need to be grounded in mutual consent, respect for local choice, and adherence to legal frameworks that protect sovereignty and human rights.

Nationalism is something that cannot be taken out of the roots of the citizens of that nation. Similarly, Greenlanders desire to be seen not as Americans or Danes, but as Greenlanders, asserting their democratic autonomy and indigenous identity.

References

The 1951 agreement allowing the US military in Greenland. (2026, January 15). HISTORY. https://www.history.com/articles/1951-agreement-that-allows-us-military-presence-in-greenland

Here’s why Greenland is strategically important to the U.S. (2025, January 23). National Geographic. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/greenland-us-purchase-history-wwii

A milestone in Arctic sovereignty? Trump’s new Arctic strategy is shaping Greenland’s future as an independent state. (n.d.). Avaleht | Sisu@UT. https://sisu.ut.ee/defactostates/a-milestone-in-arctic-sovereignty?

US and Denmark discuss Greenland 'military access' in more conventional talks. (2026, January 24). Le Monde.fr. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/01/24/us-and-denmark-discuss-greenland-military-access-in-more-conventional-talks

Why is the U.S. interested in Greenland? (2026, January 23). Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Why-Is-the-US-Interested-in-Greenland?

Historical Aspect of the Bilateral Partnership
Dating back to the Cold War, the relationship between India and the former USSR (now Russia) has a long history of trust and friendship. The foundation for the partnership was laid down by the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in 1971, which lasted through generations of changes in ideology. Post 1991, when the Soviet Union fell apart, India and the Russian Federation worked to strengthen their ties. In 2000, they signed the Declaration on Strategic Partnership, and in 2010, they upgraded it to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”.

The two countries held annual summits to make high-level political dialogue a regular part of their relationship. This allowed for ongoing cooperation in areas like defence, energy, science, technology, and diplomacy. This long-lasting partnership is the foundation on which modern summit meetings try to build a world order that is more balanced.

The India-Russia Summit as a Strategic Base

The last India-Russia Summit was more than just a meeting between two countries; it was also a way for the two countries to work together on regional and global issues. The summit allowed both countries to reaffirm their strategic independence and policy independence in a time when alliances are changing, the world is becoming more fragmented, and countries are competing for power.

This annual forum brings together India's goal of "multi-alignment" and Russia's focus on "strategic sovereignty." Both countries support a variety of partnerships instead of just aligning with one bloc or the other. This naturally supports multipolarity. The annual summit has now become a place for more discussions about changes to global governance, regional stability, development of global south,  mutual prosperity, free and fair trade, and economic resilience.

Cooperation in Defence and Balance of Power: Defence cooperation still forms a major stakeholder in the corporation between India and Russia, which is also a big part in keeping the world stable. For decades now, Russia has been one of the most dependable defence partners of India, giving advanced platforms like the S-400 Air Defence System, nuclear-powered submarines, and BrahMos missiles.

This partnership eventually strengthens India's ability to counter threats. Indirectly, Russia also helps to keep a multipolar world order by allowing India to maintain its strategic independence, making sure that no one power bloc controls all of India's defence partnerships. This ensures a more even distribution of military power in the Indo - Pacific and Eurasian regions.

The Economic and Energy Aspects of Multipolarity: The summit also shows how increasing economic and energy cooperation can be used to get involved in a multipolar world. India needs Russia as an energy partner, especially in the oil, gas, and nuclear energy sectors. Long-term energy deals help India make its supply chains more diverse and less likely to be affected by geopolitical problems.

Both countries also support alternatives to the supremacy of the dollar in trade through national currency settlements and other financial tools. These kinds of projects challenge the dominance of Western-centred financial systems and encourage a more diverse global economic structure, which is an important part of a multipolar world.

Global Governance and Multilateralism: India and Russia both want to change the way global governance works so that it better reflects the world as it is today. Both countries want the United Nations Security Council to be more representative, and Russia has always supported India's claim to permanent membership.

Through groups like G20, BRICS, MTCR, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and SCO, both India and Russia work together to enhance the voices of strategic stability and the global South and highlight it at a global level. In this regard, the India-Russia summit strengthened this initiative further by highlighting the principles, such as respect and sovereignty for all and inclusive development.

Tackling Global Polarisation: As the world is becoming increasingly divided due to geopolitical rivalries, especially between the developed Western countries and the developing and emerging countries, such as that of Asia, the relationship between Russia and India is becoming increasingly complicated. It is very evident that in today's scenario, India shares strong ties with countries such as the USA and Europe, while Russia is becoming closer to countries like China and non-Western partners. The US under President Trump understands the importance of Russia as a serious global partner instead of letting it become a junior partner of China. India, despite having border problems and recent clashes with China, is managing bilateral relations with China in a prudent manner. This makes the strategic task of maintaining the bilateral partnership more of a diplomatic balancing act.

Although there are different political views, the India-Russia summit is a sign that even after so many complications, the ties are still strong owing to common vested interests and deep-rooted cooperation. This collaboration underscores that multipolarity signifies coexistence and cooperation, rather than confrontation, despite differing ideologies.

Problems and Limitations

Although the annual bilateral summit shows the strong partnership between two countries, eventually strengthening the desire for a multipolar world, but it is not without problems. As India is increasingly diversifying its defence and energy sectors, it has started interacting with other countries apart from Russia.

Additionally, the Western sanctions on Russia due to the Ukraine/EU/NATO War have brought to the fore the changing regional dynamics. This resulted in the levy of secondary and tertiary sanctions on India and some Indian companies that have nothing to do with this tribal European war of strategic domination. All this makes it hard for deep involvement between the two. The problems in negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with the US have become hostage to the US demands that mandate India to curtail the purchase of energy and armament from Russia. In this context, Russia has already expressed its concern at the US trying to interfere in the bilateral relationship by persuading India to commit to stopping future purchases of Russian crude oil.

As Russia works on its own pathways and changes in this tense geopolitical environment, India needs to ensure that it does not become too dependent on other countries, including the US, weakening its historical ties with Russia. But as we highlight these problems, we also understand the importance these dialogue platforms hold, like the summit that was held between two countries, since it allows both countries to directly interact and work on their dynamics to continue their strong partnership in this changing world.

Conclusions

The US and China need to remember that international relations are not a zero-sum game. India’s relationship with the Russian Federation is not at the expense of India’s bilateral relationship with either the US or China. India has never subscribed to the mentality of military alliances and power blocs. Hence, the India-Russia annual summit is a sign of shared commitment, strategic trust, and diplomatic stability in a newly emerging world order with many poles. By encouraging cooperation in various sectors such as defence, diplomacy, energy, and global governance, this summit helps make the world a more balanced one. Despite India’s interim framework for a bilateral free trade agreement with the US being signed, India will not yield its policy options and bilateral relations with the Russian Federation at the altar of an unpredictable, unreliable and often tumultuous US-India bilateral relationship.

In a nutshell, in these uncertain times of change, the India-Russia partnership shows that multipolarity is not just a theory, but a stark reality that cannot be wished away by one hyperpower. A world where power is spread out, voices are heard, and sovereignty is protected through interaction and mutual respect - this is the aim of the India-Russia relationship and the annual summit.  This continued bilateral engagement is still shaping and holds a promise for not just peace and cooperation between India and Russia, but for the entire world.

References

Joint Statement following the 23rd Russia-India Annual Summit, December 05, 2025 “Russia-India: A Time-Tested Progressive Partnership, Anchored in Trust & Mutual Respect“. (n.d.). President of Russia. https://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6426

MEA. (n.d.). State visit of the president of the Russian Federation H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, to India (December 04 - 05, 2025). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40346/State_Visit_of_the_President_of_the_Russian_Federation_HE_Mr_Vladimir_Putin_to_India_December_04__05_2025

Narayanan, M. K. (2025, December 23). Putin’s visit to India and the aftermath. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/putins-visit-to-india-and-the-aftermath/article70425676.ece

PIB. (n.d.). From strategic partnership to special and privileged bond: India-Russia relations at a glance. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2198621®=3&lang=2

Programme of the Russia-India conference 2025. (n.d.). Valdai Club. https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/programme-of-the-russia-india-conference-2025/

China’s Broad Objectives
Myanmar, as a country, holds a lot of strategic potential for China. Geographically, Kyaukpyu is situated on Ramree Island, which is in the Bay of Bengal. This area is of immense importance to India, considering it as the centre of its strategic influence. With the development of a deep seaport funded by China, this influence will be challenged. Along with that, it will also increase the balance of power towards China by expanding its power in the region, extending its goal further of taking forward the BRI project. China has significantly upgraded the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, opening a joint logistics and training centre at the facility in April 2025. The extensive Chinese-funded expansion includes a new deep-water pier capable of handling large warships and a dry dock, raising concerns about exclusive Chinese military maritime access and the base's strategic importance in the region. The Ream naval base is located on the Gulf of Thailand. Kyaukpyu would then become an important part of BRI, complementing Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Djibouti (Horn of Africa), among others, completing China’s strategic strings of pearls.

Since this project will also bypass the Malacca Strait, it will allow China to diversify its energy routes and reduce its strategic dependence on other countries. This is because over 80 per cent of China's crude oil imports traverse the Malacca Strait, which can become a vulnerable chokepoint because of any crisis in the United States or its allies. With the plan to build a railway line connecting this town to Mandalay and Yunnan, along with the 770 kilometres oil pipeline from Kyaukpyu to Yunnan and the natural gas pipeline already developed in 2013, this vulnerability will be overcome, giving a much favourable position to an already strong China.

The China-Myanmar Bilateral Relations:

With the land border between China and Myanmar being approximately 2100 kilometres and a direct link to the Bay of Bengal, it becomes uniquely attractive for China to build a relationship with Myanmar, providing it a natural bridge to the Indian Ocean. For Myanmar, which is facing sanctions and isolation globally since the 2021 coup, China emerges as a default partner and a major investor over which it can superficially rely and depend. China has shrewdly engaged and funded all actors in Myanmar, including the former government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and various rebel armies.  This is pushing the Myanmar junta closer towards Beijing, and the development of Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port presents a win-win situation for both countries.

Additionally, this port has the potential to become a dual-use civilian-military naval base in the future because of its geographical location, giving it proximity to India, tracking the Indian Navy movements, as well as helping in intelligence collection. Since China has also followed the same pattern in other of its development plans, such as the one in Djibouti (which eventually became a naval base) gives this potential military setup gives it a stronger support base, much to the concern of India.

Significantly, the development of the port has been planned in such a way that it will include a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), heavy cargo and large vessels carrying capacity, and transport corridors that will link the region’s coast to the inland trade hubs. All this shows that a multi-billion-dollar project is being planned by China because of the importance it attaches to the regional significance that Myanmar brings. The most important factor is the easy access to the Bay of Bengal region, eventually making China Myanmar’s top trading partner, surpassing other countries in all aspects, especially India.

Implications for India

India India-Myanmar land border is 1643 kilometres long. The Kyaukpyu project will be beneficial for China and Myanmar, but will create a lot of roadblocks for India. Currently, India is strengthening its Act East Policy by engaging with different countries, especially in Southeast Asia. But these connectivity ambitions of India have already started facing delays, thanks to this Chinese project. The Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) has already faced delays in progression because of the security challenges in Myanmar and the supply chain disruptions it faces. With the introduction of the Chinese presence, which is in a rapid developmental phase, the ability of India is in question, creating a developmental gap.

Traditionally, India has served as a net security provider for Myanmar. This ambitious project of China will give it a dominant position over India, challenging its traditional role. It will also give access to China to the regions of the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, which India has historically dominated. It may challenge the autonomy and restrict various activities that India has been conducting in these regions since the beginning.

Moreover, intelligence risks for India will increase because of increased Chinese presence, giving them direct access to track the naval assets, along with the ships and submarine movements, and also the missile testing ranges. Although currently this port has been framed as an economic hub, as evident from Hambantota and Gwadar Ports, this port could eventually turn into a military hub, fulfilling the strategic aims and requirements of China.

What can India do?

In today's global scenario, the aims and ambitions of one country cannot be stopped by another but can be altered and restricted. India can follow the same policy, where it can restrict China's growing advancements and follow a secure strategic policy. The most important thing is to strengthen the ties with Myanmar, which is on the verge of breakdown, thanks to China. Because of the 2021 coup, the civil situation of Myanmar is not in a good state. India can expand the developmental and economic assistance that it has already provided. It can also engage militarily by conducting bilateral exercises with the defence forces. Community programs and civil engagement can also be promoted, and since India shares a border with the Northeast, cooperation over border security measures can also help in taking forward the relationship.

Additionally, India can fast-track the long-pending Kaladan project. Connectivity to Sittwe can be improved, and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway can be operationalised at the earliest. The Act East Policy of India should continue with a strong vigour, counterbalancing China's growing influence. Apart from that, naval deployments in the Bay of Bengal region can be increased, and maritime awareness can be enhanced to brace for Chinese actions. India can also engage with regional and global platforms such as BIMSTEC, ASEAN, or the United Nations (UN), where it can build relations and discuss shared problems, which will eventually give it a strong position regionally and globally.

Conclusions

For China, the development of Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port is more than just another infrastructure project; it is Beijing’s push to gain access to the Indian Ocean and strengthen its position in South Asia. Since China and India are in constant competition and at loggerheads, this will give a forward push to China in the face of India. Myanmar needs investment, which will be provided by China; in the process, it will risk increasing the probability of overdependence on China.

India, on the other hand, will face a plethora of challenges, be it maritime competition or the risk of future military warfare or intelligence risk or losing its global position. Therefore, to counter this movement by China, India needs to combine diplomacy, strategy, defence preparedness, and partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.

For Kyaukpyu is not just another port; it is a crucial challenge for India to maintain the strategic balance and uphold stability in the Bay of Bengal region.

Recommendations

Deeper engagement with the ruling military junta in Myanmar and its successor government is essential, despite opposition from the US and Western democracies. India must continue to provide developmental, economic, and military aid and preferential trade benefits to Myanmar, similar to its engagement with the Taliban 2.0 government in Afghanistan. India must manage its own neighbourhood and restrain extra-regional powers from exerting strategic veto and influence in its near abroad. India should align with other Asian powers like Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia in engaging Myanmar, despite its democratic record. Joint developmental projects co-financed by Japan and India in Myanmar are crucial to prevent total Chinese dominance of this small Asian neighbour.

References

Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean. (n.d.). CSIS | Centre for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/kyaukpyu-connecting-china-indian-ocean

'String of pearls': How China-made Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar threatens India's nuclear attack submarine base. (2024, January 8). Firstpost. https://www.firstpost.com/world/string-of-pearls-how-china-made-kyaukphyu-port-in-myanmar-threatens-indias-nuclear-attack-submarine-base-13588512.html

Zachary Fillingham. (n.d.). Backgrounder: Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu Port. Geopolitics News & Risk Analysis - Keep Pace with a Changing World. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-myanmars-kyaukpyu-port/