Dr. Reshmi kazi

Professor, Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia New Delhi; Director, Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Studies, CSA

India’s No First Use Policy: A Time Contested Commitment

By Prof Reshmi Kazi, Jamia Millia Islamia

December 2025

Introduction

In May 1998, India crossed the Nuclear Rubicon by conducting five nuclear weapon tests in Pohkran. Following the tests, the Indian national security advisor Brajesh Mishra released a draft report from the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on Indian Nuclear Doctrine on 17 August 1999. The draft report broadly outlined the rationale and intentions of India’s nuclear weapons emphasizing a “retaliation only” policy in para 2.3. Subsequently, in January 2003, the NSAB report was revised and operationalized by the Cabinet Committee on Security. The official nuclear doctrine while reiterating India’s earlier position, unambiguously mentioned acceptance of a ‘no first use’ posture in Para 2 (ii). Clearly the NFU policy constitutes a prominent attribute in both the documents. Other vital components of the now operationalised doctrine include minimum credible deterrence, second strike capability, massive retaliation and nuclear disarmament as its defining features. These guiding principles of the official nuclear doctrine reflect dynamism and play an influential role in determining nuclear stability in South Asia. Regardless of their importance, India’s nuclear doctrine and its variables have been sporadically debated and contested over time. Perhaps, the most controversial element of India’s nuclear doctrine remains the NFU commitment. The policy has often been relegated as a mere declaratory policy unlikely to affect an adversary’s behavior in a crisis situation. India’s NFU posture has been described as “not so much a strategic choice, but a cultural one. (1)” Expansionists have further downgraded the NFU guideline as practically “unenforceable” and advocated for its revision. Should India’s NFU policy be retained or revised?

What is the NFU policy?

India’s position on the use of nuclear weapons is deeply embedded on the understanding that these weapons constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the

international system. Mindful of this, the August 1999 draft report of the NSAB mentions the word “peace” five times in its Preamble text para 1 (1), (2), (4) and (5). The draft report emphasizes the fallacies of maintaining an offensive doctrine pertaining to the legitimate first use of nuclear weapons and its consequential threat to peace, stability and sovereignty of states. Alternatively, a no first use policy is a testament of restraint that structures expectations by transforming a tactical option into a strategically exceptional and responsible act. Among the existing nine nuclear armed states in the world, India and China are the only two countries that profess a NFU posture as the guiding principle of their strategic nuclear doctrine. This position is widely considered to be sui generis within the global nuclear landscape. Under the NFU commitment, India professes an absolute and unconditional pledge:

• not to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons first against nuclear weapon states

• not to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states

• Not to resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against countries that are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

India and No First Use Policy

India’s NFU pledge of non-use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-armed powers and non-nuclear states establishes a fundamental aspect of its nuclear doctrine. It is a manifestation of strategic confidence for increased stability particularly among adversarial nuclear capable powers. Prime Minister Vajpayee, in the official paper, Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy, echoed New Delhi’s “readiness to discuss an NFU agreement [with Pakistan] as also with other countries, bilaterally, or in a collective forum” (2). In August 1998, Vajpayee reiterated this commitment when he declared that India “will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Having stated that, there remains no basis for their use against countries which do not have nuclear weapons (3)”. The NFU approach explains that it is primarily a retaliation-based policy where India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike. India’s nuclear weapons thus have a sole purpose, which is to deter the use of nuclear weapons. However, should deterrence fail, India will retain the option of using nuclear weapons only for the purpose of inflicting a counter strike against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere. This will be undoubtedly in the form of massive retaliation. The possibility of inflicting unacceptable costs upon an adversary seeking misadventure would strengthen the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. The underlying objective of the NFU strategy is to promote crisis stability and propagate strategic restraint while ensuring national survival.

The Politics of No First Use debate

The NFU principle has generated enormous debate in both academic and strategic circles. The policy has been criticized from time to time on several grounds. In March 2011, senior opposition leader Jaswant Singh made a plea to re-examine the "antiquated" NFU policy. Citing concerns over long-term threats to India from Pakistan’s expanding nuclear arsenal under a fragile government primarily controlled by the military establishment and an expansionist China, Singh argued that India could not "sit in yesterday's policy". However, in response, the then External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna quelled these alarms stating that there would be no revision of the NFU policy by the Indian government. He reiterated India’s continued adherence to it. In 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party’s election manifesto of 2014 had indicated a revisit of the doctrine “to make it relevant to challenges of current times (4)”. The efficacy of the NFU was questioned on the ground that it holds little relevance as an effective strategic means against Pakistan. Further, cynics demerited the NFU to be merely a declaratory policy that is devoid of essential mandatory legitimacy and cannot be relied upon in realistic situations. Later, Indian Defence Ministers like Manohar Parikkar and Rajnath Singh have periodically made statements suggesting that India should not “bind” itself to the NFU or that any shift in the policy depended on “circumstances” (5). There have been strong suggestions that changing strategic dynamics demands that India enhances its own strategic ambiguity which is left in vacuum by the existing NFU policy. While the NFU is one of the core principles of India’s nuclear policy and espouses other doctrinal elements like minimum credible deterrence, second-strike capability and assured retaliation, these criticisms need wider discussion.

The politics of the NFU debate is not really about the policy on paper. Rather it is about power, credibility, and audience management. It is not just a moral window-dressing that can be overlooked as inconsistent and unreliable especially during crisis times. At the very outset, the NFU is a serious pledge to refrain from the use of inhumane weapons of mass destruction. It is a powerful signalling mechanism that conveys to the international audience, India’s intention, resolve and determination to not to initiate a nuclear use first. To its adversaries, it is an instrument of strategic restraint reassuring them that NFU posture lowers pressure in fast moving crisis like Kargil, Balakot and Operation Sindoor. To the domestic audience, NFU become associated with identity politics implying that we are not reckless, we are different from them. This perception underscores India’s doctrinal coherence while underpinning Indian model of assured retaliation but which is not necessarily warfighting. This is significant as India maintains asymmetric legitimacy even as it is the only nuclear armed state facing two nuclear adversaries while still maintaining restraint. Irrespective of this, NFU faces severe challenges to its absolute interpretation when the politics of strategic stability, changing strategic dynamics and deterrence needs pulls it in polar opposite directions.

Will India retain or revise its NFU policy?

The answer to this question lies in the assessment whether India’s external security environment has undergone any “radical change” in recent times for the Indian Government to contemplate the revision of its NFU posture. The optics on the strategic front remains the same with cross-border terrorism continuing from across the Line of Control and Pakistan is still expanding its nuclear stockpile. However, given its professed NFU posture that is premised upon an assured second strike retaliation, India’s own nuclear capability and stockpile is expected to multiply especially given the developments being made in its breeder technology, which will yield reactor-grade plutonium. Recently, India conducted the second successful test of India’s K4 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) from INS Arighat with a range of 3,500-km range covering Pakistan and also a large part of China. The K4 expectedly strengthens India's second-strike capabilities making its nuclear triad more credible. “Hence, any hypothetical calculations of Pakistan’s nuclear bombs should not be a determining factor for revising the NFU policy. (6)” It can be argued that the Pakistan Army under Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir pursues an India-centric military policy but that is not a new challenge for India. Also, noteworthy is that recently at the United Nations General Assembly, the civilian government in Pakistan headed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced that he is “ready for talks with India” (7). Arguably, business with Pakistan remains unchanged and has not significantly altered the strategic map for India to revise its NFU posture.

On the India-China front, the nuclear armed neighbours share a complex ties of cyclical pattern of extensive economic ties (albeit skewed in China’s favour) and deep-seated strategic distrust. Despite strained ties (2020 Galwan clashes), both nations have recently grown closer in the face of tumultuous economic shifts resulting from the impact of United States’ punitive tariff policy on the larger geoeconomic landscape. Presently, the two Asian giants are engaged in normalising “fractious relations” over the eastern Ladakh boundary conflict. This is an important prerequisite for stepping up the dialogue process for stable bilateral relations(8). On the nuclear issue, China does not accept India’s nuclear status and has not engaged in any constructive nuclear dialogue. Expectedly this status is not going to change in the near future. India, though having a stable deterrence is unable to match with China's rapid military modernisation. China’s expansionist approach has far-reaching consequences for restructuring security balance in Asia, which remains a direct strategic concern for India. Although, the self-declaratory policies may not have any impact on either India or China, bilateral discussions on NFU would certainly promote strategic stability and develop models of risk reduction particularly when both the nuclear armed states share borders.

In the final analyses, India’s no first use policy has been contested and withstood the test of time. In strategic terms, you cannot get deterrence for free. However, to project a deterrence capability that is premised upon a maximalist position will bear enormous financial, political, international and reputational costs. Relatively, a no first use policy envisages a less strenuous cost with significant benefits and hence cannot be ignored.

References

1 Raja Menon, “Just One Shark in the Deep Blue Ocean,” Outlook, August 10, 2009 at

https://www.outlookindia.com/opinion/just-one-shark-in-the-deep-blue-ocean-news-261048 (accessed on December 30, 2025).

2 “The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 4–5.

3 “India Evolves Nuclear Doctrine,” The Times of India, August 5, 1998.

4 “BJP Election Manifesto 2014,” at https://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf (accessed on December 30, 2025), p.39.

5 Sushant Singh, “Manohar Parrikar questions India’s no-first-use nuclear policy, adds ‘my thinking’,”
The Hindu, November 11, 2016 at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/manohar-parrikar-questions-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-adds-my-thinking-4369062/ (accessed on December 30, 2025). and “‘No First Use’ nuclear policy depends on circumstances: Rajnath Singh,” The Hindu, August 16, 2019 at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-first-use-nuclear-policy-depends-on-circumstances-rajnath-singh/article29109149.ece (accessed on December 30, 2025).

6 Reshmi Kazi, India’s No-First-Use Policy: A policy of restraint and responsibility, South Asian Voices, April 15, 2014 at

https://southasianvoices.org/indias-no-first-use-policy-a-policy-of-restraint-and-responsibility/ (accessed on December 30, 2025).

7 “Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif appeals for India talks in UNGA address, hails Trump role in mediation,” The Hindu, September 27, 2025 at https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistani-pm-appeals-for-india-talks-in-unga-address-hails-trump-role-in-mediation/article70099572.ece (accessed on December 30, 2025).

8 Transcript of Special Briefing by MEA on Prime Minister’s visit to China (August 31, 2025) Ministry of External Affairs, August 31, 2025 at https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl%2F40074 (accessed on December 30, 2025).

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