Dr. Walter K. Andersen

Just weeks after Jaishanker’s successful January 2025 visit to the US, Prime Minister Modi visited the US in February -- and Trump called Modi a “great friend” and the bilaterals addressed immigration (India agreed to take Indians unlawfully in the US), defense, education, and trade.  On trade, the two sides adopted something called Mission 500 – aiming for 500 billion dollars in bilateral trade by 2030.  This represented a significant growth from present 132 billion dollar bilateral trade, with India having a trade advantage of about 45 billion dollars.  Trump did make note of this Indian trade advantage and complained about what he said were barriers to US sales of its products, but virtually no one predicted that this would come to play such an important role in shaping the US-India relationship.  Rather, Trump on several occasions before and after the February meeting with Modi  referred to the Indian Prime Minister as a “great friend”.    Howard Lutnick, the very influential Secretary of Commerce, a few weeks later addressed the annual India Today Conclave and spoke of the great potential of improved Indo-US trade  ties, but there were hints even then of the US focusing on the tariff issue, arguing that countries that had significant trade surpluses with the US had them because of unusually high tariffs and other barriers on US products.  Added to the focus on this issue was growing US irritation over increase of Indian and Chinese purchases of oil that Russia has discounted to provide money for the war against Ukraine and to make up for loss of oil sales to countries that had imposed sanctions on Russia because of its invasion of Ukraine.

     So now we come to  the February 24, 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the impact of that on US Indian relations.  Russia(and nearly everyone else)  calculated that there would be a quick Russian victory and its replacement with a government in Ukraine friendly to Russian interests.  But there was no quick victory and Russia had to find a way to pay for the war – and increased sale of oil was one way out.  Both India and China import most of their oil needs and purchase of depreciated Russian oil is seen by both as advantageous, saving India about 2 - 3 dollars per barrel. India in 2025 replaced China as the largest recipient of Russian discounted oil.  Russia which once supplied only 3 percent of India’s imported oil now supplies some 40 percent, replacing Middle Eastern states as the major source of India’s imported oil.  About one third of that is purchased by the politically influential Ambani family refineries, which sells over half its  refined product abroad at a hefty profit.  One industry source notes that India has saved some 16 billion dollars so far  by purchasing discounted Russian oil. Trump and others charge that these increased Indian (and Chinese) purchases are  enabling Russia to sustain its fight against Ukraine.  The US imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on imports from India because of the oil purchases – and that is added to the initial 25 percent tariffs responding to perceived Indian barriers to US products. 

      Further irritating Trump is the Indian rejection of his taking credit for ending the flare-up between India and Pakistan in the wake of an April 22, 2025 attack on Indian tourists by Islamic militants in Kashmir.  Still another source of tensions has been India abstaining from all UN votes calling for a cease fire in the fighting in Ukraine and honoring traditional borders.  These differences rest, in my view, on a fundamental axiom in Indian foreign policy:  that outside bodies (like the UN or the US) should not interfere in domestic politics of a country for any reason (even for defense of democracy).   Added to this reluctance are some other factors against getting involved in issues relating to Ukraine are:  (1) traditional reliance on Russian arms;(2) Russian consistent backing of India in international forums (on such issues as Indian annexation of Sikkim); (3) as a hedge against Russia siding with Pakistan and/or China  against India.  Critics of the Indian stand of taking a public stand on Ukraine argue that Russia is in fact an outside actor impinging on the territorial integrity of Ukraine—and even threatening the independence  of Ukraine.  Putin has tried to address this issue by arguing that Ukraine has historically been part of Russia, that its Orthodox faith common to both countries had its origins in what is now Ukraine, and culturally both speak a closely related Slavic language – in short he has questioned the legitimacy of a separate Ukrainian state.  

     The current crisis in Ukraine has its roots in lack of any real resistance to the Russian annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, followed soon after by Russian support for efforts of Russian speaking minorities in eastern Ukraine to throw off Ukrainian rule – and join Russia.  But he misjudged the current situation on two counts: (1) Ukraine under its Jewish President Volodomyr Zelensky has put up a fight against Russian advances; (2) NATO countries in Europe have united to provide Ukraine financial assistance and arms --  and to draw closer militarily to each other and recently to the US.  

     On the key question of the impact on indo-US relation of continued Indian import of huge amounts of Russian oil, much will depend on whether Russia and Ukraine can negotiate a  resolution that ends the fighting – and that in turn will almost certainly require a willingness of both Russia and Ukraine to compromise. I am not optimistic about whether they are willing to do so. This crisis stands in the way of Trump’s view of himself as a peacemaker worthy of a Noble Peace Prize.  There is an Indian factor that is involved --  and that Indian involvement has an impact on US-Indian ties, including important issue of tariffs.  Tariffs have always had a political component and US tariffs will in part depend on nature of political relations between India and the US.