Dr. Arun Sahgal

State of Play

A situation obtains where US is finding it difficult to support its air campaign, with both the aircraft carriers, Gerald Ford and Abrham Lincoln have had to redeploy and its AD and communication resources taken a major hit. Israel, for the first time in any war is facing direct attacks, penetrating its famous Iron Dome and Arrow 3 interceptors. Interestingly even the NYT has acknowledged that despite US claimed destruction of 80—90% Iranian continues to not only launch attacks but precision targeting. Latest is the destruction of a US Air Force E-3 Sentry aircraft on a Saudi Arabia air base. Which as per analysts could undermine US abilities to spot incoming Iranian threats at distance, earlier in a similar strike two KC 135 refuelers were badly damaged injuring 20 plus personnel. Arab states are also suffering from Iranian incessant attacks that include, military and critical infrastructure, oil and energy installations, as also critical metal industries, on which region and US are dependent. The most critical element of war which has entered its second month is closure of Hormuz Strait and Iranian control, its selective release of oil and gas tankers belonging to what it calls friendly countries and denial to US, other Western countries and its allies. This is causing havoc in energy market since 20% of global energy passes through these straits.

The reality of operational situation thus is that although the US and Israel have had impressive operational successes leveraging its advanced precision systems—the core political objective of regime change remains unmet, creating frustration and pressure for escalation. This brings to forth the issue, given the fact that Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, Iran remains in possession of 450Kg of 80% enriched uranium, will the prevailing politically sensitive and operationally difficult scenario force US President, who is under increasing political pressure for starting this war force him to deploy ground troops to force open the Straits.

Given the foregoing backdrop, the talk frames the conflict as a 30-day stalemate marked by horizontal escalation, strategic miscalculations, and competing objectives among the US, Iran, Israel, and Arab states. Going forward will be dictated by competing strategies and notions of victory and its strategic impact.

Competing Strategies

Strategic dominance in conflict is a function of escalation control vs escalation dominance. Ability to control escalation is more decisive than merely dominating the opponent by fire power and destruction. Calibrating response is about strategic flexibility i.e. is more options and flexible strategy. Victory does not go to the strongest but the one that has better strategy applied to advantage. Take the case of Iran, while being pounded by US-Israel coalition, has expanded the conflict horizontally, involving Arab states, indirectly restricting US basing options, and targeting critical infrastructure. It is fighting a calibrated, selective, asymmetric war, avoiding full escalation while imposing costs.

Seen in the above context, United States, Iran, Israel and Arab states have Divergent Strategic Objectives.

a. United States broad objectives are:

Neutralise Iran’s regional influence.

Secure its enriched uranium and destroy its processing capabilities.

Control oil flows and secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Force leadership change or at least weaken Iran enough to negotiate a ceasefire on favourable terms

 b. Iran’s objectives are

Reduce US influence in the region.

Assert dominance over the Strait of Hormuz as a major regional power.

Demand sanctions relief, security guarantees, and no missile caps.

An important unstated objective is to leverage proxies to contain growing Israeli influence and promotion of Palestine state.

 c. Israel

Seeks to weaken Iran militarily. Economically and militarily strong Iran is challenge to Israeli and regional security and must be contained militarily, together with US military power.

Acts as a potential spoiler in peace efforts, till such time its objectives are met.

 d. Arab States

Have sought security guarantees from US against Iranian hegemony and support to regional proxies deemed as destabilising influence. US inability to contain Iran is seen as a major strategic setback forcing revaluation of their options.

Strikes and destruction by Iran has led to economic and infrastructure disruptions, and possible evaporation of Arab dream

May consider revaluating their ties with United States as also Israel under Abrham Accord. Possibility of accommodation with Iran cannot be overlooked.

Obtaining Scenario

After 30 days the war is in a stalemate. Neither side has achieved decisive gains. US precision strikes continue, but Iran’s regime remains intact. As highlighted above, Iran has expanded the conflict horizontally by involving Arab states and restricting US access to regional bases. Isreal has expanded the conflict to Lebanon against Hizbollah, using the war to degrade their capabilities and create buffer in South Eastern Lebanon. War I Lebanon is not going fully according to plan; Israeli ground forces have suffered major losses. Entry of Houthi’s into conflict will lead to expansion of conflict zone impacting major oil and trade shipments from Suez Canal and Baba Mendel.

Preferred Strategic Options

The US present strategy is linear escalation: degrade infrastructure, target leadership and force compliance. It is following twin track policy of compellence through continuous strike and offers of off ramp, based on 15-point plan. Its biggest constraint is blockade of Strait of Hormuz and effective Iranian control; seen along with inability to bring about regime change as a double jeopardy.

US inability to force an acceptable settlement, for both its interests and equally those of Israel and Arab States that could force American boots on ground to force open the Strait, ensuring energy and other critical flows such as Naphtha, sulphur etc, critical for fertilisers.

Iran on the other hand in the face of coalition campaign is resorting to calibrated escalation, targeting critical infrastructure of Americans and allies selectively. It too has two-fold aim, survive coalition campaign with acceptable damage, without loosing control over the Strait, which is its major bargaining chip. There is realisation that blockade cannot be indefinite, sooner or later it will have to come to the negotiation table. Hence denials, as strong perception exists that points towards a deal, that would not insist on regime change but installation of less theocratic regime, amenable to regional actors.

Ground Assault

The final section evaluates the feasibility and risks of US ground operations, highlighting severe constraints: limited troop numbers, difficult terrain, Iranian defensive depth, and the risk of nuclear escalation.

Lecture highlighted that as a contingency planning US has mobilised nearly fifty thousand elite troops, comprising air borne division, marine expeditionary units, Delta forces, Seals and even specialised units that are directly under operational control of the President. This is backed by close air support assets such as A-10 taken out of mothballed, attack helicopters, long range artillery assets. There are reports of American can use air dropped cluster mines

Terrain Considerations

Area around the Strait on Iranian side features mix of cliffs and high grounds, overlooking channels and water strips. Areas around Bandar Abas comprise vertical cliffs, as an extension of Zagros Mountains. Terrain favours defender, elevated positions allowing long observations. Narrow shipping lanes, concentration of ships and tidal waves are other hazards.

Iranian Deployments

Iranians have been preparing for US invasion for some time. As highlighted by many analysts, Iran in preparation has developed, what can be called “anti-access and area denial” strategy, aimed at first denying access and subsequently manoeuvre. Towards this they have created large number of underground tunnels all along the Gulf. These have been prepared for firing medium range cruise missiles of 1000 Km range, backed by smart guidance (Chinese BeiDou3). These are further supported by drones and missiles.

Next element of defence is Midget submarines locally assembled and obtained from North Korea, these can fire both Torpedoes and short-range cruise missile. We also need to note is that Iranian military has not come into play in this standoff war. Amphibious assaults will be contested by both IRGC and military units.

Amphibious Operations

History of these operations highlight these are complex and difficult. Forces will have to manoeuvre narrow defensible and relatively shallow water environment. Given the preparations and going by month long operations, it can be surmised these will be high risk and costly operations, that could lead to large casualties. Exceptional casualties could force the US leadership to seek unexceptional solution that could touch or in the least threaten nuclear escalation as a worst-case scenario.

Strategic Dilemma

A ground offensive must produce a clear victory to avoid a Vietnam‑like loss of face. However, escalation risks are enormous. Large scale casualties or partial success that does not result in opening of Strait, will be seen more than military as a political failure. This can force a befuddled establishment to seek extreme option that could include the possibility of posturing or use of tactical nuclear weapons, an avoidable escalation, of untold consequences.

Possible Scenarios

In the prevailing situation three scenarios are feasible

1. Managed De-escalation

Economic consequences resulting in closure of Straits of Hormuz, growing anti-war political sentiment in US, pressure from Arab, NATO and Indo – Pacific force Trump administration gives into military advice making a quiet pullback. Trump declares the frozen conflict a victory, even though the structural damage remains: Iran retains strait control. leadership is more amenable, see’s in this opportunity to integrate Iran economy globally, making some concessions regionally

2. Regional Realignment

Gulf states and middle powers begin hedging by building ties with Iran. A new Iran - China – Russia axis emerges. Later powers while remaining invested regionally, attempt to induct Iran into broader regional economic, trade and development framework. US remains regionally committed but loses its status as the unquestioned regional power centre,

3. Full Spiral

Trump authorises ground operations. The 82nd Airborne and Marines invade. Iran activates proxies across the region, shuts the Strait of Hormuz, and oil spikes above $150. NATO allies refuse to join, fracturing the Atlantic alliance.

4. Nuclear Escalation Is the Ultimate Wildcard

Iran may consider tactical nuclear use if regime survival is threatened.The US must weigh whether a war weakens Iran or inadvertently strengthens its strategic influence

Conclusion

The Third Gulf War is stuck in a strategic stalemate. Ground operations are possible but deeply unattractive due to terrain, force limitations, Iranian asymmetric capabilities, and nuclear risks. The conflict’s trajectory will hinge on whether the US prioritises escalation control or is pushed—by frustration or Israeli pressure—into a high-risk ground campaign.

A very dangerous situation prevails