November 2026
Introduction
Britain is strained, and Scottish independence is back on the table. But the comparison with the Soviet collapse does not survive contact with the facts. Every few years, when Britain looks tired, the comparison comes back: the United Kingdom is a multinational state in decline, held together by habit and inertia, and one day it will come apart the way the Soviet Union did in 1991.
The analogy of comparsion is tempting. Growth is weak. Living costs are high. Government borrowing is expensive. Scottish nationalism, after a long period in office, keeps polling in territory that would have been unthinkable a generation ago. And, as in the late 1980s, there is a hostile power probing at the edges of the country's waters.
But an analogy is only useful if the underlying structures match. In this case they mostly do not. The UK is under real strain, and Scotland's constitutional future is a live question that deserves to be taken seriously. Yet the likeliest outcome over the next five to ten years is neither collapse nor, necessarily, a clean break. It is a continuation of an argument that the British system is well designed to absorb. This article sets out why, and then looks hard at the Scottish case, because that is where the real tests lie.
The arithmetic of the centre
Start with the simplest point: size. The Soviet Union was a union of fifteen republics in which Russia, though dominant, accounted for roughly half of the population. When the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia and the Central Asian republics began to press for sovereignty, the centre was being asked to lose enormous parts of its economy, its industry and its resource base, and the departure of any one republic raised questions about the rest. Moscow's authority was a bargain among republics, and once it started to unravel, there was no stable resting place.
The United Kingdom is built differently. England holds about 84 per cent of the UK's population. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland together make up the remaining sixth or so. No breakaway region can drain the centre the way the republics drained the USSR. If Scotland left, the rump UK would be smaller, poorer in some respects and diplomatically awkward, but it would remain a large, coherent, wealthy state with its capital, its financial centre, its central bank, its seat on the UN Security Council and the great majority of its people and taxpayers intact.
That asymmetry cuts in two directions. It means England does not depend on the others for its viability, which lowers the stakes of any one departure for the UK as a whole. But it also means the kind of cascade seen in 1991, where each exit made the next more likely and the centre more fragile, has no obvious mechanism here. Wales has no comparable independence movement. Northern Ireland's constitutional question runs on its own track, governed by the Good Friday Agreement and a distinct demographic and political dynamic. Scotland is a case on its own, not the first domino.
The economy: strained, not bankrupt
The Soviet Union did not fall merely because it was unpopular. It fell because a command economy had stopped delivering, because it was running out of hard currency and credibility, and because its political system offered no peaceful way to correct course. By the end, it could not feed its cities reliably, could not borrow on tolerable terms, and could not hold its currency together.
The British economy has plenty of problems. Growth has been weak for years. Living costs are high and the squeeze on household budgets has been politically corrosive. The government's borrowing costs are elevated, which limits what any chancellor can do without spooking markets. These are real and serious issues, and nothing in this article should be read as complacency about them.
But they are the problems of a mature market economy, not a collapsing one. The UK has one of the deepest financial systems in the world. It has an independent central bank that sets interest rates free from day-to-day political instruction. It has a floating currency, which means that when confidence falls, the pound adjusts rather than the government being forced into a rigid defence of an exchange rate it cannot afford. It borrows in its own currency, in deep and liquid markets. Painful episodes, such as the market turmoil after the 2022 mini-budget, show that markets discipline British governments quickly. They also show that the system is capable of absorbing a shock, correcting, and carrying on.
This is the crucial difference. A weak economy under a flexible, institutionally robust framework produces austerity, political arguments and changes of government. A weak economy under a rigid, closed framework produces a legitimacy crisis.
Politics: the pressure valve
The Soviet Union was a one-party state with a command economy. There was no legitimate channel through which discontent could be expressed and converted into change. Dissatisfaction accumulated, and when reform finally came under Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika loosened the controls without replacing them with institutions able to manage the pressures released. Nationalism, long suppressed, became the main vehicle for grievance, and the system had no way to channel it other than coercion, which it increasingly lacked the will to use.
The UK is a multi-party democracy with a market economy. Discontent here normally goes through elections and changes of government rather than building up until the system breaks. Voters angry at one party can punish it and elect another. Insurgent parties, from the SNP to Reform UK, can win seats, shape the agenda and even change the direction of the major parties. Referendums can be, and have been, held. A government that loses the confidence of the public can be removed without a single shot being fired.
That is not a guarantee of stability. Democracies can be badly governed, polarised and slow to deliver. But the ability to absorb anger through ordinary politics is a structural feature that the USSR lacked entirely, and it matters enormously for the question of whether strains accumulate to breaking point.
There is a second, more specific point. Scotland is not being held in the Union by force or by a veto. The 2014 referendum was agreed by both governments, campaigned on fiercely and settled by a vote, with 55 per cent choosing to remain. The debate since has been over whether and when another vote should take place and on what terms, not over whether Scots may ever decide. A union that is held together by consent, even grudging consent, is a different thing from an empire held together by an apparatus of control.
Scotland: a divided country, not a settled trend
None of this means Scotland's question has gone away. It has not. Independence remains the central cleavage in Scottish politics, and the SNP has governed in Edinburgh for well over a decade.
What do the polls say? One recent survey put support for independence at 54 per cent. That is striking, but it should be read with care. It came from a firm that tends to be less favourable to Yes than some others, which makes the result more notable, not less. Yet a Survation poll conducted in the first half of November showed only a modest boost for independence, not enough to put Yes in the lead, and commentators noted that the next two or three polls would be crucial. Over the autumn, different pollsters have produced different pictures: some have shown Yes narrowly ahead, others have shown No ahead, and several have shown a country split almost evenly.
The honest reading is that Scotland is a divided country rather than one moving steadily in a single direction. A trend line would be a story of momentum. A cluster of results scattered either side of 50 per cent is a story of a deadlock, in which a large minority is firmly for independence, a large minority is firmly against, and a small number of undecided and shifting voters decide the margin. That is a very different political situation from the Baltic republics in 1990 or 1991, where majorities for sovereignty were overwhelming and the question was how, not whether.
The fiscal question
If independence is to be won and sustained, it has to be able to pay its way. And here the numbers pose a serious challenge.
The official figures, known as Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS), estimate that Scotland's notional net fiscal deficit in 2025-26 was £25.3 billion, or 10.9 per cent of GDP. For the UK as a whole, the comparable figure was 4.2 per cent of GDP. That is a gap of more than six percentage points, and it continues a long-running pattern.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, a respected and independent body, offers an important qualification about where the gap comes from. It is not that Scotland raises less revenue. On the contrary, revenue per head in Scotland is almost exactly the same as the UK average, once North Sea oil and gas and onshore activity are included. The difference is on the spending side. Spending for the benefit of Scotland, devolved and reserved combined, is about £2,720 higher per person than the UK average. The IFS also points out that this largely reflects decisions taken by the UK government, notably the relatively generous block grant, rather than mismanagement by the Scottish Government. And it stresses that, as things stand, the notional deficit has little direct bearing on the Scottish Government's own finances, because it is absorbed within the wider UK deficit.
That last point cuts both ways. For supporters of the Union, it shows the scale of the adjustment an independent Scotland would face: it would no longer be sharing the burden of borrowing with a much larger economy, and it would have to either raise taxes, cut spending, borrow more or some combination. For supporters of independence, it shows the deficit is a function of present arrangements and policy choices, not an immutable feature of the Scottish economy, and that a sovereign government could choose a different mix.
Whichever way one reads it, a starting deficit of around 11 per cent of GDP would be an extremely difficult inheritance. For comparison, a deficit of that size in a new state seeking to establish credibility with bond markets would likely mean expensive borrowing, tough early budgets, or both.
North Sea oil: not a safety net
The traditional nationalist answer to the fiscal question has been oil. In 2014, the case rested heavily on North Sea revenues, and the subsequent collapse in oil prices did much damage to that argument.
The trend is still down. North Sea revenue has fallen from almost £5.5 billion in 2023-24 to some £3.9 billion in 2025-26. Production is declining as fields mature, and the long-term policy direction, in both Edinburgh and Westminster, is toward the energy transition. Economists broadly agree that oil and gas is not a safe long-term foundation for an independent country's budget. Revenues are volatile, subject to global price swings, and finite.
The figures show how much it matters. Strip North Sea revenue out of the picture and Scotland's deficit would be about 12.9 per cent of GDP rather than 10.9 per cent. So oil is not the explanation for the gap, and it is not the cure either. A two-percentage-point improvement is useful, but it is a modest cushion against a structural shortfall, and it is shrinking.
That does not mean Scotland lacks a future in energy. Offshore wind, hydrogen, carbon capture and the wider green transition are real opportunities, and Scotland has natural advantages. But these are long-term investment stories, not near-term fiscal fixes, and they would also, in large part, be bound up in cross-border grids and markets that an independence settlement would have to preserve.
Trade, borders and the currency
The other great constraint is the market that Scotland already trades in. Trade with the rest of the UK accounts for about 65 per cent of Scottish exports. That is far more than Scotland sells to the EU and the rest of the world combined. Any change that raises the cost of doing business across the border would therefore hit Scotland's economy harder than England's.
The risks include border frictions, regulatory divergence, tax differences and, above all, a different currency. If Scotland adopted its own currency, businesses and households would face exchange-rate risk on most of their trade. If it kept sterling without agreement, it would have no say over monetary policy and no lender of last resort. If it joined the euro, it would be tied to a monetary system in which it had little influence and would need to meet convergence criteria it does not currently satisfy. None of these paths is impossible, but each carries costs, and none is as straightforward as the 2014 prospectus tended to suggest.
The scale of what is at stake has been modelled. One study found that Scottish GDP could be hit by as much as 5.5 per cent if the border with England became as restrictive as the one between Ireland and the UK. Estimates vary and depend on assumptions, particularly about whether an independent Scotland rejoined the EU and whether it did so on terms that left trade with England frictionless. But even the more optimistic projections recognise that leaving a market that takes two-thirds of your exports is a very large decision.
The contrast with the USSR is again instructive. When the Soviet republics left, they were leaving a failed system with a failing currency. Scotland would be leaving a functioning, if frustrating, market and monetary union, one that works well enough that most of its businesses depend on it.
The security dimension
There is one more factor that sets the present moment apart from earlier rounds of the debate: the security environment.
Russian naval vessels and long-range bomber aircraft have been operating in and around the North Sea and the waters to Britain's north. The Royal Navy and the RAF track them routinely, and RAF fighters based in Scotland are regularly scrambled to intercept aircraft approaching UK airspace. This is not an abstract concern: the seas between Scotland, Iceland and Norway form a strategic gateway to the Atlantic. The undersea cables and pipelines that carry Britain's data and energy lie beneath those waters, as do the approaches used by submarines.
If Scotland left the UK, it would take on responsibility for defending a long coastline, a vast maritime zone and critical energy infrastructure, as well as the question of its relationship with NATO. The leading independence parties have said they would seek to join NATO, which means meeting alliance expectations on defence spending. NATO members have recently agreed to move toward much higher targets, and a new state would be expected to demonstrate it was a serious contributor, not a free rider.
That is expensive. Building an independent navy, air force, intelligence service and cyber capability from a standing start would take years and a great deal of money. There are also questions about bases, the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent at Faslane and the division of existing military assets, all of which would be intensely contentious in any separation negotiation.
This matters for the fiscal argument. An independent Scotland would begin with a notional deficit of around 11 per cent of GDP, falling oil revenue, and pressure on its trade. To that would be added a defence bill that does not exist in the same form today because it is currently met by the UK as a whole. A burgeoning revenue deficit and rising defence outlay are not a comfortable combination, particularly when a hostile power is active on the doorstep.
The same logic works in reverse for the rest of the UK. The loss of Scottish bases and waters would complicate British defence planning, and no government in London would be relaxed about the status of the nuclear submarine base. That would harden positions in any negotiation, not soften them. It is another reason why separation, if it ever came, would be neither quick nor tidy.
What the USSR comparison gets wrong.
Pulling these threads together, the Soviet analogy fails on at least five counts.
First, demography and weight. The Soviet centre was one among fifteen, and Russia's dominance was far from overwhelming. England dominates the UK to a degree that makes cascade effects implausible.
Second, the economic system. A command economy that could not deliver is a very different animal from a market economy with weak growth. The UK's problems are of productivity, investment and cost of living, not of a system that has run out of ways to function.
Third, the political system. A one-party state without legitimate ways to express discontent is different from a multi-party democracy in which discontent finds outlets at the ballot box. This is arguably the most important difference of all.
Fourth, the institutional framework. An independent central bank, a floating currency and deep capital markets give the UK tools for managing crises that the USSR did not have.
Fifth, the nature of the separatist question. Scottish independence has been put to a democratic vote before, may be put again, and would be settled by a negotiation and a referendum rather than by a sudden collapse in central authority.
The UK may change. It could, over time, become a looser or smaller union. But that is not the same as disintegrating. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in a few months, in the wake of a failed coup. A UK constitutional change, should it come, would be a drawn-out and contested process.
The case on the other side
It would be wrong to present this analysis as the last word, because there are serious counter-arguments that deserve to be stated in their strongest form.
Supporters of independence argue that the GERS figures are notional estimates built on contested allocation rules. Costs such as defence, debt interest and some infrastructure are attributed to Scotland on a per-head basis, whether or not Scotland would have chosen to incur them, and they say a sovereign Scotland could make different decisions about spending priorities. They also point out that the IFS itself says the deficit is largely a function of UK policy choices, not Scottish ones. They contend that small, wealthy European states such as Denmark, Norway, Ireland and the Netherlands manage perfectly well, and that Scotland's resources, particularly in renewable energy, give it an economic base comparable to theirs.
They also argue that the Union is not delivering for Scots: that Brexit was imposed against the wishes of most Scottish voters, that Westminster governments Scotland did not vote for keep being formed, and that the ability to rejoin the EU and set its own economic course would more than offset the transition costs. And they note that the 2014 decision was made on the understanding that the UK would remain in the EU, a premise that no longer holds.
There is also a possibility that this article underplays. Democracies do break up peacefully. Czechoslovakia divided without violence in 1993, and Norway left its union with Sweden in 1905. A system that allows for orderly exit might be more likely to see exits happen, not less. A divided Scotland today can become a Yes-leaning Scotland if the UK government is unpopular, if the economy worsens, or if a particular political event shifts opinion. A sudden change in Scottish opinion would not look like the Soviet pattern, but it could still be decisive.
The response from Union supporters is that these claims understate the transition risks, that the fiscal gap is a real constraint, that trade with England is too important to disrupt, and that the security environment makes this a poor moment for experiment.
Both sides can marshal evidence. What neither side can claim, at present, is a settled majority.
Conclusion: a long argument, not a collapse
So is the UK likely to go the way of the USSR in the next five to ten years? On the evidence, no.
The country is not facing the sort of simultaneous economic, political and institutional failure that brought down the Soviet state. Its largest nation holds around 84 per cent of the population and is not seeking to leave. Its economy is weak but sits on top of a deep financial system, an independent central bank and a floating currency. Its politics, whatever their faults, channel anger through elections and changes of government. And the one part of the Union with a serious independence movement is evenly divided, faces a very large notional deficit, relies on England for two-thirds of its exports, and would need to find substantial new money for its own defence at a time when Russian ships and bombers are active in the North Sea.
That does not mean Scotland will never leave. It means that if it does, it will be through a deliberate, negotiated and contested process, decided by voters who weigh up the costs, and not through a sudden implosion. The Union's strength is not that it is immune to challenge but that it has a peaceful means of handling the challenge. The relevant historical comparison is not 1991. It is the ordinary, unfinished business of a democracy deciding what kind of country it wants to be.
Poll results vary by pollster and date and should be checked against the latest releases before publication.